Augustine in His Own Words
Against the Manichees 221 to Manichean views. In that same passage, Augustine insisted that one must first answer the metaphysical question "What is evil?" He did go on to confront the question where evil comes from in his philosophical dialogue On Free Will (De libero arbitrio). Its opening book dates from the same period as On the Catholic and the Manichean Ways of Life, namely, his stint in Rome (387–388) soon after his baptism. His dialogue partner is presumed to be Evodius, a friend of his who later became bishop of Uzalis (though the key manuscripts lack the name).27 The following passage from the work's opening sets out key initial distinctions. From On Free Will, Book 1:
(1.1) Evodius. Tell me, is God not [ultimately] the author of evil? Augustine. I will tell you if you make it clear what kind of evil you are inquiring about. For we usually speak of evil in two ways: first, when we say that someone has done evil; second, when someone has suffered something evil.
Ev. I am eager to know about both kinds. Aug. But if you know (or take it on faith) that God is good—and it would be irreligious to think differently—then He does no evil. Again, if we acknowledge that God is just—and to deny this would be sacrilegious—then just as He bestows rewards upon the good, so He metes out punishments to the wicked. Such punishments seem, of course, to be evil to those who suffer them. Accordingly, if no one suffers penalties unjustly—and this we must believe since we believe that the universe is ruled by Divine Providence—God is not at all the cause of the first kind of evil, though He is of the second.
Ev. Is there not, therefore, some other author of that evil which we have found cannot be God?
Aug. There certainly is, for without an author, evil could not happen. But if you ask me who that author is, no [one] answer is possible, for it is no one person but rather each evil person who is the author of his or her own misdeeds. If you have any doubt of this, take note of our earlier remark that evil deeds are punished by God's justice. For unless they were committed voluntarily, their punishment would not be just.28
27. Printed editions ever since the Maurists' 17th-century edition have designated De libero arbitrio's two characters as "Evodius" and "Augustine," even though there is not good evidence in surviving manuscripts. In ep. 162.2, Augustine mentions to Evodius that this work was one that "I composed when you were in conversation and discussion with me." On that basis, presumably, most scholars accept the Maurist decision to insert Evodius's name. But an examination of surviving manuscripts and a recognition of ancient ways of designating dialogues open up alternative readings. On this issue, see Simon Harrison, Augustine's Way into the Will: The Theological and Philosophical Significance of De Libero Arbitrio, OECS (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 31–50.
28. De libero arbitrio 1.1.1 (CCL 29:211); trans. Russell, FOTC 59:72–73. The role of the will as the source of evil would become a central point of contention in the later Pelagian controversy. In fact, Pelagius himself would quote from this treatise of Augustine, and Augustine would feel compelled to defend this work at length; see retr. 1.9 [8]. See Chapter 10.