Augustine in His Own Words (continued)
The Philosopher 47
(5.11) The Academics held, first, that a person could not have certain knowledge concerning things which had to do with philosophy (indeed, Carneades used to say that he did not care about anything else); and, second, that a person can nevertheless be wise and that the role of the wise (as was minutely discussed by you, [Alypius], as well as by Licentius, in our earlier discussion) consists entirely in a diligent search for truth. As a result, the wise give assent to nothing at all, for if one were to give assent to things uncertain, one would inevitably fall into error—something seen as criminal for the wise. The Academics not only claimed that all things are uncertain, but they also reinforced that claim by a huge supply of arguments. Now, as for their view that truth cannot be comprehended, they seemed to have seized on the definition of Zeno the Stoic,28 who said that truth could be perceived as that which so impressed itself on the mind from what it came from that it could not be impressed from anything other than what it came from. This can be said more clearly and briefly: truth can be perceived by those signs which cannot be present in what is false. The Academics made strenuous efforts to establish the conviction that such a truth could not be found. Thus, in defense of their contention, the dissensions of philosophers, the illusions of the senses, [the experience of] dreams and delirium, pseudo-arguments and sophistries were vigorously set out. And because they had it from the same Zeno that nothing is more disgraceful than to indulge in opinions, they very cleverly concluded that if nothing can be known and if mere opinion is really disgraceful, then the wise ought never to accept anything as certain.
(5.12) For this reason, a great deal of animosity was aroused against them. It seemed to follow as a logical consequence that the one who would accept nothing as certain would thus do nothing. Because the Academics believed that their wise man accepted nothing as certain, they seemed to describe him as sleeping all the time and shirking all his duties. So they brought forward the idea of a certain "probability," what they termed "truth-like," and maintained that the wise never neglect duties since they have something to guide them. The truth, however, lies hidden, buried, or confused either by some sort of darkness within nature or by the misleading similarity of things. Moreover, they claimed that the very act of withholding or, as it were, curbing assent was a great exploit on the part of the wise. Now, I believe, I have expounded their whole system briefly, as you wished, and I have not fallen short of your injunction, Alypius—that is, I have acted with good faith, as they say.29
28. "Zeno the Stoic": Zeno of Citium (c. 334–262 b.c.e.), founder of the Stoic school of philosophy. See Brad Inwood, ed., The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); N. Joseph Torchia, "Stoics, Stoicism," AugEncy, 816–20.
29. C. Acad. 2.5.11–5.12 (CCL 29:24–25); my trans., based on Kavanagh, FOTC 5:145–47. This passage draws on and summarizes Cicero, Academica, 2.6.16–34.111.