59. For a gathering of the fragments of Pelagius's De natura, see PL 48:598–606. (continued)
Against the Pelagians 401 been sinners. He declares what they have been, not that they could not have been otherwise. Therefore, even if all human beings could be proved to be sinners, that would not in any way prejudice our position, since we insist not so much on what human beings are as on what they are able to be. (43.50) God, being as good as He is just, created human beings with sufficient ability to be without the evil of sin—if only they had been willing. . . . Natural ability does not come from will. . . .
(44.52) But what disturbs many people, you will say, is that I do not maintain that it is by the grace of God that a person can be without sin. . . . O blindness of ignorance, O listlessness of an inexperienced mind, to suppose that I defend without the grace of God what one hears should be attributed only to God. (45.53) But when it is said that this very ability does not come from human choice but from nature, from the author of nature, namely, God, is there any way that what is considered to belong to God particularly can be regarded as without God's grace? . . . We affirm then that the possibility of anything lies not so much in the power of the human choice as in the necessity of nature . . . For instance, I can speak. That I can speak is not up to me, but that I do speak is up to me, that is, it is due to my own will. And because choosing to speak is up to me, I can do either, that is, either speak or not speak. But because the fact that I am able to speak is not up to me, that is, does not belong to my choice and will, it is necessary that I always be able to speak. And even if I wished that I could not speak, still, I cannot become unable to speak unless I were to remove the organ by which I carry out the task of speaking. . . . (49.57) Because not sinning is up to us, we can either sin or not sin.60
(ii) Imitating the Original Sinner
Pelagius, given his moral rigorism, was outraged by those who blamed the sin of Adam for human sinfulness. He insisted that we do not inherit original sin; we imitate the original sinner. From Pelagius, On Nature, as quoted in Augustine, On Nature and Grace:
(9.10) [A human being] is not damned just because it is said, "All have sinned in Adam." One is damned not because of sin contracted in the origin of one's birth, but rather because of an imitation of Adam.61 If one was as one was because one could not have been otherwise, then one would have to be free of blame. . . . (19.21) First,
60. Quoted in Nat. et gr. 7.8–49.57 (BA 21:254–350); trans. Mourant and Collinge, FOTC 86:27–64 (modified). Here Pelagius uses the example of speaking to distinguish between the ability (posse), which comes from God, and the willing (velle), which comes from us. In Book 3 of On Free Choice (Pro libero arbitrio), as preserved in Augustine's gr. et pecc. or. 1.3.3–5.6, Pelagius uses a similar example of seeing.
61. "Imitation of Adam": Pelagius, In Romanos, commenting on Romans 5:12 ("Through one man, sin came into the world, and through sin death"), tersely notes: "By example or by pattern. . . . As long as they sin the same, they likewise die" (trans. DeBruyn, Pelagius's Commentary, 92–93). See Augustine's very different reading of this text below.