19. Conf. 5.10.19–10.20 (CCL 27:68–69); trans. Bourke, FOTC 21:120–22. (continued)
Against the Manichees 213 man mind—so lively, so wise, so perceptive—I did not think that the truth lay hidden, only that the way to search for it did, and that the approach to it would have to be taken on the basis of some divine authority. It remained to figure out what that authority was, since there was a great cacophony of voices, and every one promised that he could deliver it. I, therefore, ran up against this impenetrable forest, which was frustrating to be stuck in for so long a time. And in the middle of this, without any respite, my mind was driven by a passionate desire once more to find the truth. I kept turning more and more away from those I was determined to get away from. In such serious dangers there remained no other alternative than to beg the help of Divine Providence with tears and anguished cries, and this I did without ceasing. And now some arguments of the Bishop of Milan moved me to wish to explore, not without some hope, into many matters concerning the Old Testament itself, which, as you know, we used to invoke curses on since it had been misrepresented to us. And I also decided to be a catechumen in the Church that my parents had committed me to until I should either find what I wanted or convince myself that the search could not be made. Had there been anyone who at that time could teach me, he would have found me very ready and receptive. In this and similar ways let there be a care for your soul. Long have you also seen yourself moved, and if now you think you have been tormented long enough and you wish to put an end to sufferings of this kind, follow the path of Catholic teaching which has come down to us from the apostles through Christ Himself, and will continue on through the ages.22
Believe in Order to Understand
Manichean mockery of Christianity's demand for faith prompted Augustine on the far side of his conversion to meditate on the relationships among faith and reason and authority. To summarize his core position, he appealed to the Septuagint's rendering of Isaiah 7:9: "Unless you believe, you shall not understand." In the following passage, Augustine notes that belief is necessary not only for religious progress but even for secular society. First, he observes that our knowledge of history always depends on faith of sorts: trusting the historical documents we use to reconstruct our past. Here he points to a textbook example of Cicero. Second, he points out that we would not even know if our parents were really our parents without some degree of belief. From On the Advantage of Believing:
22. De utilitate credendi 1.2–8.20 (CSEL 25.1:4–25); my trans., based on Meagher, FOTC 4:392–417. On this, see Isabelle Bochet, "L'unité du De utilitate credendi d'Augustin," in Van Oort et al., Augustine and Manichaeism, 24–42.
(9.21) [Manichees] accuse the Catholic Church especially of commanding those who come to her to believe, whereas they boast that they do not impose the yoke of believing on their followers, but open up a fountain of teaching. "What should one say?" you ask. "Is that not more a side of theirs that deserves praise?" No, that's not the point. For they do this not because they are endowed with real strength, but to win over large numbers under the name of "reason." The human soul naturally enjoys such promises, but it fails to consider its powers or well-being and craves for the food of the healthy—food wrongly given to any but the strong—and quickly downs these deceivers' poison. One cannot rightly enter the path of true religion without submitting to a certain weight of authority about things that must first be believed, things that later, once one has performed well and proved worthy, one arrives at and perceives.
(9.22) Now perhaps you ask for some reasonable explanation of this issue that would convince you that you ought to be taught first by faith rather than by reason. This is easy to do, provided you stay fair-minded. But so as to do it in a helpful way, I want you to answer me as though I were questioning you. First of all, tell me why you think one should not believe. "Because," you say, "credulity—from which the credulous get their name—seems to me to be a fault. Otherwise, we would not be in the habit of using this term as a criticism. . . ." (10.23) You [also] say, "Let's see whether we should even believe in matters that have to do with religion. For even if we concede that it is one thing to believe and another thing to be credulous, it does not follow that there is no fault in believing in matters of religion." . . .
(11.25) Now, in other matters, if someone believes something, there is no fault in it provided one does not claim to understand what one does not know [for certain]. For example, I believe that wicked conspirators were once put to death thanks to Cicero's virtue, and yet I not only do not know this [historical fact]; I even know that there is no way in which I can know it. . . . For even if someone thinks he knows that fact that I mentioned about Cicero, although nothing prevents one from learning about it, the matter itself cannot be grasped as a matter of knowledge. Now, if one does not understand that there is a great difference between grasping something with certainty by the mind's reasoning—what we call "understanding"—and believing what has been profitably handed down by oral tradition or by books for later generations, then one certainly errs, and no error lacks some disgrace. Therefore, whatever we understand we owe to reason; whatever we believe we owe to authority; whatever we are opinionated about we owe to error. But everyone who understands also believes, and everyone who is opinionated believes as well. But not everyone who believes understands, and no one who is opinionated