3 On the Correspondence between Vocal and Mental Terms
On the Correspondence between Vocal and Mental Terms proposition 'Every white man is a man', neither 'man' nor 'white' is the subject; rather, the compound of the two,'white man', is the subject. The same holds in the case of the proposition 'The one running quickly is a man'; neither 'the one running' nor 'quickly' is the subject; it is the compound expression 'the one running quickly' that serves as subject.
Nor is it only a name in the nominative case that can be a term. Even in one of the oblique cases a name can be a term, for in those cases a name can be the subject or predicate of a proposition. Still, in an oblique case a name cannot be the subject with respect to just any verb. Thus, the Latin sentence
'Hominis videt asinum' is not well formed, although 'Hominis est asinus' is.
But the question of which verbs can and cannot take an oblique case as subject is one that belongs to grammar, the role of which is to deal with constructions of words.
3: On the Correspondence between Vocal and Mental Terms Now that we have exposed the various senses of 'term' we should continue our account of the divisions drawn among simple terms. There are, we have seen, three kinds of simple terms—spoken, written, and conceptual. In all three cases we can subdivide the notion of a term in similar ways. In the case of spoken and written language terms are either names, verbs, or other parts of speech (i.e., pronouns, participles, adverbs, conjunctions, prepositions); likewise, the intentions of the soul are either names, verbs, or other parts of speech
(i.e., pronouns, adverbs, conjunctions, prepositions). However, since there is no reason to postulate irrelevant elements among mental terms, one might wonder whether, among intentions, participles constitute a separate part of speech over and above verbs in the way that they do in spoken and written language; for the participle of any verb, with the appropriate form of 'to be', signifies precisely what the corresponding form of that verb byitself signifies. The multiplicity of synonymous expressions in no way enhances the significative power of language; whatever is signified by an expression is signified equally by its synonym. The point of the multiplicity at work in the case of synonymous terms is the embellishment of speech or something of that nature, so that the relevant multiplicity has no place at the conceptual level. But since the distinction which spoken language exhibits between verbs and their participial
On the Correspondence between Vocal and Mental Terms forms does not enable us to express anything we could not express without the distinction, there is no need to postulate mental participles to correspond to spoken participles. A similar doubt is possible in the case of pronouns.
Mental and spoken names, on the other hand, differ in that although all of the grammatical features of mental names belong to spoken names, the reverse is not true; whereas some grammatical features belong to both mental and spoken names, others are peculiar to spoken and written names (the grammatical features of these two kinds of names being always the same). Case and number belong to mental and spoken names alike. Thus, just as the spoken propositions 'Man is an animal' and 'Man is not the animals' have distinct predicates, one of which is singular and the other, plural, so it is with the corresponding mental propositions which the mind asserts before any word is uttered: the predicate of the one is singular; that of the other, plural. Further, the spoken propositions 'Man is man' and 'Man is not man's' have predicates which differ in case; the same holds true of the corresponding propositions in the mind.
On the other hand, gender and declension are grammatical features peculiar to spoken and written names. These features do not add to the significative poweroflanguage. Thus, it sometimes happens that two names are synonymous; and, nevertheless, they are of different genders or belong to different declensions. Consequently, it is not necessary to assign a corresponding multiplicity of grammatical forms to natural signs, for we can eliminate from mental names all of those grammatical features with respect to which spoken names can differ, while remaining synonymous. It is less clear whether the distinction between an adjective and its comparative and superlative forms is limited to conventional signs, but since there would be little profit in pursuing it I shall not deal with the issue. The notion of quality prompts a similar question. I shall consider it in another context.
The foregoing makes it clear that although sometimes the thing signified is such that merely by varying certain grammatical features (e.g., case, number, or degree of comparison), we can alter the truth-value of propositions, this never happens with gender or declension. Admittedly, in the interests of good grammar, we must frequently pay attention to the gender of a name. Thus, whereas the Latin sentence 'Homo est albus' is well-formed, 'Homo est alba' is not, the difference being traceable only to a difference in gender. But good grammar aside the gender and declension of the subject or predicate are irrelevant. On the other hand, to know whether a proposition is true or false one must attend to the number and case of the subject and predicate. Thus, while 'Man is an animal' is true, 'Man is the animals' is false. The same point holds in other cases.
Thus, while spoken and written names have some grammatical features of their own, they share others with mental words. The same is true in the case of verbs. Grammatical features that are common include mood, number, tense,
On the Correspondence between Vocal and Mental Terms voice, and person. In the case of mood this is clear, for distinct mental propositions correspond to the spoken propositions 'Socrates reads' and 'Would that Socrates read'. This is true also in the case of voice, for we must assign different mental propositions to the spoken propositions 'Socrates loves' and 'Socrates is loved'. Nevertheless, mental verbs exhibit only three voices, for the common and deponent verbs of spoken languages do not effect the significative power of language. Common verbs are equivalent to verbs in both the active and passive voice; whereas, deponents are equivalent to verbs in the middle or active voice; but, then, we need not attribute those grammatical forms to mental verbs. Number, however, is a grammatical feature that mental verbs exhibit, for different mental propositions correspond to the following: "You are reading' and 'You all are reading'. The same is true in the case of tense, for different mental propositions correspond to the spoken propositions: 'You are reading' and 'You have read'. The point also holds for person, for we must distinguish mental propositions in the case of "You read' and 'I read'.
That it should be necessary to postulate such things as mental names, adverbs, conjunctions, and prepositions is shown by the fact that to every spoken proposition there corresponds a mental proposition. Just as those parts of the spoken proposition which contribute to the significative power of language are distinct, so also are the corresponding elements in mental propositions. Therefore, since spoken names, verbs, adverbs, conjunctions, and prepositions are essential in generating all the diverse propositions and sentences making up spoken language
(for with only spoken names and verbs at our disposal, we would be unable to express all that we can express with the help of the additional parts of speech), distinct elements must likewise be necessary in the generation of mental propositions.
Grammatical features peculiar to spoken and written verbs include conjugation and figure, for sometimes it happens that verbs from different conjugations are synonymous; and similarly, with verbs that differ in figure.
The careful reader will have no difficulty in expanding the foregoing remarks to cover the remaining parts of speech and their grammatical features.
Nor should anyone be surprised that I speak of mental names and verbs. Let him first read Boethius' commentary on the De Jnterpretatione; he will find the same thing there.' However, when Aristotle defines both the name and the verb in terms of spoken words, he is using the terms 'name' and 'verb' in a narrower sense to cover only the spoken name and the spoken verb."