16 Against Scotus' Account of the Universal
Against Scotus' Account of the Universal substance is ever predicated of anything. Therefore, only an intention of the soul or a conventional sign is a universal; but | am not here using the term 'universal' for conventional signs, but only for signs that are universals by nature. That substance is not capable of functioning as predicate is clear; for if it were, it would follow that a proposition would be composed of particular substances; and, consequently, the subject would be in Rome and the predicate in England which is absurd.
Furthermore, propositions occur only in the mind, in speech, or in writing; therefore, their parts can exist only in the mind, in speech, and in writing.
Particular substances, however, cannot themselves exist in the mind, in speech, or in writing. Thus, no proposition can be composed of particular substances.
Propositions are, however, composed of universals; therefore, universals cannot conceivably be substances.
16: Against Scotus' Account of the Universal It may be clear to many that a universal is not a substance outside the mind which exists in, but is distinct from, particulars. Nevertheless, some want to claim that the universal is, in some way, outside the soul and in particulars; and while they do not want to say that a universal is really distinct from particulars, they say that it is formally distinct from particulars. Thus, they say that in Socrates there is human nature which is contracted to Socrates by an individual difference which is not really, but only formally, distinct from that nature. Thus, while there are not two things, one is not formally the other.
I do not find this view tenable:
First, in creatures there can never be any distinction outside the mind unless there are distinct things; if, therefore, there is any distinction between the nature and the difference, it is necessary that they really be distinct things. I prove my premise by the following syllogism: the nature is not formally distinct from itself; this individual difference is formally distinct from this nature; therefore, this individual difference is not this nature.
Again, the same entity is not both common and proper, but in their view the individual difference is proper and the universal is common; therefore, no universal is identical with an individual difference.
Again, opposites cannot be attributed to one and the same created thing, but common and proper are opposites; therefore, the same thing is not both
Against Scotus' Account of the Universal » common and proper. Nevertheless, that conclusion would follow if an individual difference and a common nature were the same thing.
Again, if a common nature were the same thing as an individual difference. there would be as many common natures as there are individual differences; and, consequently, none of those natures would be common, but each would be peculiar to the difference with which it is identical.
Again, whenever one thing is distinct from another it is distinguished from that thing either of and by itself or by some thing intrinsic to itself. Now, the humanity of Socrates is something different from the humanity of Plato; therefore, they are distinguished of and by themselves and not by differences that are added to them.
Again, according to Aristotle things differing in species also differ in number, but the nature of a man and the nature of a donkey differ in species of and by themselves; therefore, they are numerically distinguished of and by themselves; therefore, each of them is numerically one of and by itself.
Again, that which cannot belong to many cannot be predicated of many. but such a nature, if it really is the same thing as the individual difference, cannot belong to many since it cannot belong to any other particular. Thus, it cannot be predicable of many; but, then, it cannot be a universal.
Again, take an individual difference and the nature which it contracts.
Either the difference between these two things is greater or less than the difference between two particulars. It is not greater because they do not differ really; particulars, however, do differ really. But neither is it less because then they would admit of one and the same definition, since two particulars, can admit of the same definition. Consequently, if one of them is, by itself, one in number, the other will also be.
Again, either the nature is the individual difference or it is not. If it is the difference I argue as follows: this individual difference is proper and not common; this individual difference is this nature; therefore this nature is proper and not common, but that is what I set out to prove. Likewise, I argue as follows: the individual difference is not formally distinct from the individual difference: the individual difference is the nature; therefore, the nature is not formal.y distinct from the individual difference. But if it be said that the individual difference is not the nature, my point has been proved; for it follows that if the individual difference is not the nature, the individual difference is not really the nature; for from the opposite of the consequent follows the opposite of the antecedent. Thus, if it is true that the individual difference really is the nature, then the individual difference is the nature. The inference is valid. for from a determinable taken with its determination (where the determination does not detract from or diminish the determinable) one can infer the determinable taken by itself; but 'really' does not express a determination that detracts or Responses to Objections diminishes. Therefore, it follows that if the individual difference is really the nature, the individual difference is the nature.
Therefore, one should grant that in created things there is no such thing as a formal distinction. All things which are distinct in creatures are really distinct and, therefore, different things. In regard to creatures modes of argument like the following ought never be denied: this is A; this is B; therefore, B is A; and this is not A; this is B; therefore, B is not A. Likewise, one ought never deny that, as regards creatures, there are distinct things where contradictory notions hold. The only exception would be the case where contradictory notions hold true because of some syncategorematic element or similar determination, but in the same present case this is not so.
Therefore, we ought to say with the philosophers that in a particular substance there is nothing substantial except the particular form, the particular matter, or the composite of the two. And, therefore, no one ought to think that in Socrates there is a humanity or a human nature which is distinct from Socrates and to which there is added an individual difference which contracts that nature. The only thing in Socrates which can be construed as substantial is this particular matter, this particular form, or the composite of the two. And, therefore, every essence and quiddity and whatever belongs to substance, if it is really outside the soul, is just matter, form, or the composite of these or, following the doctrine of the Peripatetics, a separated and immaterial substance.
17: Responses to Objections The ability of a doctrine to handle objections is a sign of its truth. Consequently, I shall outline some objections against the foregoing and show how they can be met. Many men of no small authority hold that the universal is, in some sense, an entity outside the soul and belonging to the essence of particular substances. They bring forth arguments and authorities to show this:
(1) It is claimed that when things both really agree and really differ, there is something by which they agree and something else by which they differ.
But Socrates and Plato really agree and really differ; therefore, they must agree and differ with respect to different things. They agree with respect to humanity, matter, and form; therefore, they each include an entity over and above these things, an entity in terms of which they are distinguished. These additional entities are called individual differences.
Responses to Objections (2) Again, Socrates and Plato agree more than Socrates and a donkey; therefore, there is something in which Plato and Socrates agree but some thing in which Socrates and the donkey do not agree. However, Socrates and Plato do not agree in anything that is numerically one. Therefore, that in which they agree is not a particular; it must be something common.
(3) Again, in the tenth book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle says that in every genus there is some one thing that is first and the measure of all other things in that genus.' But no particular can be the measure of all other particulars in the same genus, for no particular can be the measure of all individuals of the same species; therefore, there is some thing over and above particulars.
(4) Again, every common notion belongs to the essence of what is subsumed under it; therefore, a universal belongs to the essence of substance. But non-substantiality is not a part of the essence of any substance; therefore, some universal must be a substance.
(5) Again, if no universal were a substance, then all universals would be accidents and, consequently, all the categories would be accidents. Thus, the category of substance would itself be an accident. Consequently, some accident would be more general than substance. Indeed, it would follow that one and the same thing would be more general than itself; for if universals are accidents, they must be placed in the genus of quality; and, consequently, the category of quality would be common to all the universals. Thus, it would be common to the universal which is itself the category of quality.
Other arguments and innumerable authorities are adduced in behalf of this view, but in the interests of brevity I shall not consider them now.I shall, however, refer to them in a number of places later in the book. To the objections raised I respond as follows:
Response to (1) To the first objection I grant that Socrates and Plato both really agree and really differ; they agree specifically and differ numerically. But I want to claim that it is in terms of the same thing that they agree specifically and differ numerically; and here I do not differ from those who distinguish between the common nature and the individual difference, for they are forced to say that it is in terms of the same thing that the individual difference is both really the same as and formally different from the nature. One might object here that the same thing cannot be the cause both of agreement and of the difference which is its opposite. While the claim is true. it is beside the point; for specific identity and numerical difference are not intrinsically opposed. It ought to be granted, therefore, that Socrates agrees specifically with Plato and differs numerically from him by one and the same thing.
Response to (2) In the same way the second argument fails. For it does not follow that if Socrates and Plato agree more than Socrates and the donkey, there is some one thing with respect to which they agree more. But it is sufficient they
Responses to Objections agree more of and by themselves. Thus, I say that Socrates agrees more with Plato in virtue of his intellective soul; and, similarly, that he agrees with Plato more than with the donkey with respect to his whole being. Thus, if we are to be accurate we should not say that Socrates and Plato agree in some one thing which is their essence; we should Say rather that they agree in several things, for they agree in their forms and in themselves taken as wholes.
Ofcourse, if by contradiction there was one nature in both of them, they would agree in that too; but one might as well say that if by contradiction God were frivolous, He would rule the world badly.
Response to (3) With regard to the third point one should say that although an individual may not be the measure of all the individuals of the same genus or the same lowest level Species, nonetheless, one and the same individual can be the measure ofindividuals from another genus or of many individuals from the same species. This is all that is needed to preserve Aristotle's view.
Response to (4) The response to the fourth objection is that, properly speaking, no universal belongs to the essence of any substance, for every universal is an intention of the soul or a conventional sign and nothing of either sort can belong to the essence of substance. Consequently, no genus nor any species nor any other universal belongs to the essence of any substance. But, Strictly speaking, it should be said that a universal expresses or indicates the nature of a substance; that is, it expresses the nature which is a substance. The Commentator makes this point in the seventh book of the Metaphysics, when he notes that although it is impossible that any universal belong to the essence of anything, universals do express the essence of things." Thus, all authorities who say that universals belong to the essence of substance or are in substance or are parts of substances should be interpreted as saying only that universals indicate, express, designate, and signify the essences of things.
But one might object along the following lines: common names like 'man' and 'animal' signify substantial entities but not particular entities. The items they signify are substantial; but if they were particular substances, the term
'man', for example, would signify all men and clearly it does not.
In response to this objection ] want to claim that common names signify only particulars. Thus, the name 'man' does not signify anything other than the thing which is a particular man. Consequently, the only substantial entity for which it can supposit is a particular man. Indeed, it ought to be granted that the name 'man' signifies indifferently all particular men, but it does not follow that the term 'man' is equivocal. The reason is that although it signifies several individuals equally, it signifies them all by one convention; and in signifying them it is subordinated to only one concept and not several. Thus, it can be predicated of them univocally.
Response to (5) With respect to the last objection it should be noted that ?
Aristotelis Opera, 198, verso, B.
Responses to Objections those who hold that intentions of the soul are qualities of the mind have to claim that all universals are accidents; nevertheless, not all universals are signs of accidents. On the contrary some are signs of substances only; they constitute the category of substance. Other universals constitute the other categories. Therefore, it should be granted that the category of substance is an accident, although it signifies substances and not accidents; and, consequently, it should be granted that some accident (i.e., the accident which is a sign only of substances) is, of itself, more general than substance. But this is not more perplexing than the claim that some word is a name of many substances.
But does not this imply that one and the same thing is more general than itself?
I think not, for in order that one thing be more general than another a distinction between them is required. Thus, although all universals are qualities, one can deny that all universals are per se less general than the common term
'quality'. The general term 'quality' is a quality; but this is not a case where one term is more or less general than another, for we are dealing here with just one term.
One might also object that since no one term is predicable of different categories, 'quality' cannot be common to different categories. But here we must ask whether the categories are being taken significatively or not. When the categories are not taken significatively, one and the same thing can be predicated of different categories. Thus, the propositon ' "Substance" is a quality' is true if the subject supposits materially or simply for an intention. In the same way ' "Quantity" is a quality' is true if 'quantity' does not stand significatively.
It is in this way that the same thing is predicated of different categories. In the same way the proposition ' "Substance" is a word' and ' "Quality" is a word' are both true provided the subjects are suppositing materially and not significatively.
Likewise, one might object that the notion of spiritual quality is more general than any category, for it is predicated of several different categories and no one category is predicated of all the categories. The correct response here is that the notion spiritual quality is not predicated of all the categories when these are taken significatively, but only when they are taken as signs. Thus, it does not follow that the notion of spiritual quality is more general than any category; for one term is more general than another if, when both are taken significatively, the first is predicated of more items than the second.
A similar difficulty arises with the name 'expression', for this name is one subsumed under the notion 'name'. 'Expression' is a name and not every name is the name 'expression'. Nonetheless, the name 'expression' is somehow more general than all names, more general even than the term 'name'; for every name is an expression, but not every expression is a name. Thus, it seems that the same thing is both more general and less general than some other thing. The diffi-