75 Problems With Expressions Like 'Begins' and 'Twice'
Problems With Expressions Like 'Begin' and 'Twice' be noted that the subject of an exceptive proposition always has this form of supposition. This is clear in 'Every man besides Socrates runs'. Here the term 'man' supposits confusedly and distributively but not mobily, for it is not possidle to descend to particulars while altering the original proposition only by substituting a singular term for the common term and the sign of universality. The following inference is not valid: every man except Socrates runs; therefore that man except Socrates runs; for the consequent is improper as will become clear later. Nonetheless, it should be noted that it is possible in some way to descend to all the relevant particulars, but not in the same way. One of the relevant propositions will be negative and all of the others, affirmative. Thus, the following inference is valid: every man except Socrates runs; therefore Socrates does not run and therefore, that man runs and that man runs and .
. (and so on for all the relevant particulars other than Socrates). It is the exceptive expression that is responsbile for this.
75: Problems With Expressions Like 'Begin' and 'Twice'
But there is a problem with propositions of the sort we considered earlier:
'Socrates ceases to be white', 'Socrates was twice at Rome', 'Socrates was black three times', and 'Socrates begins to be literate'. The question is, how do the predicates of these propositions supposit?
It is clear that they do not supposit determinately, for it is not possible to descend to a disjunctive proposition. Thus, the following is not valid:
Socrates begins to be literate; therefore, Socrates begins to be this or he begins to be that .
. (referring in turn to all the things for which the predicate supposits); for the antecedent can be true while each element in the consequent is false. It does not, then, supposit determinately.
Nor do they supposit confusedly and distributively, for the following is not valid: Socrates begins to be literate; therefore, Socrates begins to be this literate individual (where the reference is to Plato). Thus, we do not have confused and distributive supposition.
Nor do they supposit merely confusedly, for it is not possible to descend to particulars by way of a proposition with a disjunctive predicate. Thus, the following is not valid: Socrates begins to be literate; therefore, he begins to be this literate individual or that literate individual or .
Problems With Expressions Like 'Begin' and 'Twice' literate individuals). The reason the inference fails is that the antecedent can be true and the consequent false.
It can be said that the predicate-term in propositions of this sort (as well as that which follows the verb, adjective, or noun) has neither determinate supposition, nor merely confused supposition, nor confused and distributive supposition. It has a different form of supposition for which we have no name.
The relevant form of supposition agrees with merely confused supposition in that in both cases it is possible to ascend from a pronoun referring to any particular contained under a common term to the common term itself. Thus, it follows that if every man is this (where the reference is to some animal), every man is an animal. Likewise, it follows that if Socrates begins to be this (where the reference is to some literate individual), he begins to be literate.
But this form of supposition differs from merely confused supposition in that it is not possible here to descend to the disjunction of the proper names of the things for which the general term supposits. For it does not follow that if Socrates begins to be literate, he begins to be this or that or that or ..
. (where the reference is in turn to all literate individuals).
It differs from determinate supposition in that one cannot descend by means of a disjunctive proposition.
The reason why such terms have none of the aforesaid forms of supposition is as follows: the propositions containing such terms are equivalent to conjunctive propositions each composed of two or more propositions. These propositions have the same subject; nevertheless, at least one of them is affirmative and one negative so that one and the same term has different forms of supposition in these propositions. Consequently, these terms do not have any one of the normal forms of supposition in the proposition whose parts are the various exponential propositions. For example, 'Socrates begins to be white' is equivalent to the conjunction 'Socrates was previously not white and now for the first time is white:. In 'Socrates is white' the word
'white' supposits determinately; whereas, in 'Socrates was not white' it has, because of the preceding negation, confused and distributive supposition.
One might claim that a consequence of this analysis is that the subject in 'Only what is an animal is a man' would not have merely confused supposition. The point would be that since the proposition is equivalent to a conjunction of propositions, one of which is affirmative and the other negative, the subject would have a different form of supposition in each of the elements of the conjunction. The response is that in the exclusive affirmative proposition the subject has merely confused supposition, for although the exponents of that proposition have subjects with different forms of supposition, those subjects are not identical with the subject in the original exclu-