13 On Univocal and Equivocal Terms
On Univocal and Equivocal Terms when we say that 'man' is a name, 'donkey' is a name, and 'whiteness' is a name.
Now, just as names of second imposition conventionally signify names of first imposition, a second intention naturally signifies a first intention. And just as a name of first imposition signifies something other than names, first intentions signify things that are not themselves intentions.
Still, one could claim that in a strict sense, a second intention is an intention which signifies exclusively first intentions; whereas, in a broad sense a second intention can also be an intention signifying both intentions and conventional signs (if, indeed, there are any such intentions).
13: On Univocal and Equivocal Terms The next point to consider is the division of conventionally significant terms into those that are equivocal and those that are univocal. In the Categories, Aristotle examines denominative terms with equivocal and univocal terms;! but since we have already said a good deal about denominatives in preceding chapters, we shall discuss only univocal and equivocal terms.
First, it should be noted that only words—conventional signs—can be univocal or equivocal. Properly speaking, the distinction does not apply to intentions or concepts.
A word is equivocal if, in signifying different things, it is a sign subordinated to several rather than one concept or intention of the soul. This is what Aristotle means when he says that one and the same name applies, but that the account of substance corresponding to the name is different." By "account of substnace," he means a concept or intention of the soul including the mental description and definition as well as the simple concept. He wants to say that while these differ, there is just one name. A clear example of equivocality is found in the case ofa word belonging to different languages, for in one language the expression is used to signify things signified by one concept; whereas, in the other it is used to signify things signified by some other concept. Thus, the expression is subordinated in signification to several different concepts or * impressions of the soul.
There are, however, two types of equivocality. In the first case a term is equivocal by chance. Here a term is subordinated to several concepts, but it
On Univocal and Equivocal Terms would be subordinated to one of these concepts evenif it were not subordinated to the other(s); and similarly, it could signify one thing evenif it did not signify the other(s). An example is the name 'Socrates', which is assigned to several men. But equivocality can also be intentional. Here, a word is first assigned to one thing or several things and is, thus, subordinated to one concept.
But, afterwards, because the things signified by the term are similar to or bear some other relation to other things, the term is used to signify something new.
Its new use, however, is not merely accidental. If it had not been assigned to items of the first sort it would not be used in the second case. An example is the term 'man'. In the first instance, this term is used to signify all rational animals, all those things which are subsumed under the concept rational animal.
But afterwards, those using the term see a similarity between men and their images in pictures. Thus, they use the term 'man' to signify the pictorial representations of men but notice they would not use the term 'man' to signify or stand for the representations of men unless they had first used the word in the case of real men. For this reason we say that 'man' is equivocal by intention.
Every expression that is subordinated to just one concept is called univocal, whether the term signifies several different things or not. But properly speaking a term is not called univocal unless it signifies or could signify indifferently each of several different things. The term is univocal because all of the several things it signifies are also signified by one concept. Thus, a univocal term is a sign subordinated in signification to one natural sign which is an intention or concept of the soul.
The distinction between univocal and equivocal terms does not apply merely to names but also to verbs and other parts of speech. Indeed, a term can be equivocal by the very fact that it can function as different parts of speech, i.e., as both a name anda verb, a name anda particle, a name and an adverb, etc.
It is important to notice that the division of terms into equivocal and univocal is not simply a division into opposites. Thus, the following proposition is not always false: 'Some equivocal term is univocal'. Indeed, in some contexts it is true; for one and the same word is truly equivocal and univocal, but not with respect to the same people. In the same way one person can be both a father and a son, but not with respect to the same individual. Likewise, the same thing can be both similar and dissimilar, but not with respect to the same thing. Thus, if a term belongs to different languages, it is clear that it can be univocal in each of the languages. Thus, the man who speaks only one of the languages does not want to make any distinction when the term appears in a proposition, but the term is equivocal to the man who knows both languages; and consequently, those who know both languages frequently would have to distinguish propositions in which the relevant term appears. The same term is univocal to one and equivocal to the other.
The foregoing makes clear that a univocal term is not one that has a single