15 That the Universal Is Not a Thing Outside the Mind
That the Universal Is Not a Thing Outside the Mind Other things are universals by convention. Thus, a spoken word, which is numerically one quality, is a universal; it is a sign conventionally appointed for the signification of many things. Thus, since the word is said to be common, it can be called a universal. But notice it is not by nature, but only by convention, that this label applies.
15: That the Universal Is Not a Thing Outside the Mind But it is not enough just to state one's position; one must defend it by philosophical arguments. Therefore, I shall set forth some arguments for my view, and then corroborate it by an appeal to the authorities.
That no universal is a substance existing outside the mind can be proved in a number of ways:
No universal is a particular substance, numerically one; for if this were the case, then it would follow that Socrates is a universal; for there is no good reason why one substance should be a universal rather than another. Therefore no particular substance is a universal; every substance is numerically one and a particular..For every substance is either one thing and not many or it is many things. Now, ifa substance is one thing and not many, then it is numerically one; for that is what we mean by 'numerically one'. But if, on the other hand, some substance is several things. it is either several particular things or several universal things. If the first alternative is chosen, then it follows that some substance would be several particular substances; and consequently that some substance would be several men. But although the universal would be distinguished from a single particular, it would not be distinguished from several particulars.
If, however, some substance were to be several universal entities, I take one of those universal entities and ask, "Is it many things or is it one and not many?"
If the second is the case then it follows that the thing is particular. If the first is the case then I ask, "Is it several particular things or several universal things?"
Thus, either an infinite regress will follow or it will be granted that no substance is a universal in a way that would be incompatible with its also being a particular. From this it follows that no substance is a universal.
Again, if some universal were to be one substance existing in particular substances, yet distinct from them, it would follow that it could exist without them; for everything that is naturally prior to something else can, by God's power, exist without that thing; but the consequence is absurd.
That the Universal Is Not a Thing Outside the Mind Again, if the view in question were true, no individual would be able to be created. Something of the individual would pre-exist it, for the whole individual would not take its existence from nothing if the universal which is in it were already in something else. For the same reason it would follow that God could not annihilate an individual substance without destroying the other individuals of the same kind. If He were to annihilate some individual, he would destroy the whole which is essentially that individual and, consequently, Ic would destroy the universal which is in that thing and in others of the same essence. Consequently, other things of the same essence would not remain, for they could not continue to exist without the universal which constitutes a part of them.
Again, such a universal could not be construed as something completely extrinsic to the essence of an individual; therefore, it would belong to the essence of the individual; and, consequently, an individual would be composed of universals, so that the individual would not be any more a particular than a universal.
Again, it follows that something of the essence of Christ would be miserable and damned, since that common nature really existing in Christ would be damned in the damned individual; for surely that essence is also in Judas. But this is absurd.
Many other arguments could be brought forth, but in the interests of brevity, I shall dispense with them. Instead, I shall corroborate my account by an appeal to authorities.
First, in the seventh book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle is treating the question of whether a universal is a substance. He shows that no universal is a substance. Thus, he says, "it is impossible that substance be something that can be predicated universally."!
Again, in the tenth book of the Metaphysics, he says, "Thus, if, as we argued in the discussions on substance and being, no universal can be a substance, it is not possible that a universal be a substance in the sense ofa one over and against the many."
From these remarks it is clear that, in Aristotle's view, although universals can supposit for substances, no universal is a substance.
Again, the Commentator in his forty-fourth comment on the seventh book of the Metaphysics says, "'In the individual, the only substance is the particular form and matter out of which the individual is composed."?
Again, in the forty-fifth comment, he says, "Let us say, therefore, that it is 11038 8.9, 21053> 17-19, 3 Aristotelis Opera Cum Averrois Commentariis (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1962 (a photostat of the 1562-1574 edition) ), vol. 8, 197, recto, B.
That the Universal Is Not a Thing Outside the Mind impossible that one of those things we call universals be the substance of anything, although they do express the substances of things.'*
And, again, in the forty-seventh comment, "It is impossible that they (universals) be parts of substances existing of and by themselves."
Again, in the second comment on the eighth book of the Metaphysics, he says, "No universal is either a substance or a genus."
Again, in the sixth comment on the tenth book, he says, "Since universals are not substances, it is clear that the common notion of being is not a substance existing outside the mind.""
Using these and many other authorities, the general point emerges: no universal is a substance regardless of the viewpoint from which we consider the matter. Thus, the viewpoint from which we consider the matter is irrelevant to the question of whether something is a substance. Nevertheless, the meaning of a term is relevant to the question of whether the expression 'substance' can be predicated of the term. Thus, if the term 'dog' in the proposition "The dog is an animal' is used to stand for the barking animal, the proposition is true; but if it is used for the celestial body which goes by that name, the proposition is false. But it is impossible that one and the same thing should be a substance from one viewpoint and not a substance from another.
Therefore, it ought to be granted that no universal is a substance regardless of how it is considered. On the contrary, every universal is an intention of the mind which, on the most probable account, is identical with the act of understanding. Thus, it is said that the act of understanding by which I grasp men is a natural sign of men in the same way that weeping is a natural sign of grief.
It is a natural sign such that it can stand for men in mental propositions in the same way that a spoken word can stand for things in spoken propositions.
That the universal is an intention of the soul is clearly expressed by Avicenna in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, in which he comments, "I say, therefore, that there are three senses of'universal'. For we say that something is a universal if (like 'man') it is actually predicated of many things; and we also call an intention a universal if it could be predicated of many." Then follows the remark, "An intention is also called a universal if there is nothing inconceivable in its being predicated of many."®
From these remarks it is clear that the universal is an intention of the soul capable of being predicated of many. The claim can be corroborated by argument. For every one agrees that a universal is something predicable of many, but only an intention of the soul or a conventional sign is predicated. No 4 Ibid., 198, verso, B.
5 Tbid., 198, recto, B.
6 Tbid., 210. recto, B.
7Ibid., 256, verso, A-B.
4vicennae Metaphysica, Tract. V, chapter 1-E, 140.