77 On Improper Supposition
77: On Improper Supposition Just as proper supposition occurs when a term supposits for that which it properly signifies, improper supposition occurs when a term is employed improperly.
There are many forms of improper supposition. There is antonomasia, in which a term supposits for that to which it most especially belongs. Thus,
'The Apostle says this', 'The Philosopher denies this', and so on. There is synechdoche in which a part supposits for the whole. Another form of improper supposition is metonymy where that which contains supposits for that which is contained or where the abstract form of an accident supposits for the subject and so on.
Thus, it is necessary to determine when a term and a proposition are being taken literally and when those uttering or writing them are using them in a different way. The reason is that there is scarcely a term which is not in some way employed equivocally in different places in the writings of the philosophers, saints, and authors. Those who always want to take a term univocally and in just one sense frequently make mistakes about the intentions of authors and go wrong in the inquiry after truth, for almost all words are employed equivocally.
In terms of the foregoing one can make explicit how the relevant terms supposit in propositions like "The intelligible being of a creature was from all eternity' and 'To be white belongs to Socrates'. They supposit either for a thing, a word, an aggregate of these, or an intention of the soul. But when the terms are taken in their proper signification, we can determine in the case of each of these whether the proposition is true or false. Thus, if the subject in 'The intelligible being of a creature was from all eternity' supposits for a thing, that thing is either a created or an uncreated thing. If it supposits for a created thing the proposition is clearly false, but if it supposits for an uncreated thing the proposition is clearly true. If it supposits for something that is an aggregate of both it is clearly false, and if it supposits for an intention of the soul, a word, or something else the proposition should be denied. But if propositions like these are not employed literally, one must focus on the propositions whose place they are taking; and as these are true or false, the original propositions should be judged accordingly. Thus, since by 'The intelligible being of a creature was from all eternity', one means 'God from all eternity understood a creature'; and since this is true one should also grant the original proposition which conveys this second proposition.
On Improper Supposition These remarks about terms and their supposition are sufficient. Here ends the first part of this Summa.