54 On Relation According to the Opinion of Others
On Relation According to the Opinion ofOthers case of 'knowledge' and 'object of knowledge' and 'sense' and 'sensible'; although he neither establishes the point in any other cases nor provides additional examples, the point does hold in other cases. Thus, 'that which can heat' and 'that which can be heated' are correlatives. Nevertheless, it does not follow that because that which can heat exists, that which can be heated also exists. Likewise, it does not follow that just because that which can be made white does not exist, that which can make white does not either.
The same point holds in many other cases.
54: On Relation According to the Opinion of Others Up to now we have been examining the account of relations which 1 think Aristotle holds. Now we shall consider relations in the view that is opposed to Aristotle's. On that view every relation is a thing distinct from its foundation, so that the similarity by which white Socrates is like white Plato is a thing reaily and totally distinct from both Socrates and the white which grounds the similarity. The same sort of account holds in the case of paternity, fielty, and all the other things that are placed in the genus of relation.
Thus, although 'foundation of a relation' is not a piece of Aristotle's philosophical jargon, proponents of this view claim that every relation has both a foundation and a term and that it is really distinct from both. They prove that relation is a distinct thing in many ways:
First, each distinct category signifies distinct things; relation is a distinct category; therefore.
Again, whiteness is able to remain without similarity; therefore, whiteness is not similarity.
Again, if a relation were the same as its foundation, then since the foundations of relations fall under different categories (i.e., substance, quantity, and quality), some relations would be in the category of substance, others in the category of quality, and still others in the category of quantity; but, then, relation would not be a distinct category.
Again, it is by one and the same foundation that white Socrates is similar to white Plato and distinct from black Socrates; therefore, if a relation were identical with its foundation, similarity and dissimilarity would be identical.
But then they would not be different relations.
Again, if relations were identical with their foundations, then since there is motion towards a foundation (e.g., there is motion towards whiteness),
On Relation According to the Opinion of Others there would be motion towards a relation, and that runs counter to the Philosopher's remarks in the fifth book of the Physics.'
Again, the unity of the universe consists in the order of its parts; if therefore, relation were not a distinct thing, that order would not be a distinct thing, so that the universe would not be one.
Again, when the parts composing some whole are separated the parts remain, but the union does not; therefore, the union is something different from the parts.
Again, in the nature assumed by the Word there is no absolute thing which is not like something in my nature, therefore, since that nature is united with the Word and not mine, that nature has something which mine does not have, but it is not anything absolute; therefore, it is something relative, which is what we set out to prove.
For these and similar reasons, many hold that relation is a thing outside the mind and really distinct from every absolute thing.
Nevertheless, they distinguish between relations, for some are real and others are relations of the reason. Examples of the latter are the relations of God to his creatures and other relations which cannot exist without the operation of this intellect.
The properties previously mentioned are attributed to relations; for while some relatives are contrary to each other (e.g., virtue and vice), others are not, as nothing is the contrary of the triple.
Again, relations admit of more and less, although as I have indicated this is not true of all relations.
Again, every relative is said with respect to a correlative. Nevertheless, it sometimes happens that one real relation corresponds to another real relation. Thus, the similarity of Socrates corresponds to a real relation in the thing to which it is similar. Sometimes, however, a real relation in one thing does not correspond to a real relation in another, but only to a relation of the reason. Thus, to the real relation whereby a creature depends on God, there does not correspond any real relation in God, but only a relation of the reason.
Likewise, relations are said to be simultaneous by nature, so that if one relation is the other must also be. But this property is to be construed as holding only in the case where both objects are real relations. Where one object is a real relation and the other a relation of the reason, the property need not hold. Examples are knowledge and the knowable object and sense and the sensible object.