Front matter
William of Ockham Ockham's Theory of Terms Part I of the Summa Logicae SeZsesersesescctc & SSS SSeS eset ses eS) == Sen a on ran eat i se og2 ; f fk a ¥ oe es as aon > 3 = ZS esi eeeel a SSes rs a an <—S5an) Feeeet ie, a i 2 i a POP OI SISA SIS SS PFNS eS ee Translated and introduced by Michael J. Loux
Ockham's Theory of Terms PART I OF THE SUMMA LOGICAE Translated and Introduced by Michael J. Loux UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS NOTRE DAME LONDON Copyright © 1974 University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, Indiana 46556 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Ockham, William, d. ca. 1349.
Ockham's theory of terms, part I of the Summa logicae.
1. Logic—Early works to 1800. 2. Philosophy—Terminology.
74-12565 ISBN 0-268-00550-8 ISBN 0-268-00551-6 pbk.
Manufactured in the United States of America To Frederic Bieter Contents Preface xi The Ontology of William of Ockham Summa Logicae, Part I: On Terms
1 On the Term in General 2 On Three Senses of 'Term'
3 On the Correspondence between Vocal and Mental Terms 4 On Categorematic and Syncategorematic Terms 5 On Concrete and Abstract Names That Are Non Synonyms
6 On Concrete and Abstract Names That Are Synonyms 7 The Correct Account of Abstract and Concrete Names 8 On the Third Mode of Concrete and Abstract Names
9 On the Fourth Mode of Concrete and Abstract Names 10 On Connotative and Absolute Names 11 On Names ofFirst and Second Imposition
12 On First and Second Intentions 13 On Univocal and Equivocal Terms 15 That the Universal Is Not a Thing Outside the Mind
16 Against Scotus' Account of the Universal 17 Responses to Objections .
18 On the Five Universals in General 22 On the Comparison ofSpecies and Genus vii viii Contents 24 On Property 28 On Descriptive Definition
32 On Inherence and Being In 41 On the Distinction of the Categories 43 On the Properties ofSubstance 44 On Quantity Against the Moderns
45 Responses to Objections 46 On the Items in the Category of Quantity 47 On the Properties of Quantity 48 On Quantity According to the Common Opinion
49 On Relation According to Aristotle's Opinion 50 Arguments in Behalf ofAristotle's View 51 Responses to Objections 52 On the Items in the Category of Relation
53 On the Properties ofRelatives 54 On Relation According to the Opinion of Others 55 On the Category of Quality 56 On Quality According to the Opinion of Others
Contents ix 63 On Supposition 64 On the Division ofSupposition 65 On How the Supposition of Terms Must Be Distinguished 66 Responses to Objections
67 On Material Supposition 68 On Simple Supposition 69 On Personal Supposition 70 On the Division ofPersonal Supposition
71 On Rules for Determinate Supposition 72. Responses to Objections 73 On Merely Confused Supposition 74 On Confused and Distributive Supposition
75 Problems With Expressions Like 'Begins' and 'Twice'
76 On the Supposition of Relatives 77 On Improper Supposition Preface Despite the historical importance and contemporary relevance of Ockham's philosophy, little that he wrote has been translated into English. Hoping in a modest way to fill this vacuumI have translated a text (Part I of the Summa
Logicae) which provides a comprehensive introduction to the key themes of Ockham's ontology and philosophy of language.
In preparing the translation I have employed the Boehner edition of the Summa. While it is unfortunate that my translation was completed before the publication of the proposed critical edition, the Boehner edition has proved more than adequate for my purposes. As Boehner himself claims, his edition is very nearly a critical edition; and since it will provide the basis for the proposed critical edition, variations between the two texts are likely to be minimal.
Although on a few occasions I chose one of the variant readings, I have almost always followed Boehner's reading of the text. Like Boehner I do not find chapter 51 authentic. As he suggests, the style of chapter 51 deviates markedly from the style of the rest of the Summa; furthermore, although the general tone of the chapter is Ockhamistic, there are a number of points made there that are explicitly repudiated in other chapters. The most glaring case is the account of the contrariety of relatives found in chapter 51. In chapter
53, a clearly authentic section of the Summa, that account is presented only to be rejected. But while chapter 51 is not authentic, textual tradition incorporates it into the Summa. In my translation I have honored that tradition.
The major difficulty confronting the translation of Ockham is presented by the structural complexity and redundancy of his style, and early in the project I realized that a literal translation in readable English would be difficult if not impossible. I opted for readability, but while the translation sometimes departs from the peculiarities of Ockham's style,
I have endeavored throughout to make it an accurate translation. xi xii Preface The examples Ockham employs also provide some difficulty. Upon occasion, these examples depend upon grammatical features of Latin that have no parallel in English, so that it is impossible to translate these examples into English while retaining their point in the text. Where such examples were essential I retained the Latin, where non-essential I eliminated them.
The only other point that should be noted is my set of conventions for distinguishing between material, simple, and personal supposition. Material supposition is marked by single quotes ('x'); terms exhibiting simple supposition are italicized (x); and terms which have personal supposition are not marked at all (x). Two remarks about these conventions are necessary. First, if we are to be faithful to Ockham's account of supposition we must construe x, 'x', and x not as three different terms, but as three styles or modes in which one and the same term can appear. Second, the marker for simple supposition must be construed as neutral between simple and personal supposition. In the same way the marker for material supposition is meant to indicate that the marked term is exhibiting either material or personal supposition. Ockham holds that any categorematic form in any context can exhibit personal supposition, but he claims that a term can exhibit material or simple supposition only in certain clearly defined contexts. It is such contexts that my single quotes and italics are meant to mark.
In some cases it was difficult to determine whether Ockham is using a term in material or simple supposition. In those cases I opted for single quotes. In a few places, especially the section on the predicables, this convention forced arbitrary choices upon me; but alternative conventions would have involved considerable semantical and syntactical awkwardness.
Preceding the translation are two essays, one dealing with Ockham's ontology and the other focusing on Ockham's theory of supposition. Since there are already a number of useful introductions to Ockham's life and overall philosophy;
I have limited my introductory essays to a consideration of the central themes of Part I of the Summa.
After a blanket expression of appreciation to all those colleagues who so patiently listened as I droned on about Ockham, I would like to thank Professors Guido Kung, Earl Ludman, and Ralph MclInerny, all of whom read the introductory papers and offered helpful comments. I would also like to thank
Mr. Alfred Freddoso and Mr. Michael Baumer, who used the translation in a reading course in Late Medieval Philosophy. They both provided suggestions that improved the translation in many ways. Doubtless, the greatest debt of 1See the introduction to Philotheus Boehner's Ockham: Philosophical Writings (London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1957); see also chapter
1 of Ernest Moody's The Logic of William of Ockham (New York: Russell and Russell, 1965); and Moody's contribution to the Encyclopedia of Philosophy 8: 306317.
Preface xiii thanks is owed Professor Mary Sirridge who worked through the translation line by line. She furnished me with a list of corrections that was many times longer than I would like to admit.
More general thanks are due Rev. Ernan McMullin. He established the junior sabbatical program in the department of Philosophy at the University of Notre
Dame. Without the leave of absence provided by that program this translation would never have been completed. I would also like to thank Professor Manley
Thompson who introduced me to the Summa. Finally I want to express my appreciation to Rev. Frederic Bieter who taught me classics as an undergraduate. To him this book is dedicated.
May, 1974 University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana