68 On Simple Supposition
On Simple Supposition of propositions. In short, any simple or complex term can exhibit material supposition.
One can, however, divide material supposition, for sometimes a spoken or written word supposits for itself. Examples are ' "Man" is a name',
«"Man's" is in the genitive case', ' "Man is an animal" is a true proposition', " "Well" is an adverb', and ' "Reads" is a verb'. Sometimes, however, a spoken word, a written word, or a concept of the mind does not supposit for itself but for some other spoken or written word which it does not signify. Thus, in the Latin sentence
' "Animal" praedicatur de "homine"
' the word 'homine" does not supposit for the word 'homine', for 'animal' is not predicated of 'homine'. In that sentence the simple term 'homine' supposits for the word 'homo', for it is of 'homo' that 'animal' is predicated in 'Homo est animal'. Likewise, in ' "That man runs" is true', the subject "that man runs" does not supposit for itself but for the proposition 'Man runs', which it does not, nevertheless, signify. Likewise, in the Latin sentence ' "Homo" praedicatur de '"'asino" in obliquo', the word "homo" supposits for oblique forms, for in the proposition 'Asinus est hominis', it is not the word 'homo', but 'homonis' that is predicated. Likewise, in ' "Quality" is predicated of its subject in the concrete', the term 'quality' supposits for concrete names that are predicable of a subject.
68: On Simple Supposition Just as any complex or simple term can exhibit material supposition, any complex or simple term that is significative or consignificative can exhibit simple supposition; for every such term, whether mental, vocal, or written, can supposit for a concept of the mind. This is inductively evident.
Further, just as a term exhibiting material supposition sometimes supposits for itself and sometimes for something else, so a mental term suppositing simply supposits sometimes for itself (as in 'Man is a species' and 'Animal is a genus') and sometimes for some other intention of the soul which it does not, nevertheless, signify (as in a mental proposition like "That man is an animal is true'). The same point holds in many other such cases.