69 On Personal Supposition
69: On Personal Supposition Next we shall consider personal supposition. It should be noted that only a categorematic term that is being employed significatively as the extreme of a proposition supposits personally.
The first condition excludes syncategorematic terms, not only those that are names but also conjunctions, adverbs, prepositions and any others there may be.
The second condition excludes all verbs because a verb can never be the extreme of a proposition, not when it is functioning significatively. One might object that in 'To read is good', 'to read' functions significatively and, nevertheless, supposits. The response is that 'to read' is not a verb but a noun. It is because of the use to which it is put that an infinitive can function not only as a verb but as a noun. If 'to read' were to remain a verb here and were to be a name no more than 'reads', the proposition 'To read is good' could be no more true than 'Reads is good'. Whence comes the difference? It is from the use to which those who speak the language put the expression.
The expression 'extreme of a proposition' excludes a part of an extreme, even if the part be a categorematic term and a noun. Thus, in 'The white man is an animal', neither 'man' nor 'white' supposits. The whole extreme supposits. Thus, even when the parts of an extreme are ordered according to greater and lesser generality, it is not necessary that the inference from a proposition affirming one to a proposition affirming the other be valid. The tule governing such inferences should be understood to hold only when the extremes which actually do the suppositing are ordered according to greater and lesser universality. Thus, from the Latin sentence "Tu es vadens ad forum', one cannot validly infer 'Tu es existens ad forum'. 'Existens' and 'vadens' are ordered as more and less general, but the extremes themselves are not so ordered; consequently the inference is not valid. Nonetheless, sometimes the inference is valid, for sometimes the parts cannot be ordered as more and less general unless the wholes of which they are constituents are also so ordered or capable of being ordered. Examples are 'white man'—'white animal? and 'seeing man'—'seeing animal'. Therefore, an inference of this sort is frequently valid, but not always. At any rate, what is a part of an extreme in a proposition does not supposit in that proposition, although it can supposit in some other proposition.
The expression 'taken significatively' excludes all categorematic expressions functioning simply or materially; for since they are not then employed significatively, they cannot supposit personally. Examples are ' "Man" is a name' and 'Man is a species'.
70: On the Division of Personal Supposition Personal supposition can be divided into discrete and common supposition.
Discrete supposition occurs when the suppositing term is the proper name of some object significatively taken or a demonstrative pronoun significatively taken. Such supposition yields a singular proposition like 'Socrates is a man' and 'That man is a man'. If one should object that 'This herb grows in my garden' is true and that, nonetheless, the subject does not have discrete supposition, the response is that the proposition, taken literally, is false; however, by that proposition one means 'An herb of that sort grows in my garden', where the subject supposits determinately. Thus, when a proposition that is literally false has a true sense, if it is taken in that sense, the subject and predicate should have the same supposition they have in the corresponding true proposition.
We have common personal supposition when a common term supposits, thus 'A man runs' and 'Every man is an animal'. Common personal supposition is divided into confused supposition and determinate supposition. Determinate supposition occurs when it is possible to descend to particulars by way of a disjunctive proposition. Thus, the following is a good inference: a man runs; therefore, this man runs or that man .
. (and so on for all the relevant particulars). The name 'determinate supposition' is employed because where such supposition operates, the assertion is that a proposition of the relevant sort is true in the case of some determinate particular. That particular by itselfis sufficient to make the proposition true. Nothing else is required. Thus, for the truth of.
'A man runs', it is required that one of the relevant singular propositions be true. Any one will do, and it makes no difference whether the remaining singular propositions are all false. Nonetheless, it frequently happens that many or all of the remaining singular propositions are true. Thus, the following rule can be employed: whenever it is possible to descend to the particulars under a general term by way of a distunctive proposition and whenever it is possible to infer such a proposition from a particular, the term in question has personal determinate supposition. Therefore, in the proposition 'A man is an animal', both extremes have determinate supposition; for the following is a good inference: a man is an animal; therefore, this man is an animal or that man .
. (and so on with all the relevant particulars). Likewise, this is a good inference: this man is an animal (where some particular man is pointed out); therefore, a man is an animal. Likewise, the following is a good inference: a man is an animal; therefore, a man is this animal or a man
. (and so on with all relevant particulars). It also follows that if a man is this animal, where some particular animal has been singled out, then a man is an animal. Thus, both 'man' and 'animal' have determinate supposition.
On the Division of Personal Supposition Personal confused supposition belongs to every common term exhibiting personal supposition, but not determinate supposition. It is divided into merely confused supposition and confused distributive supposition. Merely confused supposition occurs when a common term supposits personally and it is not possible, without a change in either extreme, to descend to particulars by way of a disjunctive proposition, but it is possible to descend by way of a proposition with a disjunctive predicate and it is possible to infer the original proposition from any particular. For example, in the proposition
'Every man is an animal', the word 'animal' has merely confused supposition; for one cannot descend to the particulars under 'animal' by way ofa disjunctive proposition. The following is not a good inference: every man is an animal; therefore, every man is this animal or every man is that animal or every man is .
. (and so on for all the relevant particulars). Nonetheless, it is possible to descend to a proposition with a disjunctive predicate involving particulars; for the following is a good inference: every man is an animal; therefore, every man is this animal or that animal or that ..
. (and so on for all the relevant particulars). .The consequent here is a categorical proposition composed of the subject 'man' and the predicate 'this animal or that animal or... It is clear that this predicate is truly predicated of every man and that, consequently, the universal proposition is true. Likewise, the universal proposition can be inferred from any item contained under 'animal'; for the following inference is valid: every man is this animal (no matter which animal is pointed out); therefore, every man is an animal.
Confused and distributive supposition occurs when, assuming that the relevant term has many items contained under it, it is possible in some way to descend by a conjunctive proposition and impossible to infer the original proposition from any of the elements in the conjunction. Thus, the subject in 'Every man is an animal' supposits confusedly and distributively, for the following inference is good: every man is an animal; therefore this man is an animal, that man .
. (and so on for all of the relevant particulars). The following inference, however, is not valid: that man is an animal (no matter which one is singled out); therefore, every man is an animal.
I said that it is possible to descend in some way. I said this because it is not always possible to descend in the same way. Sometimes it is possible to descend without altering the original proposition except by changing the subject or predicate from a common term to a singular term; but sometimes it is possible to descend only with some alteration in the proposition, so that something which is neither a common term nor a term contained under a common term is present in one of the propositions but absent in the other.
For example, from 'Every man except Socrates runs', one can descend to a conjunction of singular propositions; for the following inference is good: every man except Socrates runs; therefore Plato runs, Cicero runs,
. (and so on for all men other than Socrates). But in these singular propositions