8 On the Third Mode of Concrete and Abstract Names
On the Third Mode of Concrete and Abstract Names When the two expressions are taken significatively, one can substitute this definition for 'subject' and vice versa. Once this is done it is easy to determine which propositions are true, and which, false.
8: On the Third Mode of Concrete and Abstract Names While important in themselves, the questions discussed in the previous chapter have forced us to digress.from the central point. We shall return to the main issue and consider another way in which concrete and abstract names can function. In the process we will be able to clarify some points made earlier.
There are abstract names (or some could be introduced into usage) which incorporate, in a disguised way, syncategorematic terms or adverbial qualifications.
The result is that each of these abstract names is equivalent in signification to the combination of a concrete name (or some other term) and some syncategorematic term (or other expression or group of expressions). For the speakers of a language can, if they wish, use one locution in place of several. Thus, in place of the complex expression 'every man', | could use 'A'; and in place of the complex expression, 'man alone', I could use 'B', and so on with other expressions.
Now, assume that this sort of account holds for some abstract names. We would have a case where an abstract name and a concrete name neither supposit for nor signify different things, but where predicating one of these terms of the other would yield a false proposition and where terms predicable of one of these terms would not be predicable of the other. Suppose, for example, that the abstract term 'humanity' were to be equivalent in signification to the expression 'man as man' or 'man insofar as he is man'. Then 'Man runs' would be true, but since 'Man insofar as he is man runs' is false, 'Humanity runs' would be false. Or suppose that 'humanity' were equivalent to the expression
'man necessarily . . . (so that the one expression could be used in place of the other). Then, it would be false that humanity is a man; for it is false to say that man is necessarily a man. No man is necessarily a man, but only contingently. Similarly, it would be false to say "Humanity is white'; for 'Man is necessarily white' is false.
Following the same general procedure, one could claim for any pair of concrete and abstract names, that while the names neither signify nor supposit for On the Third Mode of Concrete and A bstract Names distinct things, first, predicating one of the other yields a false proposition and, second, things predicable of one are not necessarily predicable of the other.
Thus, one could claim that although quantity is not a thing distinct from sub-stance and quality, both of the following propositions are false: 'Substance is quantity' and 'Quality is quantity'. If the name 'quantity' were equivalent in signification to the complex expression 'necessarily quantified while remaining in the nature of things', then while preserving the view (that quantity is not a thing distinct from substance and quality), one could consistently claim that 'Substance is quantity' is false; for the proposition 'Substance is necessarily quantified so long as it remains in the nature of things' is also false. The same sort of account will hold in other contexts, whether the things involved are created or divine.
Thus, using the same technique, one could claim that while the Divine Essence, Intellect, and Will are, in no way, distinct, the proposition 'God understands by His Intellect' is true and the proposition 'God understands by His
Will' is false. Likewise, while contending that the soul is not distinguished from the intellect and will, one could hold that the proposition 'The intellect understands' is true and the proposition 'The will understands' is false, and so on with other examples.
I think that the difficulties which arise with regard to such examples are not real, but only verbal or logical. Thus, those who are ignorant of logic uselessly fill innumerable volumes on these issues, inventing difficulties where none exist, thereby abandoning the problems they ought to examine.
Although abstract names are seldom or never employed in everyday speech as equivalent in signification to several expressions, they are frequently used in this way in the writings of saints and philosophers. Thus, in the fifth book of his Metaphysics, Avicenna says "Horseness is nothing more than horseness; for by itself it is neither one nor many; nor does it exist in sensible things, nor in the soul." In saying this Avicenna only means that Horse is not defined as being either one thing or many, nor as existing in the soul or in things outside.
None of these notions is contained in the definition of horse. Thus, Avicenna was using the term 'horeseness' as equivalent in signification to several expressions, either taken alone or with the mediation of a verb and copula. He clearly did not mean that horseness is some entity which is neither one thing nor many and neither outside the soul nor in the soul. For this is both impossible and absurd. He merely meant that none of these notions is part of the definition of horse. That this is what he means is clear enough to one who examines his remarks carefully. Thus, he says, "Since it" (ie., the universal) "would be man or horse, this intention is some thing other than an intention like horseness or hu- ' Avicennae Metaphysica (St. Bonaventure, New York: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1948 (a typescript of 1520 edition) ), Tract. V, chapter I-A, 134.
On the Third Mode of Concrete and Abstract Names manity which exhibits universality, for the definition of horseness is distinct from the definition of universality; nor is universality contained in the definition of horseness; for horseness has its own definition, which does not lack universality."? From these and other remarks (which in the interests of brevity ] omit), it is perfectly clear he merely means that none of these things is placed in the definition of horse or horseness. Thus, in that passage he means to use the name 'horseness' in such a way that it is equivalent in signification to several expressions. Otherwise, the following inference would not be valid: one, many, and similar notions are not placed in the definition of horseness; therefore, horseness is not one thing. The inference, on the contrary, would be invalid in the way that the following inference is invalid: white is not placed in the definition of man; therefore, man is not white.
The foregoing remarks enable us to expose a fallacy in a form of argument which verbally, at least, appears valid. Consider the following: every absolute entity is a substance or quality; quantity is an absolute entity; therefore, quantity is a substance or quality. The general form of argument here is 'Every B is A; C is B; therefore, C is A'. We can expose a fallacy in this form of argument if we properly interpret the relevant terms. Thus, interpret 'B' as 'man'; 'A' as 'animal'; and 'C' as 'the necessarily risible thing'; here, the interpretation is such that for 'C' we can substitute the whole expression 'the necessarily risible thing' and vice versa. But when we interpret the argument in this way we get a false conclusion from true premises. Thus. 'Every man is an animal; the necessarily risible thing is man; therefore, the necessarily risible thing is animal'.
But that this argument is fallacious indicates that the general form, 'Every B is A; Cis B; therefore, C is A' is itself fallactious. More generally, attending to this particular use of abstract terms enables us to preserve many seemingly false remarks found in traditional writings.
Not only can an abstract name be equivalent in signification to several expressions; the same thing can happen to concrete names and expressions of other kinds. Thus, those expert in logic hold that the Latin term 'totus' includes the term it distributes, so that when used syncategorematically, it is equivalent to the Latin expression 'quaelibet pars' ('each part'). Thus, the Latin sentence
'Totus Sortes est minor Sorte' is equivalent to the Latin sentence 'Quaelibet pars Sortis est minor Sorte' ('Each part of Socrates is less than Socrates').
Similarly, the Latin word 'quodlibet' incorporates the term it distributes, so that it is equivalent to the phrase 'omne ens' ('each thing'). Otherwise, the Latin sentence 'Quodlibet est homo vel non homo' would make no sense. So it is with many other words. When one utters the Latin word 'curro', the first person pronoun is understood, 'curro', then, is equivalent to 'curro' plus the relevant pronoun. The same holds true of many other expressions; if we do not ? Ibid.
On the Third Mode of Concrete and Abstract Names recognize this fact, we will have great difficulty in grasping the intentions of authors.
Thus, one expression is sometimes equivalent to several. It can also happen that when one expression is added to another, the resulting whole is equivalent to yet another complex expression, nor need these two complex expressions be structurally the same. Sometimes expressions found in the first complex will have a different case, mood, or tense in the second, and sometimes they are simply eliminated. Thus, if the term 'totus' is construed syncategorematically, 'Totus Sortes est minor Sorte' is equivalent to 'Quaelibet pars Sortis est minor Sorte', where 'quaelibet pars' replaces 'totus' and the oblique form
'Sortis' replaces the nominative form 'Sortes'. Some hold that the proposition 'The generation of a form occurs in an instant' is equivalent to the proposition 'No part of a form comes to be before another but all come to be together.'
Here, the copula 'is' is eliminated. Likewise, some say that the proposition 'Quantity is an absolute thing' is equivalent to the proposition 'The distance between parts and the extension of parts would be absolute things, were they to continue existing without substance and quality'. If this analysis is correct it is clear that the following inference is invalid: every absolute thing is a substance or a quality; quantity is an absolute thing; therefore, quantity is a substance or a quality.
Should someone say that following this procedure I could put a stop lo any syllogism simply by saying that this or that term in the syllogism conceals some syncategorematic term, I would respond as follows: to know whether an inference is valid, one must understand the meanings of the terms and, then, judge accordingly whether the relevant inference is valid. And because, with many terms, it is clear that according to standard usage no such syncategorematic term is concealed, one need merely appeal to the standard rules governing the syllogism to determine whether the syllogism in question is valid. Still, logicians can determine for every inference whether it is valid by analyzing the terms into their nominal definitions; once this is done, the rules will enable him to determine what should be said about the inference.
All abstract privatives and negatives (with many other terms) can be analyzed in terms of the general procedure outlined above, but more of that later.
Further, this procedure gives us a basis for denying all such propositions as "Matter is privation', 'Air is darkness', 'The soul is sin', and so on. It also enables us to preserve propositions like the following: 'God does not create sin' and 'God is not the author of evil'. In the treatise on fallacies I shall explain the source of invalidity in inferences like the following: this is evil; God makes this; therefore, God makes evil.