34 On Division
On Division In the broadest sense of all we say that a term signifies provided it is a sign which is capable of being a part ofa proposition or a whole proposition and designates something, whether primarily or secondarily, whether in the nominative or one of the oblique cases, whether by actually expressing or merely connoting something, whether by signifying affirmatively or merely negatively. In this sense we say that the name 'blind' signifies sight because it does so negatively, similarly, that 'immaterial' signifies matter negatively and that both 'nothing' and 'non-being' signify being but in a negative way. Anselm discusses this mode of signifying in On the Fall of the Devil.'
Therefore, in some sense of 'signify' every universal can be said to signify.
In chapter 8 of Logic, Damascene says, '"'The universal is what signifies many, for example, 'man' and 'animal'.""? Every universal signifies many in the first or second way since every universal is predicated of many either in a de inesse present tense proposition or in a past, present, or future proposition or in a modal proposition. Clearly then those are wrong who say that the word 'man' does not signify all men. According to the aforementioned authority the universal term 'man' signifies many things; but since it does not signify many things which are not men, it must signify many men. This point must be granted; for nothing is signified by 'man' except men, and not one man more than another.
Therefore every universal signifies many things. Genera and species, since they can be predicated ofa pronoun referring to some object, do not signify many except in the first or second sense. But of the remaining universals many signify in the first or second sense only; whereas others signify in the third or fourth senses as well. Thus every universal that is not a genus or species, while signifying many things in the nominative case, also signifies something else in one of the oblique cases. This is clear with 'rational', 'risible', and 'white', and similarly of course with other universals.
34: On Division A universal not only signifies many but is divided into many. 'To be divided', however, has a number of senses. For something is said to be divided when by a real partition of the whole one part is physically separated from another. In 'Tbid., T. 158, 339B-341C.
? Dialectica, chapter 8, 27-28. this sense we say that the carpenter divides wood, the mason divides stone, and the blacksmith, iron.
But in another sense we speak of dividing something in such a way that no part of the thing is actually separated from another part. This sort of division applies to items under which many things are subsumed. In this sense I might divide the word 'dog' into its significata, saying that one kind of dog is a barking dog and another is a celestial body, and so on. I do not in this case separate one part of the word from another. Rather, I take the many to which the word is common, and I separate them under different common notions. It is in this sense that logicians speak of division. "There are," Damascene says in chapter
12 of Logic, "eight ways of dividing things. (1) A genus can be divided into its species, as animal is divided into rational and irrational. (2) A species is divided into its individuals, as man is divided into Peter and Paul and the other inidividuals who are men. (3) A whole is divided into its parts, either into similar parts or dissimilar parts. We have a division into similar parts when the parts are each called by the name of the whole and have the same definition as the whole. Thus we might divide flesh into many fleshes: each element in the division is called flesh and has the definition of flesh. Division into dissimilar parts occurs when the parts have neither the same name nor definition as the whole. Thus we can divide Socrates into his head, his hands, and his feet: none of these has the same name or the same definition as Socrates. (4) We can also divide an equivocal word into its various significata and this can happen in two ways, either as a whole or as a part." After providing some examples
Damascene continues, "(5) We can divide a substance into its accidents, as when we say that some men are white and some black. (6) We can also divide an accident into its substances, as when we say that some white things have souls and some do not; and (7) We can divide an accident into its accidents, as when we say that some cold things are dry and some wet. Finally, (8) We can divide something into those things that derive from it or we can divide something into those things from which it derives. Thus in the first case we say that the medical art gives rise to medical books and to medical instruments, and in the second that health derives from healthy foods and healthy water."
It should be noted that in the aforesaid modes of division we take one thing, and without physically dividing or separating one part from another, we generate many things. Nevertheless, in some modes of division that which is divided designates something which can really be divided into items which are designated by the dividentia. The third and fourth modes of division are examples. In other modes this is not so. When we say that some men are white and some black, we are not dividing a whole into its real parts; those parts are, however, actually separated from each other.
It should be noted also that when we speak of a substance as being divided ' Tbid., chapter 12, 17-44.