51 Responses to Objections
Responses to Objections Again, suppose God creates a man before He creates any other men and that afterwards other men are generated. Employing this supposition
I argue: whatever is in any one of the other men, God can by His absolute power produce in the first man; but being-a-son is in one of the other men; therefore, God can produce this relation in the first man. But when this is done, the man will be a son, and he will be the son of some man. Every man, however, will be younger than the man in question. Therefore, the man will be the son of someone who is younger than him, and this seems to involve a contradiction.
Countless additional arguments could be adduced in support of the view.
But in the interest of brevity I omit them.
51: Responses to Objections But someone will object that this is not Aristotle's view.
(1) First, on the basis of what Aristotle says in the Categories when he enumerates the categories: "Of simple terms, each one signifies either substance or quantity or quality"! and so on for the remaining categories. But here he seems to mean that distinct things are designated by distinct genera. Thus, since relation is one of the ten genera, it will designate something different from the things designated by the other genera.
(2) In addition, he says in the same treatise, "Those things are relatives which are said of other things."? Substances, however, are excluded from this class since although they may be of other things, they are not relative to anything else. But the criterion does not seem to fit either terms or external objects which are absolute, so that there must be something different from these things to which being a relative applies.
(3) Besides, how can those things be true which Aristotle teaches about relatives—that they admit contraries, that they admit of more and less, that they are simultaneous by nature? Such features it seems do not hold true of either terms or absolute things.
(4) It seems we can construct an argument derived from the principles of Aristotle's philosophy, for it is impossible for one and the same thing both
11> 25-26, 269 36-37.
Responses to Objections to be and not be at one and the same time. Absolute things, however, can continue to exist even when their relations cease to exist. They must then be distinct things.
(5) Also,a passion really differs from its subject; for it is really demonstrated of its subject, and a thing is not demonstrated of itself. 'Equal' and 'unequal' with other relatives are passions; for to be called equal and unequal is the property of quantity; and to be similar and dissimilar is the property of quality as Aristotle teaches in the Categories; therefore. . .
(6) Again, it is necessary that a principle of real operation be itself real.
Relation seems to be this sort of thing; for it sometimes happens that things which did not produce pleasure when they were in a certain relation and order, do produce it when their relation and order is otherwise.
(7) Further, how will we be able to preserve the distinction between the ten categories (since relation is one of them); the distinction of created being into absolute and relative; and the distinction of being outside the soul into the ten categories?
(8) What will happen to common locutions like 'The father is a father by paternity', 'The son is a son by fielty', 'The similar is similar by similarity',
(for no relation is similar), and 'Relation is an accident'.
(9) If we reject the relation of union it seems impossible to explain how form is united with matter, how one part is united with another to form a continuum, how an accident is united with its subject, and how spirit is unitec with corporeal nature. The union of spirits with corporeal natures is not merely an element of Christian orthodoxy; every nation, rite, and sect confesses it. It is a piece of common belief even in superstitious religions.
(10) If the view in question were true, then one and the same thing would be in different categories. Aristotle, however, seems to deny this, since for him the negative proposition in which one category is denied of another is an immediate proposition.
These considerations might lead some to think the Philosopher's view is different from the one outlined here. Nonetheless, they should not lead the careful reader to think that Aristotle did perhaps postulate the relevant sorts of entities as things outside the soul.
Response to (1) In response to the point made in the first objection, Aristotle did not prove that a distinction of things corresponds to the distinction among simple terms. Likewise, a distinction of things in God is not proved by the fact that we say that some of the divine names signify justice; others, wisdom, goodness, power, and so on. Nor can we establish a diversity of things in the horse from the fact that we say that some of the names applied to the horse signify mobility; others, corruptibility, etc. The sense of these lo367 26-27; 11° 15-18.
Responses to Objections cutions is rather that some of the terms applied to God designate that God is just; others, that God is wise; others, that God is good; and so on with the rest; and in the case of the horse the sense is that some of the terms signify what the horse is, others that the horse is mobile, corruptible, etc. The same point holds in the present case. Each simple term signifies either substance or quantity.
. The sense is that some terms signify what a thing is; others, of what quality, how it is quantified, how it is related to other things (e.g. 'similar' and 'equal'), what it does, what is done to it, etc.
Aristotle expresses the nature of the categories more clearly in the fifth book of the Metaphysics where he says, "Of the categories, some signify what a thing is; some, how it is qualified; some, how it is quantified; others, how it is related to other things," etc.
Therefore, Aristotle does not mean that there are as many things as there are significant terms. He means to show, on the contrary, how some terms are absolute; some, connotative; and some, relative, as I have argued in sufficient detail elsewhere.
Response to (2) The same sort of response applies here. According to Aristotle terms are called ad aliquid or relative which are said to be of other things. Put otherwise, relatives are terms which when signifying something point to something else, so that a proposition in which such a term is predicated of a thing cannot be known to be true unless one knows determinately the other thing that is pointed to. Thus, just from seeing a head, wing, or hand, one can know what it is even if he does not know to what or whom it belongs.
Response to (3) As regards the contrariety exhibited by relatives, it should be noted that things are sometimes said to be contraries which can be acquired by way of motion and which resist coexistence. In this sense whiteness and blackness are contraries. But sometimes we speak of terms as contraries. We say that terms are contrary when they cannot be truly predicated of the same thing with respect to the same thing. It is in this sense that relative terms can be contraries. Thus, 'similar' and 'dissimilar' and 'equal' and 'unequal' are contraries. They cannot be truly predicated of the same thing with respect to the same thing. Sometimes we confine the term 'to admit more and less' to the real addition of one thing to another. In this sense both whiteness and light admit of more or less. But sometimes we use the term in relation to predication. Here, a name admits a comparison, and in this sense relation admits of more and less. But this does not always happen because of the addition of one thing to another. Commonly this happens because one thing is taken away from another. Thus, what is unequal becomes more equal because one of its parts was taken away. It sometimes happens that a thing
Responses to Objections comes to bear a relative name solely on the basis of a change in something else. It also happens that things can be called more or less with respect to a relative name because of a change in something else, or this may happen because of a decrease or increase in some other absolute thing inhering in the object itself.
Likewise, relatives are said to be simultaneous by nature. This is not because they are things one of which necessarily requires the other but because if 'to exist' is truly predicated of one of them significatively taken, it is necessarily predicated of the other also significatively taken; for the following is valid: the double exists; therefore, the half exists (and vice versa).
Response to (4) Here the correct response is simply to grant the conclusion; for absolute things really are distinguished from relations. It is relative terms that are said to be relations, and such things are really different from external objects. Nonetheless, this form of argument frequently deceives the inexperienced. It drives them to admit a plurality of things which one should not in fact postulate. The following inference provides an example: creation is; conservation is not; therefore, creation is distinguished from conservation.
It will become clear in remarks that follow when this form of argument works.
One might object that since what is white comes to be similar from being dissimilar, it must now possess something it did not previously possess. My response is that the white comes to be similar from being dissimilar simply by the fact that some other thing has been made white. No new entity need come to the object in question. God becomes a creator from being a noncreator; an¢ a column which was not to the right comes to be on the right; but in neither case need the object in question acquire any new entity. The same holds true in the present case.
Response to (5) The difficulty about a passion and its subject is easily handled once it is recognized what a demonstrable passion is. It is not an external thing really existing in a subject. It is, on the contrary, a term which is predicable of its subject in the second mode of perseity and which can supposit for the same thing as that subject. In this way 'similar' and 'dissimilar' and 'equal' and 'unequal' are said to be passions of quality and quantity respectively.
Response to (6) Just because we find that different effects result from the fact that certain things are ordered and arranged in a different way, we should not think that the relation which they signify is the cause of the relevant effect. It is, on the contrary, the absolute things which are ordered in the relevant way that are the cause. One thing can be causative with regard to a thing it
Responses to Objections could not cause before simply because it has been brought closer to that thing. There is no need for the addition of some new thing. This is the case in music and painting. Things which formerly did not produce pleasure now do merely because they are arranged differently.
Response to (7) This difficulty about the distinction of the categories forces itself only upon some. Even Avicenna is one who finds it a notorious difficulty. But no one need be bothered by the difficulty. He has the right to examine alternatives. The Peripatetics, faithful to Aristotle, have a different account; they say that the distinction among the categories is not taken from a distinction among the things they designate, but rather from the distinction among questions that can be posed about some individual substance. Averroes makes this point in the seventh book of the Metaphysics.' But it should not be thought that the ten genera are things outside the soul or that they signify ten things in such a way that each is signified by just one genus. The teaching of the Peripatetics holds that the ten genera are ten terms designating the same things in different ways. Terms representing each of the eight parts of speech can all signify the same thing. 'White', 'being white', 'to be white',
'white-ly', and the remaining forms provide an example of this. The same thing holds in the case of the distinction among the categories; despite their distinction there is an identity among the things they designate.
Likewise, the distinction of being into absolute and relative is not a distinction of being qua being, but a distinction among terms. It is like the distinctions between abstract and concrete terms, proper and apellative terms, and nouns and adjectives. For on what basis coulda thing be called absolute?
Because it is distinguished from something else? In that case relations, which recent writers construe as external, would be absolute; for they are construed as things really different from everything else. Because it does not require or depend upon something else? In that case no accident would be an absolute thing, nor would substantial form, nor any created thing; for each one of these requires something else and depends on something else for its existence. Perhaps, things are to be called absolute which can be grasped by themselves and do not require any other term to be understood.
But, then, matter, all accidents, and even the Godhead turn out to be something less than absolute; for according to many thinkers matter cannot be understood without form; an accident without its subject; nor the Godhead without the notion of finite persons.
The point about the division of being outside the soul is clear to anyone who looks at the text in the sixth book of the Metaphysics.® The distinction is not a division of things outside the soul, but a distinction among 5 Aristotelis Opera, 164, recto, B.
Responses to Objections terms. This is clear from what is said in the Categories and in the fifth book of the Metaphysics." In one place he says that composition and division do not belong to the things that the mind combines and divides. In the other he says that being is said in as many senses as there are categories; for one signifies what something is; another how it is qualified; and another how it is quantified. But it is clear that composition, division, and signification cannot be features of things, but only of terms.
Response to (8) Of the things that are customarily said about relations, many are improper and some are even false. This is clear to one who examines the books of recent writers on relations. Some of the common locutions, however, are in their intended sense true, e.g., 'The father is a father by paternity', 'The son is a son by fielty', 'The similar is similar by similarity', etc. In the case of such locutions there is no need to invent any object by means of which a father is a father; a son, a son; or a similar thing, similar. Neither is there any need to multiply objects in locutions like 'The column is to the right by dexterity', 'God creates by creation, is good by goodness, is just by justice, powerful by power', 'An accident inheres by inherence', 'The subject is subject by subjectivity', 'The suitable is suitable by suitability', 'The chimera is nothing by nothingness', 'The blind is blind by blindness', 'Body is mobile by mobility', and so on with innumerable other propositions.
If we are to make explicit and unambiguous each of these propositions, we must analyze them into two propositions employing a description in place of the name. Thus "The father is a father by paternity' becomes 'The father is a father because he begot a son', and 'The son is a son by fielty' becomes 'The son is a son because he was begotten'. 'The similar is similar by similarity' becomes 'The similar is similar because it has a quality of the same sort as something else'. The same kind of analysis holds with the other propositions.
But if one finds this technique for handling these propositions unsatisfactory, there is another way of preserving propositions of this type without multiplying entities. One can construe the abstract and relative terms (ie.,
'father' and 'paternity', 'son' and 'fielty', 'similar' and 'similarity') as signifying the same thing. Thus, 'The father is a father by paternity, i.e., by himself? and 'God is creator by His active creation, i.e. by Himself" (for 'active creation' does not signify anything over and above God). 'God is good by His goodness, i.e. by Himself (for His goodness is not something different from Himself).
Anselm provides us with an account of how relation can be called an accident in chapter 25 of the Monologion.® Unlike whiteness relation is not said to be an accident because it is a form actually informing the substance
8p_L., T. 158, 178 D-179A.
Responses to Objections of which it is said. It is an accident because it is a term predicable of something contingently; it can be successively affirmed and denied because of a change in that of which it is predicated or, as in the case of terms like
'equality', 'similarity', 'lord', and 'creator', because of a change in something else.
Response to (9) Nor can one argue from the union of matter and form, subject and accident, parts in a whole, or spirits and bodies to the conclusion that there is something, the relative thing, lying between the things united. For the same question can be asked of these mediating things—how can they, by being added to something else, produce one thing? They do it either by themselves
(but, of course, this could be said of the original objects) or by some further union (in which case we would have a regress into infinity). For let the mediating object be separated by some power from the things it unites, then let it be united with them as an accident is united with its subject. How is it in this case that distinct things are united? Is it by way of some further mediating entity? In that case the previous difficulty arises again.
Briefly, one should say, as Aristotle teaches in the eighth book of the Metaphysics (where he asks how matter and form make one thing), that one thing is act and the other, potency.® Since one is act and the other is potency, each is capable of uniting with the other in its own way. Or the things united are each act and potency, for we do not always have a case of act informing something else. On the contrary sometimes one thing informs another; sometimes one thing moves another; sometimes one thing rules and governs another; and so on.
Response to (10) From Aristotle's own remarks it is clear that for him there is nothing problematical in one and the same thing being designated by different categories, for he says that knowledge and the knowable as well as sense and the sensible are in the category of relation and in other categories besides.
Nor is there anything problematical in his saying that the proposition in which one category is denied of another is immediate. The point here is not related to the diversity of things they designate. The point is rather that one category is not predicated of another by direct predication in the first mode of perseity. Every such predication is per accidens. Likewise, while the same thing is designated by 'creation' and 'conservation', one is denied of the other. The same point holds in the case at issue.
Therefore, we can conclude that Aristotle construed relations in the way we have claimed.
The contrary view has two sources. First, some lean too much on the peculiarities of speech found in philosophy books. This is a source of error