19 On the Individual
On the Individual But it should be noted that sometimes the extrinsic thing designated can be a proposition, the truth of which is required if existence is to be predicated of a thing. Thus, those who say that quantity is not something distinct from substance and quality claim that the name 'quantity' designates that the proposition 'Anything of which this term is predicated has its parts distant from cach other' is true.
It should also be noted that in many views the same thing can, in the broad sense of the term, be a genus with respect to one thing and a property or an accident with respect to others. Thus, with respect to some things quantity is a genus, viz., body, line, surface, etc. Nevertheless, in the view which claims that quantity is not something distinct from substance and quality, quantity is either an accident or a property with respect to substance and quality. But this is impossible when we take the term 'genus' in the strict sense. The same point holds in the case of species.
One might object that both being and one are universals but not genera, or one might say that the common notion universal is a universal and, nevertheless, that it is neither a genus nor species. In response, the following points should be made:
First, one can say that the relevant division concerns only universals that are not predicated ofall things. Being, however, is predicated of all things and one is either an accident or a property.
Second, it should be said that the common term universal is a genus and therefore, when 'genus' is predicated of a species it stands not for itself but for the species.
19: On the Individual Next we shall examine each of the five universals in some detail, but first we shall examine the notion of an individual, the notion of that which is contained under every universal. [t should be noted that among logicians the following names are convertible: 'particular', 'individual', 'suppositum', but among theologians 'individual' and 'suppositum' are not convertible. The reason is that while only a substance can be a suppositum, an accident can be an individual. In this chapter, however, we shall use the expressions in the way that logicians do.
In logic the term 'particular' has three senses. In the first sense that is said to On the Individual be a particular which is numerically one and not many. In this sense every universal is a particular. In another sense a particular is a thing outside the mind that is one and not many and not a sign of anything. In this sense every substance is a particular. In the third sense a particular is a sign proper to just one thing; it is also called a discrete term. Thus, Porphyry says that a particular is that which is predicated of one thing.' But this definition does not make any sense if it is construed as a definition of something existing outside the mind, e.g., Socrates or Plato or something of that nature. Such things are not predicated either of onc or of many. The definition must be understood as an account of a certain kind of sign, a sign which is proper to one thing and predicated of one thing. Put in another way, 'particular' is not predicated of anything which can supposit for several things in one and the same proposition.
But even taking the term 'particular' in this sense, it can be used in three ways. First, proper names like 'Socrates' and 'Plato' are particulars. Second, demonstrative pronouns are particulars. Thus, 'this' when used to refer to Socrates in 'This is a man' is a particular. Finally, the demonstrative pronoun, taken with some common term (e.g., 'this man' and 'this animal') is a particular. And just as one can distinguish senses of 'particular' one can distinguish senses of the expressions 'singular' and 'suppositum'.
When I was a student I learned a doctrine that has been passed on to us from the ancient philosophers. According to that doctrine the suppositum ofa common term can be either per se or per accidens. Thus, the per se supposita of the term 'white' are 'this white' and 'that white', but the per accidens supposita are
'Socrates', 'Plato', and 'that donkey'. No sense can be made of this distinction unless we use the term 'suppositum' to stand for particulars, in the sense of signs of things. Using the term 'suppositum' for something that is not a sign of things, it is impossible that a term have per se and per accidens supposita. But taking 'suppositum' in another way, i.e., for a term proper to one thing, then something is called a suppositum of a term because that term can be predicated of it (not for itself but for its significatum). The per se supposita of a general term are all those complex expressions formed by a demonstrative pronoun and the general term in question; whereas proper names and demonstrative pronouns are said to be the supposita per accidens of that term. Phrased in this way, the distinction between per se and per accidens supposita is important; for it is impossible for one of a pair of contraries to be truly predicated of a per sc suppositum of the other contrary. Thus, the following is impossible: this white thing is black. But ofa per accidens suppositum of one contrary, the other contrary can be predicated, although not during the period in which it is the suppositum. Thus, if 'Socrates' is now a suppositum of 'white', it still is possible
1 Isagoge, chapter II. See The Organon ofAristotle, trans O. F. Owen, (London:
Bohn, 1853) vol. 2, 617.