6 On Concrete and Abstract Names That Are Synonyms
6: On Concrete and Abstract Names That Are Synonyms Concrete and abstract names can, however, function in other ways. Sometimes concrete and abstract names are synonymous. To avoid confusion it should be pointed out that the expression 'synonym' has two senses, one narrow; the other, broad. In the narrow sense expressions are synonymous if all those who use them intend to use them to signify one and the same thing. I am not here using the term 'synonym' in this sense. More broadly, expressions are synonymous which simply signify the same thing (so that nothing is in any way signified by one of the terms which is not in the same way signified by the other). In this sense terms are called synonymous even when those using the terms do not believe that they signify the same thing, but rather think that something is signified by one which is not signified by the other. The terms 'God' and 'Godhead' provide an example. These terms are synonymous (in the broad sense) even though some people may think that 'God' signifies a certain whole and 'Godhead', a part of that whole. It is in this second sense that I intend to use the expression 'synonym' in this chapter and many others that follow.
I want to claim, then, that sometimes abstract and concrete names are synonymous, andI think that this is Aristotle's view also. He would agree that in each of the following cases we have synonymous expressions: 'God'—'Godhead',
'man'—'humanity', and 'animal'—'animality'. It is because such expressions are synonymous that language does not incorporate abstract terms to correspond to all concrete names. Thus, whereas writers frequently use the abstract forms
'humanity' and 'animality', they seldom or never use expressions like 'cattlehood', 'donkeyhood', and 'goathood'. The corresponding concrete forms— cattle','donkey', and 'goat'—are, however, all in general use. Ancient philosophers construed the terms 'cold'—'coldness' and 'heat'—'hotness' as pairs of synonymous names. In the same way they construed 'animal'—'animality' and 'man'—'humanity' as pairs of synonyms. These writers realized that expressions like 'cold'—'coldness' and 'heat'—'hotness' differ in number of syllables and that one term from each pair is concrete and the other abstract; nonetheless, they did not distinguish between the terms with respect to signification. As in the case of all synonymous terms they employed the plurality of names only because they wished to embellish style or something of that nature.
Aristotle and his Commentator maintain that some of the names of substances and the abstract names formed from them are synonymous. Synonymy exists when the abstract term supposits neither for an accident of the substance designated by the concrete term, nor for one of its parts, nor for a whole to On Concrete and Abstract Names That Are Synonyms which it belongs, nor for something completely distinct from it. According to these philosophers, 'animality' and similar abstract expressions function in this way; for 'animality' does not stand for an accident of an animal, nor for one of an animal's parts, nor for some whole of which animal is itself a part, nor for some extrinsic thing completely distinct from an animal.
Some deny that quantity is a thing distinct from substance and quality. In their view all such abstract terms as belong in the category of quantity or stand for properties of things falling under that category function in the same way. This, of course, does not hold for those who want to construe quantity as an absolute entity totally distinct from substance and quality. But if we adhere to the former view, we must say that 'quantified' and 'quantity' are synonymous; likewise, 'long'—'length', 'wide'—'width', 'deep'—'depth', and so on.
Those who say that figure is nothing different from quantity (or from substance and quality) must treat such abstract names as pertain to figure in the same way; and similarly for abstract expressions relating to the other species of quantity. Thus, they are forced to say that names like 'figure'"—
'figured', 'straight'—'straightness', 'curved'—'curvature', 'hollow'—'hollowness', and 'convex'—'convexity' are synonymous expressions. However, these philosophers are willing to construe such expressions as synonymous only if neither includes, even in a disguised way, some expression not included in the other.
Further, those who deny that relation is a thing really distinct from absolute entities must likewise hold that concrete and abstract relatives are synonymous names, i.e., expressions like 'father'—'fatherhood', 'similar'—'similarity', 'cause'—
'causality', 'risible'—'risibility', 'apt'—'aptitude', 'susceptible'—'susceptibility', and 'double'—'duplicity'.
Nevertheless, one could consistently hold this view about relations while maintaining that concrete and abstract relatives are not synonymous. One could claim that the abstract expression supposits for two things taken together.
Thus, one might say that 'similarity' supposits for two things which are similar.
But, then, it would be false to say that the similar thing is similarity, although it would be true to say that similar things are similarity. Likewise, those who hold the views about substance, quantity, and figure outlined earlier in the chapter could hold that in one sense no abstract and concrete terms are synonymous. I shall explain this point later. The thing to notice is that they could, then, hold that a proposition in which an abstract name is predicated of its concrete counterpart is always false. But those who hold the view I have outlined and wish to preserve talk about synonymy must grant that, in all cases where abstract and concrete terms are synonymous, predication in either direction is possible.
Thus, those who hold the relevant views about substance have to grant that the following are true propositions: 'A man is humanity', 'An animal is animality'; and, consequently, they are committed to the truth of propositions such as the following: 'Humanity runs', 'Animality is white', etc. Those who