9 On the Fourth Mode of Concrete and Abstract Names
9: On the Fourth Mode of Concrete and Abstract Names We need to discuss one last mode of abstract and concrete terms. Some abstract names are such that they supposit only for many things taken together while their concrete forms can be truly predicated ofjust one individual taken singly. 'People' and 'popular' provide an example. A man can be popular, but he cannot be a people. Likewise, those who claim that number is not an entity distinct from things enumerated are committed to the view that all abstract and concrete names pertaining to number are expressions like 'people' and 'popular'.
In this view one should claim that many men constitute a number and that many animals constitute a number and, more specifically, that the angles of a triangle constitute the number three and the angles of a square, the number four. The same holds true in other cases unless one wishes to follow the procedure of the previous chapter and claim that such predications fail because the relevant expressions are equivalent in signification to several expressions.
Although there may be other modes of abstract and concrete terms, enough has been said about this distinction and about the relevant analysis into several expressions. Thus, no one should blame me if I pass over some of these modes in this work. It is not my intention here to discuss every point and leave nothing for the clever student to examine on his own. My intention is rather to examine cursorily some basic issues to aid those untutored in logic.
10: On Connotative and Absolute Names We have examined the distinction between concrete and abstract names; now we shall consider another distinction among names, one which the scholastics frequently employ. This is the distinction between names that are purely absolute and names that are connotative. Purely absolute names are those which do not signify something principally and another thing (or the same thing) secondarily. Rather, everything signified by an absolute name is signified primarily.
The name 'animal' provides an example. This name signifies cattle, donkeys, men, and other animals; it does not signify one thing primarily and another
On Connotative and Absolute Names thing secondarily so that it is necessary for one item to be signified in the nominative case and another in one of the oblique cases, nor does the nominal definition of such a term exhibit any particles or names in different cases. Indeed,
Strictly speaking, absolute names do not have nominal definitions, for a name with a nominal definition has only one such definition. Where a word has a nominal definition, the meaning of that word cannot be expressed by different
Sentences, such that terms from one sentence signify things not in any way designated by terms from the other sentences. However, in the case of purely absolute terms the meaning of the name can be expressed by different sentences whose constitutive terms do not signify the same thing. For example, 'angel' is a purely absolute term (provided, of course, the name is taken to signify the substance and not the office of an angel). Now, there is not just one way of expressing the meaning of this name. On the contrary, one person can explicate the meaning of the name by saying, "By 'angel'
I mean a substance separated from matter;" but another can say, "'An angel isa substance which is both intellectual and incorruptible;" and still another can say, "An angel is a simple substance which does not enter into composition with any thing else." Now, each of these explicates the point of the name 'angel' as well as the others; nonetheless, in cach sentence there is a term which signifies something which is not signified in the same way by any term from the other two sentences; therefore, none of these is, properly speaking, a nominal definition. So it is generally with purely absolute names; none of them has what, in the strict sense, is called a nominal definition. Examples of such names are the following:
'man', 'animal', 'goat', 'stone', 'tree', 'fire', 'earth', 'water', 'heaven', 'whiteness', 'blackness', 'heat', 'sweetness', 'odor', 'flavor', and so on.
A connotative name, on the other hand, is one that signifies one thing primarily and another thing secondarily. Connotative names have what is, in the strict sense, called a nominal definition. In the nominal definition of a connotative term it is frequently necessary to put one expression in the nominative case and another in one of the oblique cases. The term 'white' provides an example. The term has a nominal definition, one expression of which is in the nominative case and another, in one of the oblique cases. Thus, if someone should ask for the nominal definition of 'white', the answer would be "something informed with whiteness" or "something having whiteness." It is clear that here we have one term in the nominative case and another in an oblique case. Further, sometimes a verb is found in the nominal definition ofaconnotative name. Thus, if one asks the meaning of 'cause', the correct response is
"something upon the existence of which another thing follows" or "something capable of producing something else" or something of that sort.
All the concrete names functioning in the first way outlined in chapter 5 are connotative terms, for all those concrete names signify something in the nominative case and something else in an oblique case; that is, in the nominal defiOn Connotative and Absolute Names nition of those names, an expression signifying one thing is in the nominative case and an expression signifying something else is in one of the oblique cases.
This is clear with names like the following: 'just', 'white', 'besouled', 'human', and with other such names as well.
Likewise, all relative names are connotative, because in the definition of a relative name, there are different expressions which signify different things or the same thing in different modes. The name 'similar' provides an example.
Should one define 'similar', he would say, "that is similar which has a quality of the same sort as another thing," or something to the same effect.
It is clear, then, that when we take the term in its broadest sense, the name 'connotative' is more general than 'relative'.
Furthermore, those who maintain that quantity is not an entity distinct from substance and quality must claim that all names from the genus of quantity are connotative. Thus, they must say that 'solid' is a connotative term, for in their view a solid is simply a thing whose parts are separated from each other in length, breadth, and depth. In the same way they claim that the nominal definition of 'continuous quantity' is simply 'A thing having its parts lying at a distance from each other'. Thus, to be consistent, they must hold that terms like 'figure', 'curvature', 'straightness', 'length', and 'height' are connotative names. Indeed, those who claim that every entity is either a substance or a quality must hold that all the expressions in the categories other than substance and quality are connotative names. As will be shown later, they must even hold this with respect to some of the names in the genus of quality.
Expressions like 'true', 'good', 'one', 'potency', 'act', 'intellect', 'intelligible', 'will', and 'desirable' must also be construed as connotative names. Thus, the nominal definition of 'intellect' is as follows: 'The intellect is a soul capable of understanding'. Here, the soul is signified in the nominative case and the act of understanding by the rest of the sentence. The name 'intelligible' is also a connotative term; it signifies the intellect in both the nominative case and an oblique case. Thus, the definition goes: 'The intelligible is something which can be apprehended by the intellect'. Here, the intellect is signified both by the term 'something' and the term 'intellect'. The same thing must be said with regards to 'true' and 'good'; 'true' is convertible with 'being'; therefore, it signifies the same thing as 'intelligible'. Similarly, 'good' is convertible with 'being', and it signifies the same thing as the phrase, 'something which, according to right reason, can be willed and loved'.
11: On Names of First and Second Imposition All divisions we have considered so far apply both to terms which naturally signify and to terms which are merely conventional signs. Now we shall examine some divisions that are drawn only among terms that are conventional signs.
First of all, among names that signify conventionally, some are names of first imposition and others, names of second imposition. Names of second imposition are those which are used to signify conventional signs and all such features as pertain to conventional signs in their function as conventional signs.
The common term 'name of second imposition' has two senses however. In the broad sense names of second imposition are those which signify conventional utterances. An expression which is, in this sense, a term of second imposition may also signify intentions of the soul or natural signs; but it is only as signs of conventional utterances that they are terms of second imposition. In their application in grammar expressions like 'name', 'pronoun', 'verb', 'conjunction', 'case', 'number', 'mood', and 'tense' are all, in the broad sense, terms of second imposition. These names are called names of names; the reason for this is that they are used to signify parts of speech insofar as they are significant. Those names, on the other hand, which are predicated of verbal utterances whether or not they are significant are not called names of second imposition.
Thus, although names like 'quality', 'utterance', and 'spoken word' signify conventional signs and are true of them, they also signify verbal utterances which are not significant, consequently, they are not names of second imposition.
The expression 'name', however, is a name of second imposition, for the word 'man' was not some other name before it was used to signify; likewise, the exPression 'of man' did not have a case before it was used to signify; the same holds true of other such expressions.
In the narrow sense expressions are names of second imposition which, while signifying only conventional signs, can never apply to intentions of the ~ soul, natural signs. Examples are 'figure', 'conjugation', and similar expressions.
All other names (ic., those which are names of second imposition in neither the first nor second sense) are names of first imposition.
However, 'name of first imposition' has two senses. In the broad sense all names which are not names of second imposition are names of first imposition.
In this sense syncategorematic signs like 'every', 'no', 'some', and 'all' are names of first imposition. In the narrow sense only those categorematic names which are not names of second imposition are called names of first imposition. In this sense syncategorematic names are not names of first imposition.
Taking the expression 'name of first imposition' in the narrow sense, there On Names of First and Second Intention wk} are two sorts of names of first imposition; for some are names of first intention, and others are names of second intention. Names of second intention are those employed to signify intentions of the soul or natural signs, some conventional signs, and features accompanying such signs. Examples are 'genus', 'species', 'universal', 'predicable', etc. Each of these names signifies only natural or conventional signs.
But the common term 'name of second intention' has both a broad and a narrow sense. In the broad sense an expression is called a name of second intention if it signifies intentions of the soul, natural signs, whether or not it also signifies conventional signs in their capacity as signs. In this sense names of second intention can be either names of first or second imposition.
12: On Names of First and Second Intention In the previous chapter I indicated that certain expressions are names of first intention and others, names of second intention. Ignorance of the meanings of these terms is a source of error for many; therefore, we ought to see what names of first and second intention are and how they are distinguished.
First, it should be noted that an intention of the soul is something in the soul capable of signifying something else. Earlier we indicated how the signs of writing are secondary with respect to spoken signs. Among conventional signs spoken words are primary. In the same way spoken signs are subordinated to the intentions of the soul. Whereas the former are secondary, the latter are primary. It is only for this reason that Aristotle says that spoken words are signs of the impressions of the soul.! Now, that thing existing in the soul which is the sign of a thing and an element out of which a mental proposition is composed
(in the same way as a spoken proposition is composed of spoken words) is called by different names. Sometimes it is called an intention of the soul; sometimes an impression of the soul; and sometimes the similitude of the thing. Boethius, in his commentary on the De Interpretatione, calls it an intellect.2 He does not, of course, mean that a mental proposition is composed of intellects in the sense ofintellectual souls. He only means that a mental proposition is composed of those intellective things which are signs in the soul signifying
On Names of First and Second Intention other things. Thus, whenever anyone utters a spoken proposition, he forms beforehand a mental proposition. This Proposition is internal and it belongs to no particular spoken language. But it also happens that people frequen tly form internal propositions which, because of the defect of their language, they do not know how to express externally. The parts of such mental propositions are called concepts, intentions, likenesses, and "intellects".
But with what items in the soul are we to identify such signs? There are a vatiety of opinions here. Some say a concept is something made or fashioned by the soul. Others say it is a certain quality distinct from the act of the understanding which exists in the soul as in a subject. Others say that it is simply the act of understanding. This last view gains support from the principle that one ought not postulate many items when he can get by with fewer. Moreover, all the theoretical advantages that derive from postulating entities distinct from acts of understanding can be had without making such a distinction, for an act of understanding can signify something and can supposit for some thing just as well as any sign. Therefore, there is no point in postulating anything over and above the act of understanding. But I shall have more to say about these different views later on. For the moment, we shall simply say that an intention is something in the soul which is either a sign naturally signifying something else (for which it can supposit) or a potential clement in a mental proposition.
But there are two kinds of intentions. One kind is called a first intention.
This is an intention which signifies something that is not itself an intention of the soul, although it may signify an intention along with this. One example is the intention of the soul predicable of all men; another is the intention that is predicable of all whitenesses, blacknesses, etc.
But the expression 'first intention' can be understood in two senses. In the broad sense an intentional sign in the soul is a first inten tion if it does not signify only intentions or signs. In this broad sense first in tentions include not only intentions which so signify that they can supposit in a proposition for their significata, but also intentions which, like syncategorematic in tentions, are only signs in an extended sense. In this sense mental verbs, mental syncategorematic expressions, mental conjunctions, and similar terms are first intentions. In the narrow sense only those mental names that are capable ofsuppositing for their significata are called first intentions.
A second intention, on the other hand, is an intention of the soul which is a sign of first intentions. Examples are genus, species, and the like. One intention common to all men is predicated of all men when we say, "This man is a man; that man is a man;.. ." (and so on for all individual men). In the same way, we predicate an intention common to intentions signifying things when we say,
"This species is a species; that species is a species; . . ." (and so on). Again, when we say "Stone is a genus," "Animal isa genus," and 'Color is a genus," we predicate one intention of another just as we predicate one name of different names