72. Responses to Objections
Responses to Objections mal; igitur videns omnem hominem est hoc animal vel videns omnem hominem est illud animal vel ..
. (and so for all the relevant particulars). But in 'Omnem hominem videns est animal', the sign distributes the whole 'hominem videns', so that the predicate does not stand determinately. The same thing happens in the case of 'Every man's donkey runs', for here the predicate supposits confusedly only. However, in 'The donkey of every man runs', the predicate stands determinately. Likewise, in the case of 'A man is not an animal', 'man' stands or supposits determinately; but because the negation which determines the verb preceeds it, 'animal' does not stand determinately. Likewise, in the case of 'Socrates differs from man' the predicate does not supposit determinately; for the verb 'differs' includes a negation.
72: Responses to Objections But there are difficulties with the foregoing account.
(1) First, assuming that Socrates does not exist, how does 'man' supposit in 'Socrates was a man'? Likewisc, how do terms supposit in propositions concerning the past and future and in propositions concerning the possible and the other modalities? The source of doubt here is the earlier claim that a term never supposits for something unless it can be truly predicated of it.
But if Socrates does not exist, 'man' cannot be truly predicated of Socrates; for 'Socrates is a man' is false. Thus, the term does not supposit for Socrates, so that it does not supposit determinately.
(2) Second, there is a difficulty in the case of cach of the following propositions: 'The white man is a man', 'The one singing the mass is a man', and 'The one creating is God'. If we assume that no one is white, that no one is singing the mass, and that God does not create, for which objects are we to say that the relevant subjects supposit? It seems that they do not supposit for any of the things they signify because they are not truly predicated of those things. Nor do they supposit for themselves, for in that case they would not have personal supposition. But, then, they do not supposit determinately for anything, so that they do not have determinate supposition.
(3) The third difficulty concerns the form of supposition exhibited by the subjects in 'A horse is promised to you' and 'Twenty pounds are owed you'.
The source of the difficulty lies in the fact that if the terms supposit for the things contained under them, the propositions seem false, inasmuch as each of the relevant singular propositions is false. Thus, if the subject-terms supposit determinately, the propositions each come out false.
Responses to Objections (4) The fourth difficulty concerns propositions like 'He is deprived of sight' and 'He was born capable of possessing sight'.
(5) The fifth difficulty: what kind of supposition does the predicate have in 'Genera and species are second substances'?
(6) The sixth difficulty concerns propositions like 'Action is a thing outside the soul', 'Relation is a real thing', and 'Creation is really the same thing as God'.
(7) The seventh difficulty concerns the proposition 'He was twice white'; for it does not seem that 'white' supposits determinately here.
(8) The eighth difficulty: how do the subject and predicate supposit in 'Only what is an animal is a man'?
Likewise, there is a difficulty in the case of propositions like 'The Apostle says this', 'England fights', 'Drink the cup', 'The prow is at sea', 'Your goodness acts mercifully', 'The clemency of the king rules the kingdom'.
Response to (1) The response to the first difficulty is that in all such propositions the terms supposit personally. Thus, it should be understood that a term supposits personally when it supposits for things that are its significata or for things that were, will be, or can be its significata. My earlier claim should be understood in this way. It is for this reason that I earlier said that 'to signify' can in one sense be used in this way. Nevertheless it should be noted that a term cannot supposit with respect to any verb for what is not now its significatum. Although it can supposit for the things it signifies in the strict sense with respect to any verb, it can supposit for things that were its significata only with respect to past tense verbs. Therefore, one must always distinguish in the case of a proposition with a past tense verb, for the relevant term can supposit for things that are its significata or for things that were its significata. Likewise, a term cannot supposit for things that will be its significata except with respect to a future tense verb. Thus, in a proposition with a future tense verb one must drawa distinction: is the term suppositing for things that are or for things that will be its significata? Again, a term cannot supposit for things that are not but can be its significata except with respect to a verb of possibility or contingency, so we must always draw a distinction where propositions incorporate such verbs: is the subject suppositing for things that are or for things that can be or contingently are?
Thus, one must distinguish in the case of each of the following: 'Every man was white', 'Every white thing will be a man', 'Every white thing can be a man', and 'It is contingent that every man runs'.
Nonetheless, it should be understood that the relevant distinction does not concern the predicate but only the subject. Thus, there is no need to draw a distinction in the case of the following two propositions: 'Socrates was white' and 'Socrates can be white'. The reason is that the predicate
Responses to Objections names its form. This should not be understood to mean that the predicate supposits for itselfor for the relevant concept. The point is that where the proposition concerns the past, the assertion is that the proposition in which that predicate (under its proper form) is predicated of that for which the subject supposits (or of the pronoun referring to that thing) was once true. If the proposition concerns the future the assertion is that the relevant proposition will be true. If the proposition concerns the possible the assertion is that the relevant proposition is possible, and similarly in the case of propositions that are necessary, impossible, per se, per accidens and so on for the other modalities. For example, for the truth of 'The white was black', it is not required that it was ever true that the white is black. What is required is that 'This is black' was once true, where the reference is to something for which the subject supposits in 'The white was black'. Likewise, for the truth of 'The true will be impossible', it is not necessary that 'The true is impossible' ever be true. It is, rather, necessary that 'This is impossible' will be true where the reference is to something for which the subject in 'The true will be impossible' supposits. The same sort of account holds in other cases. I will consider them in greater detail in the treatise on propositions and consequences.
As regards 'Socrates was a man', I say that the predicate supposits for Socrates. The same point holds in the case of all propositions concerned with the past, the future, and the modalities. Terms suppositing personally in such propositions supposit for those things that are, were, will be, or are capable of being their supposita; and if no sign, negation, or some other such expression stands in the way, they supposit determinately.
But, then, the response to this objection is that it is correct to say that a term never supposits for something unless it is truly predicated ofit. But this is not to say that a term never supposits for something unless it is truly predicated of it by means of a present tense verb. Where it supposits for a thing with respect to a past tense verb, it suffices that the term be truly predicated ofthe thing by meansof a past tense verb. If it supposits with respect to a future tense verb, then the requirement is that it be truly predicated by means of a future tense verb and so on for the other cases. Thus, assume that although no man is now white, Socrates formerly was. Then. if it is taken for things that formerly were, 'white thing' in 'The white thing was a man' supposits for Socrates. Therefore, it is truly predicated of Socrates, but not by means of a present tense verb. The predication holds with respect to a past tense verb; for this is true, 'Socrates was white'.
But the difficulty still remains. For what does the predicate in 'Socrates was white' supposit? If it supposits for things that are, the proposition is false. The response here is that the predicate supposits for the things that were, regardless of whether they still are; therefore we have an exception to the rule J stated earlier—that in any proposition in which it occurs, a term
Responses to Objections always does or can supposit for things that now are. I meant that rule to hold only for subjects of propositions. In the case of predicates it does not hold universally. Thus, suppose that no man is now white but that many men were formerly white. Then, in the proposition 'The man was white', the predicate cannot supposit for things that are, but only for things that were.
Thus, generally, a predicate in a proposition concerning the past does not supposit for anything except for that which was. In propositions concerning the future the predicate only supposits for things that will be, and in propositions concerning the possible for things that can be. With this however, it is necessary that the same predicate be predicated of that for which the subject supposits in the aforementioned way.
Response to (2) The response to the second difficulty is that if no man is white, and if no man sings the mass, and if God does not create, the subjects in the preceding propositions supposit for nothing. Nonetheless, they are used significatively, for a term can be used significatively or can supposit personally in two ways: either the term supposits for one or more of its significata or the term is asserted to supposit or not to supposit for something. In affirmative propositions a term is always asserted to supposit for something. Thus, if it supposits for nothing the proposition is false. However, in negative propositions the assertion is either that the term does not supposit for something or that it supposits for something of which the predicate is truly denied.
Thus, a negative proposition has two causes of truth. 'A man is not white', for example, has two causes of truth; for either there are no men, so that no man can be white; or there is a man but he is not white. But if no man is white, then the subject of 'The white man is a man' supposits significatively and personally, not because it supposits for something but because it is asserted to supposit for something. Thus, since the assertion is that the term supposits for something, the fact that it supposits for nothing has the consequence that the proposition is false. If some of my earlier remarks appear incompatible with this account, they should be understood to cover true affirmative propositions; for if a term stands personally in a true affirmative proposition it supposits for some of its significata in the way outlined earlier.
One might contend that the notions of 'to supposit' and 'to supposit for nothing' are incompatible since the following is a valid inference: the term supposits; therefore, it supposits for something. The response is that the inference is not valid. The following, however, is valid: the term supposits; therefore it is asserted either to supposit for something or to supposit for nothing.
Response to (3) The response to the third objection is that the proposition 'A horse is promised you' and 'Twenty pounds are owed you' are, strictly speaking,
Responses to Objections false; for each of the relevant singular propositions is false as is inductively clear, Nevertheless, if we move the problematical terms to the predicateside of the relevant propositions, there is a way of rendering those propositions so that they pose no difficulty. Once they have been moved it is necessary to say that the terms following the relevant verbs have, in virtue of the force of those verbs, merely confused supposition. Thus, it is not possible to descend disjunctively to particulars, but only by way of a disjunctive predicate enumerating not only present but also future objects. Thus, the inference 'I promise you a horse; therefore I promise you this horse or I promise you that horse or .
. 2 (and so on for all the relevant particulars) is not valid. The following inference, however, is valid:
I promise you a horse; therefore, I promise you this horse or that horse or that horse or...
(and so on for all the relevant particulars including not only present but also future horses). The reason we must enumerate both present and future horses is that all such verbs in the final analysis incorporate a future tense verb. Thus, 'I promise you a horse' is equivalent to 'You will have a horse as a gift from me', so that in 'I promise you a horse', the word 'horse' supposits for future horses just as it does in "You will have a horse'.
But does 'horse' in 'I promise you a horse' have what is properly called merely confused supposition? The answer is that strictly speaking 'horse' does not exhibit merely confused supposition. It does not supposit at all since it is merely a part of the extreme. The rule I stated earlier about determinate supposition was stated only apropos of expressions which supposit in the strict sense, i.e., the extremes of propositions and not just the parts of extremes. Nevertheless, extending the usage, it can be said that the word 'horse' has merely confused supposition; for it follows the relevant sort of verb. Universally, a common term which follows a verb of the relevant kind and is only a part of the extreme always has merely confused personal supposition and not determinate supposition.
Thus, it should be noted that propositions of this sort in the present, past or future, sometimes incorporate a verb with a force such that what is asserted is that some proposition in which a common term is placed on the predicate-side will be or ought to be true. The assertion then is not that some singular proposition in which a particular contained under the common term is placed on the side of the predicate will be true. In the case of this sort
(if we extend the term 'supposit' in such a way that a part of an extreme can supposit), the common term does not supposit determinately; for it is not possible to descend to particulars by a disjunctive proposition, but only by a proposition with a disjunctive extreme or with an extreme having a disjunctive part. Thus,1 promise you a horse', given the force of 'I promise', asserts that 'I give you a horse' (or something similar) will be or ought to be true sometime. The assertion is not that a proposition like 'I give you
Responses to Objections this horse' (where the reference is to some particular horse) will be or ought to be true. Thus, it does not follow that if I promise you a horse, I promise you this horse or I promise you that horse. The same point holds in the case of 'I owe you 20 pounds'.
Thus, while 'I promise you a horse' should be granted, 'A horse is promised you' should not, strictly speaking, be granted. The reason is that in "A horse is promised you', the word 'horse' is the subject and not a part of the subject. Thus, it is necessary that it supposit determinately; for no sign (of universality), no negation, nor any expression including such precedes the term. Consequently, it is necessary that one be able to make the descent to particulars. But in 'I promise you a horse', the word 'horse' is not an extreme, but a part of an extreme. The whole predicate is 'promising you a horse', for 'I promise you a horse' is equivalent to 'I am promising you a horse' and here 'horse' is only a part of the extreme. The term need not exhibit what is properly called supposition. Thus, it need not supposit determinately; and, consequently, one need not be able to make the descent to a disjunctive proposition of the relevant sort.
But is it not possible to descend with respect to a part of the extreme?
The response is that sometimes a descent is possible. Thus, the following is valid: he gives a horse to Socrates; therefore, he gives this horse to Socrates or he gives that horse to Socrates or .
. (and so on for all the relevant particulars). But sometimes for a special reason of the sort involved in the present case, it is not possible to make the descent. Thus, although 'I promise you a horse' should be granted, 'A horse is promised you' should, strictly speaking, not be granted. Nevertheless, it can be granted inasmuch as it is commonly taken to mean 'Someone promises you a horse'. But why the inference 'Someone promises you a horse; therefore a horse is promised you' is not valid will be considered in the treatise on the proposition.
Response to (4) The response to the fourth difficulty is that in the proposition 'He is deprived of sight', the word 'sight' does not actually supposit. The reason is that it is only a part of an extreme. Nevertheless, to the extent that it can supposit, it supposits confusedly and distributively; for the proposition is equivalent to 'He has no sight' where 'sight' is negatively expressed in a confused and distributive manner. Nevertheless, it does not supposit confusedly and distributively in every proposition involved in the analysis of the original proposition. Thus, in the affirmative proposition 'He was born apt to have sight', it can be said in a way to supposit determinately for those things that were at one time possible. It does not, however, supposit for all such things, but only for those which were capable of belonging to the man in question.
Responses to Objections Response to (5) The response to the fifth difficulty is that strictly speaking while "Genera and species are substances' is false, one can grant 'Genera and species are second substances'. There the word 'second substances' supposits personally and determinately, for the name 'second substances' is used to signify second intentions designating real substances. Thus, it is wrong to claim that 'substance' can have simple supposition and, nevertheless, supposit for genera and species. But if upon occasion one finds an author saying that genera and species are substances, the claim should be interpreted as follows: either the author understands the signified act by the effected act, so that by 'Genera and species are substances' he means * "Substance" is predicated of genera and species', where the signified act is effected in propositions like
Man is a substance', 'Animal is a substance', etc. Or one should explain the author's claim by pointing out that 'substance' is being used equivocally. For sometimes the term signifies real things which are actually distinct from every real accident and every second intention. In that use 'substance' is properly employed. But sometimes it signifies those intentions which designate the things that are called substances in the first sense. Interpreted in this way one should grant the proposition 'Genera and species are substances', and one should grant that under this interpretation 'substances' is suppositing personally; nonetheless, it is not being employed properly, but improperly and in an extended sense.
Response to (6) The response to the sixth difficulty is that different people use such abstract names in different ways. Sometimes they use them for things and sometimes for names. If they are used in the first way then it should be said that according to Aristotle, they supposit for the same things as their concrete counterparts. Thus, 'Fire is a cause' is equivalent to 'Fire is causality'. Likewise, 'The man is a father' and 'The man is paternity' are equivalent. Indeed, where the abstract names are used to signify the same things, concrete and abstract names are, in the account provided by Aristotle and many other philosophers, synonymous expressions.
Nor should this be surprising, for take the proposition 'Creation is a real thing'. Either 'creation' supposits for something or for nothing. If for nothing, then there will be no genuine proposition or the proposition will be false.
If it supposits for something, it supposits for an external object, for a thing in the soul, or for something that is an aggregate of these. If it supposits for an external object, what is that object? It can only be God; therefore, 'creation' supposits for God in the same way that 'creating' does. The same account applies in every other such case. Some hold that this term supposits for a relation of the reason, but it is impossible that it supposit for someResponses to Objections thing in the soul because then 'Creation is a real thing' would be false. Likewise, creation would only exist in the soul, and God would be creative only in virtue of the act of the soul forming the relevant relation of the reason.
By the same logic one could maintain that 'heat-induction' supposits for such a being or relation of the reason. Nor is there any good reason why such a relation should be in a created agent and not in an uncreated agent. According to the Philosopher's view, then, there is nothing which could be signified or connoted by a concrete term of this sort that is not in the same say signified or connoted by the relevant abstract name. Therefore, for him, if both are used to signify a thing, they will be synonymous names.
Nor can one say that the mode of signifying stands in the way of synonymy. Diversity in mode of signification does not prevent synonymy unless because of the diversity of mode of signification something is signified or connoted by one name which is not in the same way connoted or signified by the other. This happens in the case of the terms 'man', Man's', and 'men'. It also happens in the case of 'man' and 'risible' and in the case of 'intellect', 'will', and 'soul'. Likewise, in the case of 'creating', 'governing',
'damning', 'living', and other such expressions which, while predicated of the same thing, are not synonymous. If diversity of mode of signification were by itself a hinderance to synonymy, I could claim that 'story' and 'tale' are not synonymous since while 'story' ends in 'y', 'tale' does not. The same point holds in many other cases. Thus, differences in grammatical features such as gender or part of speech do not prevent synonymy.
Nonetheless, where there is what is strictly called a variation in mode of signification, there is no synonymy. But there is no such variation in the present case. That is clear.
A concrete name and an abstract name can have exactly the same mode of signification if they are not abstract and concrete names of the first sort. (See the relevant section at the beginning of this treatise.) Thus when the relevant abstract names are used significatively for things, they are in Aristotle's view synonymous with their concrete forms.
Theologians, however, may find it necessary to provide a different account in some, but not all, such cases.
Sometimes, on the other hand, abstract names of this sort are used to signify their concrete forms. 'Privation', 'negation', 'contradiction', and other similar words are used in this way. Thus, in 'Man is a relation', the word
'relation' supposits significatively and for relative names. Likewise 'similarity' sometimes supposits for a relative name—the relative name 'similar'. 'Creation' sometimes supposits for the name 'creating' and 'quantity', for 'quantum'. In Aristotle's view this point holds in the many cases where abstract and concrete names do not supposit for distinct things. Therefore, just as we granted that the predicate 'real thing' is predicated of such abstract names, we should grant that their concrete forms are predicated of them and that they supposit for the same thing as the concrete forms. For as has