42 On Substance
This is what I meant whenI said that the abstract terms are in the category per se and the concrete forms by reduction. But in this issue the difficulty is more verbal than real, so I shall not dwell on it. It is sufficient to know that every simple term which can be used to answer a question raised about a substance is in a category. It makes no difference whether it is an adverb, verb, name, or preposition with its object. But some simple terms are not in any category. Thus, conjunctions and syncategorematic terms are not subsumed under any category; for by terms like 'if', 'and', 'every', and 'no', one cannot respond to any of the questions which can be raised about a substance. However, should it turn out that some of these terms can, in some way, be used to respond to a definite question, although not to all of the questions, then those terms can be subsumed under the categories.
42: On Substance Although we have hardly exhausted the general remarks that can be made about the categories, we shall now examine each of the particular categories in detail. First, we shall consider substance.
It should first be noted that 'substance' has many senses. In one sense substance is said to be anything that is distinct from other things. Writers use the word 'substance' in this sense when they speak of the substance of whiteness, the substance of color, etc.
In a stricter sense substance is anything which is not an accident inhering in something else. In this sense both matter and form as well as the whole composed of these are called substances.
In the strictest sense substance is that which is neither an accident inhering in another thing nor an essential part of something else, although it can combine with an accident. It is in this sense that substance is said to be a summum genus, and according to Aristotle it is divided into first and second substance.
But this should not be construed as the sort of division where the term divided can be predicated of the items dividing it, nor is the term divided predicable of the pronouns referring to the items dividing it. For when the reference is to a second substance, the proposition 'This is a substance' is false. Thus, the proposition 'No second substance is a substance' is true, and On Substance we can prove this by employing points established earlier. Earlier we established that no universal is a substance; but every second substance is a universal, since according to Aristotle second substances are either genera or species; therefore, no second substance is a substance.
Again, according to the teaching of Aristotle whatever is universally denied of everything immediately contained under some common term is universally denied of the common term itself, but 'second substance' is denied of everything immediately contained under 'substance'; therefore it is universally denied of substance. Thus, 'No substance is a second substance' is true, so, we can conclude, no second substance is a substance. My assumption is clear, for this is true: 'No corporeal substance is a second substance', as is the proposition, 'No incorporeal substance is a second substance'. We can show that the first of these is true (the same technique could be applied in the case of the second) by repeating the basic pattern of argument; for it is true that no besouled body is a second substance and, similarly, that no souless body is a second substance. We can show that the first of these is true (the same technique could be applied in the case of the second) by repeating the same basic pattern of argument; for it is true that no besouled body capable of perception is a second substance and, similarly, that no besouled body incapzble of perception is a second substance.
We can show that the first of these is true (the same technique could be applied in the case of the second) by again repeating the basic pattern of argument; for it is true that no besouled body which is capable of perception and rational is a second substance and, similarly, that no besouled body capable of perception, but who is irrational is a second substance. Clearly, the first of these is true; for it is convertible with the true proposition 'No man is a second substance'; and this last proposition is clearly true since each of the singular propositions supporting it is true. We are forced, then, to grant the Aristotelian view that no substance is a second substance. Therefore, when one refers to a second substance less general than 'substance' itse:f, the proposition 'This is a substance' is false.
It should be said that the division is a division of a common name into less common names. It is equivalent to the following division: of names signifying or designating substances outside the mind, some are names proper to just one substance (these names are first substances) and others are names common to many substances (these names are called second substances).
Names which are second substances are further divided; some are genera and others are species. Nonetheless, all second substances are really just qualities.
Thus, all those common names that are called second substances are in the category of quality at least in one sense of 'to be in a category', for the term
'quality' is always predicable of the pronoun referring to a second substance.
However, in another sense all second substances are in the category of substance, since 'substance' is always predicable of them when they are taken significatively. Thus, in the propositions 'Man is an animal' and 'Man is a On Substance substance', 'man' supposits not for itself but for what it signifies. For if it were to supposit for itself, 'Man is a substance' would be false and 'Man is a quality' would be true. Likewise, if the word 'man' supposits for itself, the propositions
'Man is a substance' is false and the proposition 'Man is a word and a quality' is true. Second substances, then, are simply certain names and qualities signifying just substances. It is for this reason and no other that they are said to be in the category of substance.
It is clear that this account is in agreement with the remarks of the authors, for in the Categories the Philosopher says that "every substance seems to signify what is a this-something; of first substances it is indubitably true that they signify what is a this-something."! From this passage it is clear that Aristotle holds that first substances signify what is a this-some thing, but particular substances existing outside the mind do not signify what is a this-something. They are on the contrary things that are signified; therefore, Aristotle is here calling the names of particular substances existing outside the mind first substances. But then a fortiori, he must call the relevant names second substances.
Again several times in his commentary on the Categories, Boethius indicates that in that treatise the Philosopher is dealing with words and that, consequently, he calls words themselves first and seconc substances."
Likewise, Aristotle says that first and second substances are in the category of substance, and in the same treatise he stipulates that the only items falling under the categories are the simple terms out of which propositions are composed.? Propositions, however, are not composed of substances existing outside the mind; therefore...
Again, Damascene stipulates that only names are to be subsumed under the category of substance.* Therefore, it is not at all incompatible with the remarks of the authors to say that Aristotle calls the common names of substances second substances, nor does Aristotle's own remark that "species are substances more than genera" present any difficulty here.® By remarks of this sort Aristotle only means that we can provide a more appropriate answer to the question "What is it?" (asked of some substance) by stating the species rather than the genus. Thus, although a proposition like 'Species are substances more than genera' is, literally taken, false, the point the Philosopher intended to make by the proposition is true.
To sum up: the division in question is a division among names; some are proper and some are common. Proper names are said to be first substances and common names second substances.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the Philosopher uses the term 'first 13> 1o-1L.
2 Patrologiae, T. 64, 161 C-D.
4 pialectica, chapter 32, 8-9.
On Substance substance' equivocally in the Categories. For sometimes he uses it for the names of substances existing outside the soul as when he says, "First substance signifies what is a this-something";® but in other contexts he uses it for the substances themselves that exist outside the soul as when he says,
"Substance is that which properly, principally.
. . .""? Thus, when the Philosopher says "All other things are cither said of the principal substances or are in them as subjects,"® he is not using the term 'subject' for things which really underly other things, but for the subjects of propositions. As Damascene says in chapter 8 of his Logic, " 'Subject' is used in two senses; there is the subject with respect to existence; in this sense the singular substance existing outside the soul is the subject for accidents. There is also the subject with respect to predication; in this sense the particular is the subject with respect to that which is more universal than it."? The Philosopher uses the term in the second sense when he says that second substances are said of a subject. Thus, first substances are not subjects really underlying second subStances; they are subjects only by way of predication.
It is clear from this that the Philosopher sometimes calls names and signs of substances existing outside the soul first substances; for he says that second substances are said of first substances as subjects, but this could only be by way of predication. Thus, first substance is the subject in predication and second substance its predicate; but no proposition is composed of substances outside the soul; therefore, that first substance which is the subject of a proposition with respect to second substance is not a substance existing outside the soul. Thus, when Aristotle says that if first substances were destroyed it would be impossible for any of the other things to remain, he is not talking of real destruction and real existence.!° He means, rather, destruction by way of a negative proposition. Thus, he is saying that when 'to be' is not predicated of anything contained under a common term, it is truly denied of the common term itself as well as of the properties and accidents proper to that common term. He only means then that inferences such as the following are valid: 'This man is not; that man is not; that .
. (and so for all individual men); therefore no man is; therefore, nothing is risible, therefore, nothing is grammatical; therefore, there is no grammar; therefore, there is no logic'.
If he meant real destruction, what he says would be false; for although there were no stones, the genus stone could still exist; for it would still be possible for someone to form the propositions 'No man is a stone' and 'No stone is a donkey'; but neither of these could be formed unless the relevant parts of $3b 10, 728 11, 824 33.34.
*Diglectica, chapter 8, 21-28.
9°4.6, On the Properties of Substance the proposition were there beforehand. But that is just to say that the genus stone would exist. Of course given the present assumption, it could not be affirmatively predicated of anything in a proposition that is both de inesse and in the present tense.
43: On the Properties of Substance Now that we have seen which terms are to be placed in the categorical hierarchy of substance, we shall examine some of the properties of substance.
In the Categories, Aristotle mentions a property he claims is commonto all substances, both first and second substances—that substance is not in a subject.' If this property is understood to apply to substances existing outside the mind Aristotle's point is clear, for none of them is present in a subject.
If, on the other hand, the property is taken to hold of first and second substances (things which are names of substances existing outside the mind) then the proposition 'Substance is not in a subject' should be understood in terms of the following proposition, a case of an act signified,
* "To be in a subject" is predicated of no proper or common name of substance taken significatively; "to be in a subject" is denied of every such name significatively taken'. Thus, every proposition like the following is true, 'Man is not in a subject', 'Animal is not in a subject', 'Socrates is not in a subject'. Nevertheless, if such terms were suppositing for themselves and not their significata, it would be true to say that they are in a subject; for they are really just parts of propositions and consequently concepts of the mind or spoken or written words.
But Aristotle himself seems opposed to this account, for he grants that second substances are said of subjects and denies that they are in a subject; but if we take 'second substances' uniformly, then one of these two properties does not apply.
The response is that the Philosopher is not employing the term in just one way; nor is there any requirement that he do so. Frequently it is useful, in the interests of brevity, to employ one and the same term in different ways.
Thus, Aristotle only means that the common names of substances are predicaled of subjects; nevertheless, of these same naines, suppositing as they do in the relevant effected acts, one cannot truly predicate 'to be in a subject'.
On the Properties of Substance Thus, 'Socrates is an animal' is true; and of 'animal', suppositing as it does in 'Socrates is an animal', one cannot truly predicate 'to be in a subject'; for if 'animal' supposits in that way, 'Animal is in a subject' is false.
Another property of substance—one that belongs to all second substances— is that of being predicated univocally. This property does not belong only to second substances; it belongs to differences as well. It is not, however, a property of first substances.
It should be noted that, properly speaking, nothing is predicated univocally except that which is common to many, nothing except that which signifies many or is capable of signifying many. And, therefore, since first substances are each proper to just one individual and do not signify many, they are not predicated univocally. Second substances, however, signify many things. The name 'man' does not signify primarily one nature common to all men, as many mistakenly think; it signifies on the contrary all particular men primarily as we earlier showed by an appeal to Damascene. Whoever it was that first instituted the use of the term 'man' saw some particular man and coined the term to signify that man and every substance like him. It was not necessary that the common nature occur to the person instituting the use of the term for the simple reason that there is no such common nature. But even though it signifies indifferently many men, 'man' is not equivocal, for in signifying indifferently many men it is a sign subordinated to just one concept and not many.
A third property ascribed to substance consists in the fact that first substance signifies a this-something and second substance a such-like. Since signifying either a this-something or a such-like does not belong to substances existing outside the mind, but only to the signs of such substances, it is clear that the signs, both proper and common, of substances existing outside the mind are called first and second substances. The point must be granted.
Nonetheless, it should be noted that to signify a this-something is simply to signify one thing and not many things; whereas, to signify a such-like is to be capable of signifying many. Therefore, when Aristotle says that second substances signify such-like,? he does not mean that second substances signify a quality or something really present in an individual; for this is simply false.
That is clear from my previous remarks. He only means that second substances signify many and not just one. This can be proved by examining the relevant passages in the Categories. My commentary on the Categories makes this clear.
The fourth property of substance is that of having no contrary. It should be noted that there are two very different forms of contrariety. Contrariety can be a property of terms. Thus, we say that 'white' and 'black' are contraries since it is impossible that the two terms 'white' and 'black', while
On the Properties of Substance standing for the same thing, be truly predicable of that thing simultaneously.
Contrariety can also be a property of things. Here, the term has three senses— a strict sense, a broad sense, and a broadest sense. In the strict sense things are said to be contraries which, in a given subject, work towards expelling each other and which, when naturally replacing each other in a subject, do so by stages. In this sense no substance is contrary to any other. In the broad sense things are said to be contraries which, while working towards expelling each other in a subject, do not replace each other in their first subject by stages. In this sense substantial forms are contrary since they expel each other in one and the same matter. In the broadest sense those things are contraries which are composed of things that are contrary in the broad sense. Thus, air and fire are said to be contraries since they are composed of substantial forms that are contrary in the broad sense. Nothing substantial is contrary in the first sense; but in the second and third sense, substances are opposed as contraries. In the Categories, the Philosopher speaks of contraries in the first sense? in other places, he speaks of contraries in the other senses.
The fifth property of substance is that of not admitting more and less.
This should be understood to mean that no common term in the genus of substance is ever predicated of numerically one substance first with the adverb 'more' and later with the adverb 'less'. Thus, it is not possible that the following two propositions, or others like them, be successively true: 'Socrates is more man now than he was before (or more animal now than before)' and 'Socrates is less man (or less animal) now than he was before'. Thus, of no term suppositing for substance can predicates like the following be truly predicated: 'This is more man (or more animal) now than it was before' or 'This is less man (or less animal) now than it was before'. It is, however, possible to say of numerically one substance "This is more white now than it was before."
The sixth property of substance is that substance, while remaining numerically one and the same thing, can successively admit contraries. Thus, numerically one and the same man can be first black and afterwards white. But this property belongs to substance and to no other being, as Aristotle notes in the Categories. He says, "But it seems most proper to substance that, while remaining numerically one and the same thing, it should be susceptible of contraries. For among the other things, there is no one of them which is not a substance and which, while remaining numerically one and the same, is susceptible of contraries. Thus, a color while remaining numerically one thing is not both white and black; nor is an action while one and the same thing both good and evil. The same thing holds for other things which are not substances. But substance while numerically one and the same can admit con33> 24.
On the Properties of Substance traries. Thus a man while numerically one and the same thing can be first black, later white; first warm, later cold; first evil, later good. This sort of characteristic is found in no other kind of thing."* It is clear from this passage that, according to Aristotle, to admit contraries is a property of substance alone. It is then impossible, in his view, for anything distinct from substance to admit contraries.
We can infer from this that Aristotle maintained two views. First, we can infer that, for Aristotle, quantity is not an accident distinct from substance both really inhering in substance and really serving as a subject of corporeal qualities. This is a view held by many recent writers who say that quantity is an accident existing in substance and the subject of qualities. For if this view were true, it would necessarily follow that something other than substance, while remaining numerically one and the same thing, could admit contraries by undergoing a change; for if this view were true, quantity would first receive one quality and later a quality contrary to it. In fact, quantity would admit contraries more immediately than and before substance since on that view substance is not the immediate subject of contrary qualities, but only the mediate subject. It does not, as a consequence, admit contrary qualities except by the mediation of quantity.
Likewise, we can infer that for Aristotle no accident is the subject of any other, at least not of accidents which have contraries. For if it were, something other than substance could admit contraries successively.
It follows then that it is incompatible with Aristotle's view to hold that the intellect and will are accidents of the intellective soul in which intellections, volitions, and other such acts and habits are first and foremost received.
In the same way the sense powers are not for Aristotle certain accidents in which other accidents reside. We can conclude that he would reject the view that relations are entities really distinct from substances, subjectively existing in entities (quantity and quality) that inhere in substance.
Thus, Aristotle's intended view is that every accident exists immediately in substance so that nothing which plays the role of subject mediates the relaton between a substance and any of its accidents. To clarify his view by meeting difficulties, Aristotle poses himself a problem about statements and opinions. These are not substances; nevertheless, they appear to admit of contraries; for one and the same statement is first true and afterwards false.
In resolving this difficulty Aristotle says, "But although a statement may admit contraries, it differs in the way in which it admits them, for those things which are substances admit contraries as a result of a change in themselves. Thus, that which was warm becomes cold through a change; it has entered a new state. Similarly, that which is white was black, and the good man was formerly depraved. The same holds true in other cases; it is by 44" 10-21.
On the Properties of Substance undergoing a change that substances are capable of admitting contraries.
Statements and opinions, however, remain completely unchanged. It is because of a change in things that a statement admits contraries. Thus, a statement to the effect that this or that person is sitting remains unchanged in itself; but because the facts change, the statement is at one time true and at another false. The same holds true in the case of opinions. Thus, it is a feature peculiar to substances that by undergoing a change, they can admit contraries."° It should be clear, then, that for Aristotle only substances can undergo a change from one of a pair of contraries to the other. But this would be false if quantity were the immediate subject of qualities and, nevertheless, really different from substance. Therefore, the fact that a statement is once true and later false is not due to the fact that the statement itself undergoes a change and thereby first exhibits truth and later falsity. It is due, rather, to a change, at least a local change, on the part of some substance.
To clarify Aristotle's resolution of the difficulty it should be noted that the name 'contrary' as well as the verb 'to admit' can be taken in different senses. We have already noted that the name 'contrary' is equivocal, and for the present we can focus on two senses of 'contrary'. In one sense contraries are things outside the mind. Thus, we speak of whiteness and blackness as contraries; but in another sense it is terms that are contraries, as when we say that the terms 'white' and 'black' are contraries. Thus, we say that contraries can hold true of one and the same thing, taken particularly, e.g.,
'Man is white' and 'Man is black'; but it can only be with respect to terms that this is the case. However, there are two senses, one strict and one broad, in which terms can be contraries. In the strict sense terms are contrary because they signify contrary things; and in the broad sense terms are contrary which, while suppositing for the same thing, cannot be truly predicated of the same thing simultaneously, but only successively.
'To admit', on the other hand, has two senses—one thing can admit another either through real inherence or through predication.
Taking 'to admit' in the first sense speech cannot in any way, admit of contraries. However, if we use the expression 'contrary' in the broad sense in which terms can be contraries and employ the term 'admit' in the second sense, speech can admit of contraries. That is, speech does not receive contraries in the form of accidents inhering in a subject. Nevertheless, contraries can be successively predicated of speech, not of course contraries which work towards expelling each other from a subject but terms which cannot, while suppositing for the same thing, be truly predicated of the same thing simultaneously, but only successively. Substance, on the other hand, receives by way of inherence contraries in the form of accidents in a subject.
On the Properties of Substance Aristotle adds this point, commenting, "If anyone should reject this view and claim that opinions and statements can admit of contraries" (supply; by way of real inherence), "he would be wrong"' because speech does not really receive contraries at all. He continues, "For statements and opinions can admit contraries," (that is, statements and opinions can admit contraries by way of predication) "not because they themselves admit of some contrary" (supply, through real inherence) "but because of a change in some other thing. It is because things either are or are not such and such that a statement is said to be true or false and not because the statement can admit contraries. In short, nothing can change either opinions or statements."® Aristotle means to grant that the contraries 'true' and 'false' successively hold true of a statement, while that statement remains numerically one thing. Thus, 'You sit, is first true and afterwards false; nevertheless, he would want to say that the statement does not really receive contraries just because it was once true and later false. Nothing has really changed on the part of the statement.
Its being once true and now false is due to the fact that while it now signifies things other than as they are, it formerly signified things as they actually were. Thus, it now signifies that you are sitting, but since you are not sitting, it is false. Earlier it was true because you were indeed sitting just as the statement signified. Nevertheless, the statement receives nothing in itself, nor is it changed in any way. It is for this reason that Aristotle adds, "Thus, since no change occurs in them, they cannot admit of contraries."7
In the process of making his point Aristotle makes it clear that the truth and falsity of propositions are not qualities of propositions which actually inhere in propositions. If they were it would follow that a Proposition which is at one time true and at another time false would really admit contraries.
It would also follow that in the case where something is first moving and afterwards at rest, a new quality would come to exist in the soul of the person who forms the proposition, 'This thing is moving' and another quality would be lost. It would even follow that some written proposition would be changed by the mere fact that a fly moves. But these things are all false and absurd.
Furthermore, obvious heresies would result in theology; for if the truth and falsity of propositions were qualities of propositions in the way that whiteness and blackness are qualities of bodies, then whenever some truth exists, "This truth exists' is true. It is like the situation where some whiteness exists and the proposition 'This whiteness exists' is true. The same point holds for falsity. Now, I take the falsity of the proposition 'God creates something from nothing'. On the opinion in question this is a quality of the 64> 3.11, 74> 11-12.
On the Properties of Substance Proposition actually inhering in that Proposition and, consequently, an object distinct from God. Now either that thing can be created by God or it cannot. If it cannot, it is something different from God which God cannot create, but that contradicts the Gospel passage, "All things were made by Him and without Him nothing was made." If it can be created from nothing by Him, then suppose it actually exists. On the present supposition, the proposition 'This falschood is created from nothing by God' comes out true.
But the following is a valid inference: 'This falsehood is created from nothing by God; therefore, something is created from nothing by God'. But, then, 'Something is created from nothing by God' will be true and not false.
But the falsity of this proposition does not exist so that God does not create it from nothing. It is clear that falsity is not the relevant sort of quality of propositions.
What then are truth and falsehood? Like Aristotle I hold that truth and falsity are not really distinct from the true or the false proposition. Thus, if the abstract terms 'truth' and 'falsity' do not incorporate any syncategorematic terms or expressions equivalent to such, one must grant the following
Propositions: "Truth is a true proposition' and 'Falsity is a false proposition'.
But does the preceding argument not also work against my construction of truth and falsity? The answer is no, for if it is assumed that the following propositions are true: 'Truth is a true proposition' and 'Falsity is a false proposition', it follows that the following is false: 'Wherever this falsity exists, this is true, "This falsity exists" '. Therefore, it must be granted that the falsity of the proposition 'God creates something from nothing' can be created by God from nothing. Nevertheless, it can be held that the proposition
'This falsehood is created by God' is impossible. In the same way, while 'The white can be black' is true, 'The white is black' is impossible. The reason my view can hold this and the preceding view cannot is that in my view 'truth' and 'falsity' are not absolute names but connotative names. In the former view, however, they must be construed as absolute names like 'whiteness' and 'blackness' and 'cold' and 'heat'. I agree with Aristotle's view that except for substance, nothing can admit contrary qualities by way of inherence.
Thus, at the end of the chapter on substance he says, "Thus, it is peculiar to substance that while being numerically one and the same, it can, because of a change on its own part, admit contraries. Concerning substance, these remarks suffice."® 84> 17.19.