49 On Relation According to Aristotle's Opinion
On Relation According to Aristotle's Opinion The second property is that quantity does not admit of more or less, for one quantity is not more a quantity than another.
The third property consists in the fact that it is according to quantity that something is said to be equal or unequal. Thus, quantities are said to be equal or unequal primarily and per se; whereas the substances sustaining quantity and the qualities subjectively existing in it are equal and unequal secondarily and per accidens.
These remarks on quantity suffice.
49: On Relation According to Aristotle's Opinion The third category Aristotle lists is called ad aliquid or relation. Just as there are opposing views on quantity there are opposing views on ad aliquid or relation. Some hold that relation is not something outside the mind really and completely distinct from one or more absolute things. I think that Aristotle and the philosophers following him held this view. Others, however, claim that while relation is not an absolute thing in the way that a man or a donkey is, it is really distinct from one or more absolute things. Many theologians hold this view. I used to think that Aristotle held it also, but now it seems the opposing view is implied by the principles of his philosophy.
First I shall consider the view of relations provided by Aristotle's account and afterward the view which opposes it.
First of all, I shall show that the first view is in fact Aristotle's; next, I shall support the view with arguments; third, I shall present and answer some objections against the view; finally, I shall consider the things that are subsumed under the category.
The view is that nothing except substances and qualities exists either in act or in potency. Nevertheless, different names signify the same objects in different ways. Some names signify their significata in such a way that they can be predicated of something without the addition of another expression in an oblique case. Thus, someone is a man, but he is not the man of something or the man to something (and so on through the remaining oblique cases). Other names, however, so signify their significata that they cannot be truly predicated of anything unless some other expression in one of the oblique cases can be truly and appropriately added to them. Thus, it
On Relation According to Aristotle's Opinion is impossible that someone be a father unless he be the father of someone else. Likewise it is impossible that something be similar unless it be similar to something else. Thus the names 'father', 'son', 'cause', 'effect', 'similar', and others like them cannot, when taken significatively, be truly affirmed of anything unless it is possible to add truly and correctly some other expression in an oblique case. All such names are called relative names.
According to one view everything for which such a name can supposit in a true proposition is a real relation, so that 'relation' is not a name of second intention or second imposition; it is, on the contrary, a name of first intention. Thus, the term 'relation' can, when it is taken significatively, supposit for a thing which is not a sign. From the fact that Socrates is similar to something or the father of someone, it follows that both 'Man is a relation' and 'Socrates is a relation' are true. Although theologians so use the term that it is necessary to grant that something outside the soul—an object which is not a simple term out of which a proposition can be formed—is a relation; nevertheless, I think that Aristotle held that only a name out ofwhich a proposition whether mental, vocal, or written—can be formed, is a relative, a relation, or ad aliquid. Therefore, in Aristotle's view 'relation', 'ad aliquid', and 'relative' are names of second imposition or second intention and not names of first intention. In his view it should not be granted that man is a relation or that whiteness is a relation. It is the name 'father' and not the man who is a father that is a relative.
There are good reasons for thinking that this is Aristotle's view. First, in defining relation in the Categories, the Philosopher says "Things are said to be relative which are said to be of other things or, in some way to be of or for something else." He gives examples of the different ways in which one thing can be of or for another. In one example it is in the genitive case; in another in the ablative or dative case. On the basis of this I argue: nothing but a name is said to be of or for something in the genitive or some other case; but everything that is said to be related to something else is said to be related under the guise of some case; therefore, every relative is a name. Thus, all the commentators say that the relative is said to be related to something under the guise of one of the cases, but this can only be a property of a name. It follows then that according to the Philosopher a relative is a name so designating its significatum that it cannot supposit for it except when it is possible to add to that name some other expression in one of the oblique cases.
It is beside the point to say the Philosopher takes back this definition of relatives at the end of the chapter; he does not mean to suggest there that the relevant definition does not hold in the case of all relatives. He says, on the contrary, that the definition holds for all relatives, but that since it ap16 36-37.
On Relation According to Aristotle's Opinion plies in cases where we do not have relatives it is not convertible with 'relative'.
This will become clearer later on. For the Philosopher every relation is a name of the relevant sort; that much is clear from the text in question. That text also shows that he calls the names of substances first and second substances, for he says that some are said to be of other things. Substances themselves, however, are not said to be of other things; it is only the names of substances that are said to be of other things.
Again in the Categories, the Philosopher says that "all relatives are said with respect to some correlative, provided that the correlative is corectly assigned."""
He also says that when we lack names we may construct names to stand as the correlatives ofexisting relatives. But on the basis of this I argue: the only things we can assign are names, just as the only things we can use here are names; but since we can assign relatives it follows that names are relatives.
Furthermore, on the Philosopher's view, we can construct relatives to stand as the correlatives of existing relatives; but we can only construct names; therefore, names are relatives.
One might say that according to the Philosopher we do not construct relatives, only the names of relatives. Thus, the Philosopher says, "Sometimes it is necessary to construct names—in the case where there is no name to which the relative can be correctly assigned.">
Here, it seems that we can construct the relative name, but not the relative itself. But this is not really the Philosopher's intention. He means, rather, that we construct the relative itself; for when there is no relative name in use which corresponds to a given correlative, we can construct such a name. Thus, he says that "it is necessary to construct names—in the case where there is no name to which the relative can be correctly assigned," but then the relative is assigned to the name that has been constructed; but it is assigned only to its relative; therefore, it is the name itself that is the relative. This is clear from the same text; for after giving examples of how some relatives are said with respect to their correlatives, he adds, "The same holds true in other examples, but sometimes the expressions involved differ in case.'* Here it is clear that, for Aristotle, relatives differ in case; but only names can differ in case; therefore, for Aristotle, only names are relatives.
Again, one can employ the following line of argument to show that relatives are not distinct things for Aristotle: if a relation were a distinct thing, then when it first accrued to an object that object would have some new thing inhering in it; and, consequently, it would actually be changed.
But this is contrary to what the Philosopher says in the fifth book of the 274 22.
On Relation According to Aristotle's Opinion Physics where he claims that a thing can gain a new relation without in the least changing.® Again, according to the Philosopher in the fifth book of the Metaphysics, that which is capable of heating exists with respect to that which can be heated. Thus, if the relevant relation were something existing in that which is capable of heating, it would be such a thing as is related to that which can be heated; but that thing is nothing.
Again, there would actually be an infinity of things in one and the same object. Proof: according to Aristotle, one object heats this piece of wood and an infinity of other things as well. This object is the sun, for the sun heats an infinity of bodies. Thus, the sun is now capable of producing heat with respect to each one of them. But if relation is a distinct object, there wil] be as many things actually existing in the sun as will be heated by the sun. But since the sun heats an infinity of things, there must be an infinite number of objects, each one of which is essentially different from the other, now existing in the sun. But this is opposed to the Philosopher's remark in the sixth book of the Physics, where he denies that any such infinity is to be found in nature.® Nor will it do to say that there is just one relation for all the things that can be heated and that relations themselves are not altered by altering the terms involved. By the same reasoning one could say that with respect to all these things it is unnecessary to posit even one relation. It is sufficient that there be one thing which can be called by different names or by just one name with different expressions in an oblique case added to it.
Likewise, by the same reasoning employed in showing that one relation suffices, for things of the same sort, I could easily say that with respect to all things, even those which differ in species and genus, one relation is sufficient; but then there is no longer any reason for positing relations as entities outside the soul which differ in species.
Thus, it seems to me to be Aristotle's view that only names are ad aliquid or relatives.
Many grammarians agree with this view. They say that the relative or the ad aliquid is a species of name. Thus, when Priscian enumerates the many species of names in the larger work (book three, the chapter on names) he lists the relative name saying, ''A relative is that which cannot be uttered without understanding that with respect to which it is said. Examples are 'son' and 'slave'
—for whenI say, "Son," I understand 'father'; and when I say, "Slave," I understand 'master'. Thus, if one of these is destroyed, the other in terms of which it is understood is also destroyed."" Grammarians who follow the aforesaid writer express the same view.
©The reference here seems to be to Physics VI, 7-10.
7Institutiones, vol. 1, p. 75.