62 On Habit
On Habit Some, however, say that position is a certain respect inhering in a whole or its parts. Thus, when an object that was sitting rises, it acquires in itself a thing it formerly did not have and loses one it did have.
62: On Habit The tenth category is habit. As with the preceding categories I claim that for Aristotle this category does not signify a thing distinct from enduring things.
It signifies, on the contrary, that one thing is on or around another in such a way that unless there be some hinderance, the first moves when the second does but is, nonetheless, not a part of the second and is distinct from the second in both place and position.
In this category Aristotle places expressions like 'to be armed' and 'to wear shoes'. Nonetheless, for the Philosopher, 'to have' exhibits a number of senses; I indicate this in my commentary on the Categories.
Others, however, say that habit is a certain respect in the body which surrounds another or in the body surrounded.
These remarks on the categories are sufficient.
63: On Supposition Now that we have discussed the significations of terms, we shall discuss supposition. Supposition is a property of a term, but only when it is in a proposition.
First, it should be noted that 'supposition' has two senses, a broad sense ~ and a narrow sense. In the broad sense the term does not stand opposed to 'appellation', on the contrary, 'appellation' is a term under 'supposition'. In the strict sense the two terms stand opposed. But I do not intend to speak of supposition in this sense, only in the first sense. Thus, as I use the term both subject and predicate supposit; and, generally, whatever can be a subject or a predicate of a proposition supposits.
Supposition is said to be a sort of taking the place of another. Thus, when a term stands for something in a proposition in such a way that we use the term for the thing and the term or its nominative case (if it is in an oblique case) is truly predicated of the thing (or the pronoun referring to the thing), the term supposits for that thing; or this, at least, is true when the term is taken significatively. More generally, if the suppositing term is a subject, it supposits for the thing of which (or of the pronoun referring to which) it is asserted by the containing proposition that the predicate is to be predicated. If, however, the suppositing term is a predicate, it supposits for the thing (or the thing named by the name) with respect to which the subject is asserted to be the subject. Thus, by the proposition 'Man is an animal' it is asserted that Socrates is an animal, so that were the proposition 'This is an animal' (referring to Socrates) formed, it would be true. But by the proposition ' "Man" is a name' it is asserted that this word 'man' is a name; therefore, in that proposition 'man' supposits for a name. Likewise, by the proposition "The white thing is an animal' it is asserted that the thing which is white is an animal. Thus, 'This is an animal' is true, referring to the thing which is white, and on account of this the subject supposits for that thing.
The same sort of account holds in the case of the predicate, for by the proposition 'Socrates is white' it is asserted that Socrates is the thing which has whiteness; therefore the predicate supposits for the thing which has whiteness and if nothing besides Socrates were to have whiteness, then the predicate would supposit only for Socrates.
Thus, there is one general rule: a term, at least when it is significatively taken, never supposits in any proposition for a thing unless it can be truly predicated of that thing. But, then, it is false to say, as some do, that a concrete term on the predicate-side supposits for a form, so that in 'Socrates is white', the word 'white' supposits for whiteness. For no matter how the term supposits, 'Whiteness is white' is false. Thus, according to Aristotle's account a concrete name of this sort never supposits for the form that is signified by the corresponding abstract name. But in the case of other concrete names we have considered this is indeed possible. In the same way in "A man is God', 'man' truly supposits for the Son of God; for the Son of God really is a man.
64: On the Division of Supposition .
But it should be noted that supposition is first divided into personal supposition, simple supposition, and material supposition.
Universally, personal supposition occurs when a term supposits for the thing it signifies, whether that thing be an entity outside the soul, a spoken word, an intention of the soul, a written word, or any other thing imaginable. Thus, whenever the subject or predicate of a proposition supposits for its significatum so that it is taken significatively, we always have personal supposition.
As an example of the first kind of case, in 'Every man is an animal' the word 'man' supposits for its significata; for 'man' is not used to signify anything other than men. It does not signify something common to them. As Damascene says, it just signifies the men themselves.' An example of the second kind of case is 'Every vocal name is a part of speech'; the word
'name' supposits only for vocal words; but since it is used to signify vocal words it supposits personally. As an example of the third kind of case, in 'Every species is a universal' and "Every intention of the soul exists in the soul' the subjects supposit personally; for both supposit for the thing they are appointed to signify. As an example of the fourth, in 'Every written expression is an expression' the subject supposits for the things it signifies—written words; therefore, it supposits personally.
It should be clear, then, that those who say that we have personal supposition when a term supposits for a thing do not describe personal supposition adequately. The correct definition, on the contrary, runs as follows: a term supposits personally when it supposits for the thing it signifies and does so significatively.
Simple supposition occurs when a term supposits for an intention of the soul and is not functioning significatively. For example, in 'Man is a species' the term 'man' supposits for an intention of the soul, for it is that intention which is a species. Nonetheless, the term 'man' does not, properly speaking, signify that intention. On the contrary, the word is subordinated to that intention and signifies the same thing that it does. I have explained this
, point earlier. It is clear, then, that those who say that simple supposition occurs when a term supposits for its significatum are wrong. Simple supposition obtains when a term supposits for an intention of the soul which is not the proper significatum of that term, for the term exhibiting simple supposition signifies real things and not intentions of the soul.
'Perhaps the reference here is to Dialectica, chapter 7, 15-24.