14 On the Universal
definition. Many univocal terms have nothing that could properly be called a definition. Thus, when Aristotle says that univocal terms are those to which the name is common, but the account ofsubstance is the same, he is taking the term 'account' for the intention of the soul to which, as primary sign, the relevant word is subordinated.>
But it should be noted that 'univocal' has two senses. In a broad sense every word or conventional sign that corresponds to a single concept is univocal. In a narrower sense we call a term univocal only if it is predicable of certain things or of the pronouns designating those things in the first mode of perseity. We call the term univocal with respect to those things.
For the present, we can content ourselves with distinguishing two senses of 'denominative term'. In the narrow sense a term is denominative if, first, it begins with the same sound as an abstract term but has a different ending and, second, it signifies some accident. Thus, 'brave' is denominative with respect to 'bravery' and 'just' is denominative with respect to 'justice'. In a broad sense a term is said to be denominative if it has the same stem as an abstract term but a different ending. In this sense it is irrelevant whether the term signifies an accident. Thus, 'souled' is denominative with respect to 'soul'.
For the present, this suffices as an account of the various divisions among terms. Later we shall add some points that have been omitted.
14: On the Universal It is not enough for the logician to have a merely general knowledge of terms; he needs a deep understanding of the concept ofa term. Therefore, after discussing some general divisions among terms we should examine in detail the various headings under these divisions.
First, we should deal with terms of second intention and afterwards with terms of first intention. I have said that 'universal', 'genus', and 'species' are examples of terms of second intention. We must discuss those terms of second intention which are called the five universals, but first we should consider the common term 'universal'. It is predicated of every universal and is opposed to the notion of a particular.
First, it should be noted that the term 'particular' has two senses. In the first sense a particular is that which is one and not many. Those who hold that 3 Ibid.
On the Universal a universal is a certain quality residing in the mind which is predicable of many (not suppositing for itself, of course, but for the manyofwhich it is predicated) must grant that, in this sense of the word, every universal is a particular. Just as a word, even if convention makes it common, is a particular, the intention of the soul signifying many is numerically one thing a particular; for although it signifies many things it is nonetheless one thing and not many.
In another sense of the word we use 'particular' to mean that which is one and not many and which cannot function as a sign of many. Taking 'particular' in this sense no universal is a particular, since every universal is capable ofsignifying many and of being predicated of many. Thus, ifwe take the term 'universal' to mean that which is not one in number, as many do, then, I want to say that nothing is a universal. One could, of course, abuse the expression and say that a population constitutes a single universal because it is not one but many. But that would be puerile.
Therefore, it ought to be said that every universal is one particular thing and that it is not a universal except in its signification, in its signifying many things. This is what Avicenna means to say in his commentary on the fifth book of the Metaphysics, He says, "One form in the intellect is related to many things, and in this respect it is a universal; for it is an intention of the intellect which has an invariant relationship to anything you choose." He then continues, "Although this form is a universal in its relationship to individuals, it is a particular in its relationship to the particular soul in which it resides; for it is just one form among many in the intellect."! He means to say that a universal is an intention of a particular soul. Insofar as it can be predicated of many things not for itself but for these many, it is said to be a universal; but insofar as it is a particular form actually existing in the intellect, it is said to be a particular. Thus 'particular' is predicated of a universal in the first sense but not in the second. In the same way we say that the sun is a universal cause and, nevertheless, that it is really and truly a particular or individual cause. For the Sun is said to be a universal cause because it is the cause of many things (ie., every object that is generable and corruptible), but it is said to be a particular cause because it is one cause and not many. In the same way the intention of the soul is said to be a universal because it is a sign predicable of many things, but it is said to be a particular because it is one thing and not many.
But it should be noted that there are two kinds of universals. Some things are universal by nature; that is, by nature they are signs predicable of many in the same way that the smoke is by nature a sign of fire; weeping, a sign ofgrief; and laughter, a sign of internal joy. The intention of the soul, of course, is a universal by nature. Thus, no substance outside the soul, nor any accident outside the soul is a universal of this sort. It is of this kind of universal that I shall
Speak in the following chapters.
" Avicennae Metaphysica, Tract. V, chapter 1-E, 140-141.