74 On Confused and Distributive Supposition
On Confused and Distributive Supposition But I am not concerned whether these propositions are actually true. The point I want to make is that in the case where an affirmative sign of universality mediately precedes a common term within one and the same extreme, it is not possible to descend to the items contained under that common term.
The descent is not possible either copulatively or disjunctively, no more than if the common term were itself the whole extreme of a proposition having merely confused supposition. This rule should be understood to hold in the case where the term immediately following and the term mediately following the syncategorematic term are not in the same case or where they are not related as adjective and noun. If they are so related it is impossible to make the descent to the items contained under cither of the terms. Thus, in 'Every white man is white' it is impossible to descend copulatively to the terms contained under either of the terms. It is otherwise in the first case, for there it is possible to descend to all the items contained under the term immediately following the sign of universality but not to the items contained under the other.
Nevertheless, neither term alone has what is properly called supposition; it is the whole composed of the two that supposits. Examples are 'Every man s animal runs' and the Latin sentence 'Omnem hominem videns est animal'.
A third rule runs as follows: the subject of an exclusive affirmative proposition always has merely confused supposition. Thus, in 'Only what is an animal is a man; 'animal' has merely confused supposition just as it does in the universal affirmative proposition convertible with it-'Every man is an animal'.
74: On Confused and Distributive Supposition A number of rules hold in the case of confused and distributive supposition. First we shall examine the rules governing confused and distributive mobile supposition.
The first rule is that in every universal affirmative and universal negative proposition that is neither exclusive nor exceptive, the subject has confused and distributive mobile supposition. This is clear in 'Every man runs' and 'No man runs'.
The second rule is that in every such universal negative proposition the predicate stands confusedly and distributively.
The third rule is that when a negation determining the principal composition in a proposition precedes the predicate, the predicate stands confuse dly
On Confused and Distributive Supposition and distributively. Thus, the word 'animal' in 'Man is not an animal' stands confusedly and distributively. 'Man' however stands determinately.
The fourth rule is that a term which immediately follows the verbs 'to differ' and 'to be distinguished', the participles corresponding to these verbs, the name 'other than', or an expression equivalent to any of these stands confusedly and distributively. Thus, the following is a valid inference: Socrates is distinguished from man; therefore Socrates is distinguished from this man' (where the reference may be to any man). Likewise, in 'Socrates differs from man', 'Socrates is different from man', and 'Socrates is other than man',
'man' has confused and distributive supposition.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the aforementioned rules hold only in the case where the term in question would not stand confusedly and distributively if the negation sign or the relevant verb or name were taken away. For if the term were to stand confusedly and distributively when one of these expressions were taken away, then with the addition of such an expression it would stand determinately. This is clear in 'Socrates is every man'.
Here, the predicate 'man' stands confusedly and distributively; therefore, if a negation precedes it it will stand determinately, as in 'Socrates is not every man'; for if Socrates is not that man (where any man is referred to), it follows that he is not every man. The same point holds in the case of the other expressions.
Therefore, the following rule is true: whatever makes the immobile mobile also makes immobile the mobile. That is, an expression which, when added to a term standing immobily, makes that term stand mobily also makes a term standing mobily stand immobily when added to it. Thus, in 'Socrates is aman', 'man' stands immobily; but if a negation is added to it ('Socrates is not a man'), the term stands mobily. Therefore, if a term stands mobily without any negation, it later stands immobily when a negation is added to it. Take 'Socrates is every man'; here the word 'man' stands mobily; therefore, in 'Socrates is not every man', 'man' stands immobily. The same thing should be said in the case of 'Socrates differs from every man' and 'Socrates is other than every man'.
A general rule is that if anything makes a term stand confusedly and distributively, it is either a sign of universality, a negation, or an expression equivalent to a negation. Nevertheless, it does not always happen that a term incorporating a negation makes a term stand mobily. This is clear in the case of the expression of inclusion in an affirmative proposition, for there it is not the subject but the predicate that supposits confusedly and distributively. However, in an exclusive negative proposition where the expression of exclusion is added to the subject, both subject and predicate have confused and distributive supposition.
Apropos of confused and distributive immobile supposition it should