65 On How the Supposition of Terms Must Be Distinguished
On How the Supposition of Terms Must Be Distinguished Material supposition occurs when a term does not supposit significatively, but supposits for a spoken word or a written word. A good example is
« "Man" is a name'. The word 'man' here supposits for itself but it does not signify itself. Likewise, in the proposition * "Man" is written' we have a case of material supposition, for the term supposits for that which is written.
But it should be noted that just as the three forms of supposition accrue to the spoken word, they can accrue to the written word. Thus, suppose that the following four propositions are written down: 'Man is an animal',
'Man is a species', ' "Man" is monosyllabic', and ' "Man" is a written expression'. Each can be true but only if the subject stands for something different in each case. That which is an animal can in no way be a species, nor can it be monosyllabic or written. Likewise, the man which is a species is not an animal, nor is it monosyllabic, and so on. Nevertheless, in both of the last two propositions the term has material supposition.
But we could further subdivide the supposition in which a term supposits for a spoken or written word. We would only need names to distinguish the case where it supposits for a spoken word from the case where it supposits for a written word. The situation would be like that with personal and simple supposition, where we have different terms for the different forms of supposition. We do not, however, have at our disposal terms for dividing material supposition in the relevant way.
And just as these different forms of supposition accrue to both written and spoken terms, they also accrue to the mental term; for an intention of the soul can supposit for that which it signifies, for itself, and for a written or spoken word.
But it should be noted that we do not speak of personal supposition because the term supposits for a person, nor of simple supposition because the term supposits for what is simple, nor of material supposition because the term supposits for matter. It is for the reasons given above that these terms apply. Thus, the terms 'material', 'personal', and 'simple' are used equivocally in logic and in other disciplines. In logic, however, they are seldom used without the addition of the term 'supposition'.
65: On How the Supposition of Terms Must Be Distinguished It should also be noted that any term, in any proposition in which it is placed, can have personal supposition unless those who use it limit it to On How the Supposition of Terms Must Be Distinguished another form of supposition. In the same way an equivocal term can, in any. proposition, supposit for any one of its significata, unless those who use it limit it to one particular significatum.
But a term cannot have simple or material supposition in any proposition, but only in propositions where it is coupled with an extreme which refers to an intention of the soul, a spoken word, or a written word. For example, in the proposition 'Man runs', the word 'man' cannot have simple or material supposition; for 'runs' does not refer to an intention of the soul, a spoken word, or a written word. 'Species' signifies an intention of the soul; therefore, in the proposition 'Man is a species' the term 'man' can have simple supposition.
Further, with this proposition we must, in accordance with the third mode of equivocation, distinguish between the case where we have simple supposition and the case where we have personal supposition. In the former case we have a true proposition asserting that a concept or intention of the soul is a species; in the latter we have the false proposition asserting that something signified by 'man' is a species.
The same sort of distinction must be drawn in the case of the following propositions: 'Man is predicated of many', 'Risible is a passion of man', Risible is predicated first and foremost of man'. We must distinguish here both on the part of the subject and on the part of the predicate. Likewise, we must distinguish in the case of the proposition 'Rational animal is the definition of man'; for if the proposition exhibits simple supposition it is true; if it exhibits personal supposition, it is false. The same holds true of many other propositions—e.g., 'Wisdom is an attribute of God', 'Creativity is a passion of God', 'Goodness and Wisdom are divine attributes', 'Goodness is predicated of God' and "Being unborn is a property of the Father'.
Likewise, when a term is coupled with an extreme that refers to a spoken or written word one must draw a distinction, for the term exhibits either personal or material supposition. Thus, one should distinguish in the case of the following: ' "Socrates" is a name', * "Man" is monosyllabic', * "Paternity" signifies a property of the Father'. In the last case a distinction is necessary, for if 'paternity' supposits materially the proposition (' "Paternity" signifies a property of the Father') is true. If it supposits personally it is false, for paternity is a property of the Father or just is the Father. In the same way propositions like the following should be distinguished:
' "Rational animal" signifies man's quiddity', ° "Rational" signifies a part of man', * "White man" signifies a per accidens aggregate', ' "White man" is a composite term'.
Some rules can be specified here. When a term capable of exhibiting any of the three forms of supposition is coupled with an extreme which is common to either simple or complex terms (whether these be written or spoken terms), the term can have either material or personal supposition; the relevant propositions must be distinguished accordingly. When a term is coupled