66 Responses to Objections
Responses to Objections with an extreme that signifies an intention of the soul, the term can have either simple or personal supposition. But when it is coupled with an extreme which is common to all of these, the term can have simple, material, or personal supposition. Thus, one must distinguish in the case of' "Man"is predicated of many. If 'man' has personal supposition the proposition is false, for it would be asserted that some entity signified by the term 'man' is predicated of many. If, however, 'man' has simple or material (either as regards vocal or written words) supposition, the proposition is true because both the common intention and the word (whether spoken or written) are predicable of many.
66: Responses to Objections But one can object against this account in a number of ways:
(1) First, the following is true: 'Man is the most worthy among creatures'.
But what form of supposition does 'man' have here? It does not have personal supposition because each of the relevant singular propositions is false.
It must then have simple supposition. But if, in simple supposition a term were to stand for an intention of the soul, the proposition would be false; for no intention of the soul is the most worthy among creatures. Conclusion: in simple supposition a term does not stand for an intention of the soul.
(2) Further, this is true: 'Color is the first object of sight'. However, every relevant singular proposition is false; therefore, this must be a case of simple supposition. But if the subject were suppositing for an intention of the soul, the proposition would be false. Conclusion: in simple supposition a term does not stand for an intention of the soul. Likewise, this is true: 'Man is first and foremost risible', but here 'man' is suppositing neither for a particular nor for an intention of the soul. It must then be suppositing for something else. The same point can be argued in each of the following cases: 'Being is first and foremost one' and 'God is first and foremost a person'. Each of these is true; however, the subject is suppositing neither for a particular nor an intention of the soul; therefore, it is suppositing for something else. But in each case the subject has simple supposition; therefore, in simple supposition a term does not supposit for an intention of the soul.
(3) Further, a word is not predicated of a word, nor is an intention predicated of an intention; for then every proposition like "Man is an animal' would be false.
Responses to Objections Response to (1) In the case of the first objection those are wrong who say that in the proposition 'Man is the most worthy among creatures' the subject has simple supposition. 'Man' has personal supposition in that proposition. Their argument does not succeed and can in fact be turned against them. They argue that if 'man' were to have personal supposition, the proposition would be false since all the relevant singular propositions would be false. But that line of reasoning works against their own account, for if in that proposition
'man' does not stand for any singular thing but for some other sort of thing, that thing would be the most worthy among creatures. But this is false, for then it would be more noble than any man and that clearly is opposed to their own account. They say that a common term or a species is never more noble than the particulars under it. As they put it the less general always includes the more general and something else besides. Thus, the common form, being a part of man, would not be more noble than man. Thus, if the subject in the proposition 'Man is the most worthy among creatures' were to supposit for something other than particular men, the proposition would be false.
Therefore, it should be said that 'man' supposits personally and that the proposition, when construed literally, is false inasmuch as the relevant singular propositions are all false. Nonetheless, what those who assert this proposition mean to say is correct. They do not mean that any man is more noble than every creature universally considered, but only that men are more noble than any creatures who are not men and of themselves to corporeal creatures, excluding the intellectual substances. This same thing frequently happens—propositions taken from classical authors and from teachers are false when construed literally, but when seen in the light in which they were intended, come out true. Thus it is in the case at hand.
Response to (2) The correct response to the second objection is that all such propositions as 'Color is the first object of sight', 'Man is first and foremost risible', 'Being is first and foremost one', 'Man is first and foremost a rational animal', 'The triangle first and foremost has three angles', and 'Sound is the first and adequate object of hearing' are literally false; nonetheless, the propositions the Philosopher intended by them are true.
It should be noted that the Philosopher and other writers frequently take the concrete for the abstract (and vice versa) and the singular for the plural
(and vice versa). In the same way the effected act is frequently taken for the signified act and vice versa.
An effected act is one designated by 'is' or some other expression which not only signifies that something is predicated of something else but actually effects the predication of one thing of another. Examples are: 'Man is an animal', 'Man disputes', and 'Man runs'.
Responses to Objections A signified act, on the other hand, is one which is designated by a verb like 'to be predicated of', 'to have as subject', 'to be affirmed of', and 'to belong to', all of which signify one and the same thing. For example, when one says, " 'Animal' is predicated of 'man'," animal is not actually being predicated of man; for in that proposition 'animal' is functioning as subject and not predicate. The act, then, is signified. It is not the same thing to say
« "Animal" is predicated of man' and 'Man is an animal'. The one is structurally more complex than the other. Likewise, it is not the same thing to say that a genus is predicated of the general term 'man' and to say that the common term 'man' is a genus. Further, saying that a genus is predicated of its species or that the word 'animal' is predicated of the word 'man' is very different from saying, "Species is a genus" or "The word 'man' is the word 'animal'." The first two are true, and the second false. But despite the difference, the Philosopher sometimes takes the effected act for the signified act and sometimes vice versa. Others do the same, with the consequence that many fall into error.
Now, it is precisely this confusion that is at work in the present case.
For when one takes 'first and foremost' as the Philosopher does in the first book of the Posterior Analytics,' the proposition 'Man is first and foremost risible' is false in the same way that 'A species is a genus' is false. Nonetheless, the signified act whose place it takes is true, viz., 'Of man the predicate risible is first and foremost predicated'. In that signified act both 'man' and 'tisible' supposit simply for an intention of the soul. Of this intention of the soul 'risible' is first and foremost predicated, not for itself but for the particulars under it. The effected act should be expressed: 'Every man is risible and nothing other than man is risible'. Thus, in the signified act 'man' supposits simply and for the intention; whereas, in the corresponding effected act 'man' supposits personally for the relevant particulars; for it is only a particular that can laugh. Thus, the term 'first and foremost' is correctly placed in the signified act, but it has no place in the corresponding effected act; for 'first and foremost' means 'predicated of something universally and of nothing else'. Therefore, there should correspond two effected acts to a signified act of this sort. Similarly in the case of a proposition like 'Sound is the first and adequate object of hearing'. Literally construed, that proposition is false for 'sound' supposits either for a singular thing or a universal thing.
If it supposits for a singular thing the proposition is false, for all the relevant singular propositions are false. If it supposits for a universal thing the proposition is still false, for according to the objectors nothing universal can be apprehended by the senses. Taken literally then the proposition is false.
Nonetheless, those who use and understand this locution would claim that what is meant by the proposition is the following signified act: 'To be cap173> 32.743 3.
Responses to Objections able of being apprehended by hearing is predicated first and foremost of sound.' It is of that common term that the predicate in question is predicated first and foremost, not for itself but for the particulars under it; for in the proposition where 'sound' is the subject and 'is capable of being apprehended by hearing' is the predicate, 'sound' does not supposit simply and for itself, but for the particulars under it. Thus, in the signified act 'sound' supposits simply and for an intention of the soul, but in both affected acts it supposits personally and for the particulars under it, that is, for its significata.
Theology provides a case which clearly exemplifies the foregoing points.
This is true: 'A complete intellective substance not depending on any other suppositum is first and foremost a person', and it is true for the same reason that 'man is first and foremost risible' is true. One and the same account holds in the two cases. But suppose the subject of the proposition in question supposits personally for the particulars under it. In that case the proposition is false, for all the relevant singular propositions are false. That is clear from induction. Suppose, then, it supposits simply and for the common form. In that case also it is false since no common form, whether first and foremost or not, is a person. The notion of a person, according to those who object, is incompatible with the notion of a universal. The same holds true of propositions like the following: 'The singular is first and foremost one' and 'The particular is first and foremost distinguished from the universal'. Taken literally they are false; nevertheless, the signified acts corresponding to them are true.
Therefore, it should be said as it was before, that we have simple supposition when a term supposits for an intention of the soul which is either common to many by way of predication or as sometimes happens, proper to just one thing. The reason is that nothing on the part of the thing can be any thing other than particular.
Thus, it is the mistaken view of those who think that there is something in things over and above the particular, and that the humanity which is distinct from particulars is something in individuals belonging to their essence which has led them into these and many other mistakes in logic. Nonetheless, it is not the task of the logician, as Porphyry indicates in his prologue, to deal with this mistake. The logician should merely deny that simple supposition occurs when a term supposits for its significatum and should point out that a general term has simple supposition when it supposits for something common to its significata. Whether what is common be in the thing is not for the logician to say.
Response to (3) The response to the third objection is that a word is predicated of a word and, similarly, an intention is predicated of an intention not, however, for itself but for the thing. Therefore, in the proposition 'Man is an animal', one