59 On When
On When as a name in terms of a proposition in which the verb takes the place of the relevant noun or infinitive. Thus, 'To be heated is to suffer' is equivalent to 'What is heated suffers'. 'Being heated is a passion' is equivalent to the same proposition.
But it should be noted that 'to suffer' has many uses. In one sense it is used in the case where something receives something from something else.
In this sense a subject suffers as does the matter receiving a form. In another sense the term is used more broadly to cover the first case as well as the case where something is moved without receiving something, as in local motion.
In a third sense the term is common to the first two cases as well as the case where something is caused or produced. In this third sense the verb marks a category.
To sum up, I think that Aristotle holds that all mental verbs in the active voice belong in the category of To Do and that all mental verbs in the passive voice belong in the category of To Suffer. It is irrelevant whether the verb signifies substance or quality or both substance and quality.
Others, however, say that suffering is a certain respect existing subjectively in the thing acted upon and corresponding to the respect of action.
59: On When The seventh category is when. According to Aristotle this is an ordered series of adverbs or equivalent expressions by means of which one can appropriately answer a question posed by the interrogative 'When'. He always refers to this category by the interrogative 'when' and not any other expression. We do not have any general term common to all the expressions by which one can respond to that question. For Aristotle, as I understand his view, this category does not designate anything distinct from substance and quality. It designates just those things, although not nominally but adverbially.
Whether this view is true or false, one can argue for it in the following way: suppose when is an entity which inheres in the temporal object. Since it should not be posited with respect to one time rather than another, there will be an entity of the relevant sort corresponding to the future. But the consequent is false; for if in the object which will exist tomorrow, there is an entity without which it cannot be said that the object will exist tomorrow
(in the way that something cannot be white without whiteness), the object will have an entity of this sort with respect to every instant included in the time in which it is yet to exist. Those instants, however, are infinite; therefore there will be an infinity of such entities in the object.
In the same way the object has existed through an infinity of times and an infinity of instants; therefore, an infinity of such entities remains in the object from the past.
One might say that the relevant instants did not exist in act. The response is that either some such instant existed in act or none did. If none did, then nothing is an instant; but if some did, then since there is no reason why one instant should be in act rather than another, an infinity of instants existed in act.
Further, of every thing it can be determinately said that it either is or is not. Therefore, in this man there either determinately is such an entity or there is not. Let us focus on the entity associated with tomorrow. If this entity is in the man, then it is determinately true that the man will exist tomorrow. If the entity is not in the man, then the opposite is determinately true. But this seems to be opposed to Aristotle who denies that there is determinate truth in the case of future contingents.
One can also argue theologically: either an entity of the sort in question is in that man or it is not. Suppose it is. Now, the following is formally valid: an entity corresponding to tomorrow is in the man; therefore, the man will exist tomorrow. (This is parallel to the following case: whiteness is in this first subject; therefore, this is white.) But since the antecedent is true it could not happen, even by divine power, that it was afterward false that the thing existed. Therefore, it will always be necessarily true to say, "That man was to exist on that day." Consequently, God could not but bring it to pass that he will exist on that day. But if the entity is not in the man, it will later be necessary that the relevant entity was not in that man. Now, the following is valid: the entity was not in that man; therefore, he was not to exist on that day. Since the antecedent is necessary, the consequent is also. Consequently, God cannot extend the man's life for even one more day.
Again, if when were the sort of entity those holding the contrary view think, just as the hot is hot by heat, the temporal thing would be such by that entity. Consequently, just as it is impossible for something to be hot without heat, it would be impossible for something to be temporal without the relevant entity inhering in it. But the consequent is false, for this is true
'The Antichrist will exist before the day of judgment'. Nonetheless, no such thing is in the Antichrist since he is nothing.
One might say that nothing has such an entity corresponding to a future time, at least not before it reaches that time. Thus, neither that man nor the Antichrist has an entity in him corresponding to the future. The response is