Introduction: An application: the question on brotherly correction
Introduction of morality. That is why Aquinas insists that while the theological virtues transform the cardinal virtues, they do so in such a way as to leave intact the rational structure of the latter, which is itself derived fromtheirorientationtowardthenaturalhumangood,thatis,natural perfection in accordance with the specific kind of humanity.
An application: the question on brotherly correction The question on brotherly correction is especially useful for illustrating the ways in which this theoretical apparatus can be brought to bear so as to provide determinate moral guidance about highly concrete and specific situations. Brotherly correction involves rebuking or reproving a fellowChristian – no doubt Aquinas is thinking in particular of one's brothers in a religious order, but the discussion is more broadly applicable. Aquinas's first question is whether 'there is a precept about brotherly correction' – that is, whether it is something we are required by a commandment to do.
He argues that it is. We are required by a commandment to love our neighbour, and to love someone is to will what is good for him: not just to want it in an idle way, but actually to take action to secure what is good for him. As Aquinas puts it, 'our wills are neither effective nor true if they are not proved in what we do' (DQBrCorr rep.). There are three kinds of goods for human beings: external goods, such as money and other possessions; goods of the body, such as bodily health and integrity; and the good of the soul, which is virtue. This last sort of good is the most valuable, since it touches most closely on what is fundamental to and definitive of us as human beings: our capacity for the active exercise of reason in shaping our lives. Now wanting good for someone includes wanting the absence of what is bad. It would be an odd sort of love that worked only to bestow good things on the beloved, never to remove ills.
Just as the greatest good is the good of virtue, the greatest ill is the evil of vice. So, as Aristotle says, 'someone ought to help a friend avoid sins more than loss of money' (NE .., b).
But simply knowing that we are required by commandment to rebuke an errant brother does not tell us much. Unlike negative precepts
The Recovery of Virtue (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, ), p. . I have omitted parenthetical references. xxv