On the Virtues in General: Article 8: Whether the virtues are in us by nature
On the Virtues in General Article : Whether the virtues are in us by nature Objections It seems so, because:
() John Damascene says [OrthF .], 'The virtues are natural, and they are in us naturally and equally.'
() The gloss comments on Matthew :, 'Jesus went about teaching', that 'He teaches natural sorts of justice, i.e. chastity, justice, and humility, which human beings possess naturally.'
() Romans :says that those who do not have the law do by nature the things that the law says. But the law stipulates acts of virtue. Therefore human beings naturally do virtuous acts; it seems, then, that virtue comes from nature.
() Antony says [LA, paragraph of Greek Life], 'If the will changes nature, that is corruption. If its condition is preserved, that is virtue.' In the same sermon he says that natural adornment is enough for human beings. This would not be true if the virtues were not natural. Therefore the virtues are natural.
() Cicero says [Inv .] that by nature we possess a loftiness of mind.
This seems to refer to greatness of spirit. Therefore greatness of spirit is in us by nature; and by the same reasoning so are the other virtues.
() In order to carry out virtuous activity we need only (i) to be capable ofgood,(ii)towantit,and(iii)torecogniseit.(iii)Torecognisewhatisgood is in us by nature, as Augustine says [FC .]. (ii) To want what is good is also in us by nature, as Augustine also says. (i) To be capable of what is good is also in us by nature, since our will governs our actions. Therefore nature is adequate to carry out the activities of virtue. Virtue therefore is natural to a human being, at least in respect of its predispositions.
() Rejoinder: someone might say that virtue is natural to human beings only in the sense that predispositions to virtue are; complete virtue does not come from nature. But on the other hand John Damascene says
[OrthF .], 'Abiding by what is according to nature, we remain in virtue.
But if we fall away from what is according to nature, we descend from virtue to what is contrary to nature and we find ourselves in wickedness.'
This makes it clear that according to nature we have in us the ability to turn away from wickedness. But this belongs to complete virtue; therefore complete virtue comes from nature.
Article () Since virtue is a form, it is simple and lacks parts. Therefore if it comes from nature in one respect, it seems that it must come entirely from nature.
() Human beings are more valuable and perfect {i.e. elevated} than other, non-rational, creatures. However, other creatures receive from nature enough to perfect {i.e. complete} them in their own way. Therefore since the virtues are a kind of perfection of a human being, it seems that they are in us by nature.
() Rejoinder: someone might say that this cannot be so, since human beings are perfected in many different ways. However, nature is ordered towards only one. But on the other hand virtue inclines us towards one thing, just as nature does. For Cicero says [Inv .] that a virtue is a disposition that acts in the manner of nature, which also agrees with reason. Therefore nothing prevents virtues from being in human beings by nature.
()Virtueconsistsinamid-point.Butamid-pointisone,determinate, point. Therefore nothing prevents nature from inclining towards what is virtuous.
() Sin is the absence of measure, type, and order {cf. Wisd :–}.
Butsinistheabsenceofvirtue.Thereforevirtueconsistsinmeasure,type, and order. These, however, are natural to human beings. Therefore virtue is also natural to us.
() The desiring part of the soul follows the cognitive part. But there is a natural disposition in the cognitive part, namely the understanding of principles. Therefore there is some natural disposition also in the desiring or feeling part, which can possess virtue. Therefore it seems that some virtue is natural.
() A is natural to B if the principle of A is in B, e.g. it is natural for fire to rise, because the principle of this movement is within the thing that moves. But the principles of virtue are in human beings. Therefore virtue is natural to human beings.
() If the seed of something is natural, that thing is also natural. But the seed of virtue is natural; for one of the glosses says on Hebrews that God was willing to implant in every soul the beginnings of wisdom and understanding. Therefore it seems that the virtues are natural.
() Contraries belong to the same class. But wickedness is opposed to virtue. However, wickedness is natural, for Wisdom :says, 'His
On the Virtues in General wickedness was natural,' and Ephesians :says, 'We were the children of wrath by nature.' Therefore it seems that virtue is natural.
() It is natural for the lower powers to submit to reason; for Aristotle says [Soul ., a; {cf. NE .., b}] that the higher desire, which belongs to reason, moves the lower, which belongs to the sensory part of the soul, just as the higher spheres move the lower.But moral virtue consists in the lower powers submitting to reason. Therefore these virtues are natural.
() For some change to be natural, it is enough that something has a natural aptitude in an interior and passive principle. That is why the generation of simple bodies can be called natural, and also the movements of the heavenly bodies, even though the active principle of the heavenly bodies is not nature, but intelligence, while the principle of generation of the simple bodies is external. Now human beings do have in them a natural suitability for virtue. For Aristotle says [NE .., a], 'We are apt by nature to receive from nature, but we are perfected from practice.'
Therefore it seems that virtue is natural.
() Something is natural if it is in someone from birth. According to Aristotle [NE .., b], some people, as soon as they are born, seem to be brave or temperate, or disposed towards other virtues. Also,
Job :says, 'Since I was a baby my compassion has grown with me, and it left my mother's womb with me.' Therefore the virtues are natural to us.
() Nature does not fail in what is necessary. But virtues are needed by human beings for the end towards which they are naturally ordered, i.e. for happiness, which is the activity of perfected virtue. Therefore human beings possess the virtues by nature.
But on the other hand () What is natural is not lost through sin. That is why Dionysius says
[DivNames .] that natural gifts remain even in the demons. However, virtues are lost through sin. Therefore they are not natural.
() We do not acquire or lose through habit whatever is in us naturally, or things that come from nature. However, we can acquire or lose through habit the properties of a virtue. Therefore virtues are not natural.
In Aristotelian cosmology, the motion of the higher (or more outward) spheres causes the motion of the lower spheres (those nearer the centre of the universe, the earth).
Article () Whatever is in us naturally is in everyone alike. However, virtues are not found in everyone alike, since in some people there are vices, which are opposed to the virtues.
()Weneithergainnorlosemeritbecauseofnaturalproperties,because they are not up to us. However, we do gain merit through our virtues, and lose it through our vices. Therefore the virtues and vices are not natural.
My reply Opinions differ about the acquisition of knowledge and of virtue in the same way that they differ about the production of natural forms:
(i) Some people used to believe that forms pre-existed in matter in actuality, but in a hidden way, and that they were led from being unseen to being obvious by means of a natural agent. Anaxagoras thought this; he held that everything is in everything, so that everything can be generated from everything [Aristotle, Phys ., b].
(ii) However, others said that the forms came completely from outside, i.e. by sharing in the ideas, as Plato held [Met ., b], or through an active intelligence, as Avicenna held [AvSoul .]. They also said that natural agents do no more than prepare the material for the form.
(iii) Aristotle took a middle way [GA ., b]. He held that the forms pre-exist in the capacity of the material, but are brought to actual existence through an external natural agent.
Opinions vary in a similar way about knowledge and virtue:
(i) Some hold that knowledge and virtue exist in us by nature, and that study only needs to remove whatever is blocking knowledge or virtue.
Plato seems to have thought this. He held that knowledge and virtue come to exist in us through our participating in separated forms. However, the soul is hindered in making use of these because of its union with the body.
Studying branches of knowledge or exercising the virtues is needed to counteract this hindrance.
(ii) Others have said that knowledge and virtue exist in us because of the influence of the active intelligence. On this view, the study and effort prepare someone to receive this influence.
Whereas Aquinas holds that individual human beings have within themselves an active intelligence that provides forms for their understanding, Avicenna held that the active intelligence is a separate entity, providing such forms from the outside.
On the Virtues in General (iii) Thirdly, the middle way: we possess by nature a suitability for knowledge and the virtues. However, they are not made complete in us by nature. This is the best opinion, because just as with respect to natural forms it takes nothing away from the power of the natural agents, so with respect to acquiring knowledge and virtue it preserves the effectiveness of the study and exercise.
We ought also to know that the suitability for being perfected and becoming a form can exist in something in two ways: by (a) a passive capacity only, e.g. the matter of air is suited to receive the form of fire; and by (a, b) both a passive and an active capacity at the same time, e.g. a body that can be healed is suited to health, and also has in itself an active principle of health. The latter is the way in which human beings are naturally suited to virtue; they are like this partly through possessing the nature of their species, in that all human beings share a suitability for virtue, and partly through each possessing their own individual nature, which fit some better than others for virtue.
In order to show this, we need to know that:
() With reference to the species, there are three faculties in human beings capable of possessing virtue, as is clear from our previous discussion. These are: (i') intelligence, (ii') will, and (iii') the lower desire, which is divided into the sensual and the aggressive parts. We should consider for each one of these that there exist in some sense both (a) receptivity to virtue and (b) an active principle of virtue.
It is clear, then, that in the intelligent part, there exists the potential intelligence (i'a) which has the capacity to receive any intelligible thing; and intellectual virtue consists in knowing things of that sort. Then there is the active intelligence (i'b); it is by the light of this that such things actually become intelligible. Some of these things, indeed, are naturally known to human beings straight away, without study or inquiry. The first principles are of this sort, both in theoretical matters (for example,
'Every whole is greater than a part of it,' and so on) and in practical matters (for example, 'Everything bad should be avoided,' and so on).
These are known naturally, and are the principles on which subsequent knowledge, such as is acquired by study, depends, whether it is practical or theoretical.
Similarly, with the will it is clear that there is a natural active principle (ii'b); for the will naturally inclines towards the ultimate end, while in a practical context this end has the character of a natural principle.
Article Therefore the inclination of the will functions as a certain active principle in relation to whatever tendency the affective part acquires through exercise. It is clear, though, that the will itself, being a capacity that can go in different directions with respect to the things that contribute to the end, is receptive (ii'a) to acquiring a dispositional inclination in one particular direction.
The aggressive and sensual parts are naturally capable of listening to reason. Therefore they are naturally receptive (iii'a) to virtue, which is perfected in them insofar as they are disposed to follow the good proposed by reason.
All of these predispositions to virtue follow from the nature of the human species, and therefore they are shared by everyone.
() With reference to one's individual nature, there are also certain predispositions to virtue which follow from this, and which make one incline towards acts appropriate to a particular virtue, whether by natural temperament or by the influence of the heavenly bodies.This inclination is a sort of predisposition to the virtue. It is not yet, however, complete virtue, since that requires the moderation of reason. That is why the definition of virtue includes the idea that it chooses the mid-point according to right reason [NE .., a]. Anyone who followed an inclination of this sort without rational discernment would frequently sin.
In the same way that this predisposition to virtue without the activity of reason does not have the character of a complete virtue, neither do a few premises; for it is through rational inquiry that we reach specific conclusions from universal principles. It is also the job of reason to lead someone from his desire for the ultimate end to whatever is conducive to that end. Again, reason, by governing the aggressive and sensual parts, subjects them to itself. Hence it is clear that the activity of reason is needed for full-blown virtue, whether virtue is in the intelligence or in the will or in the aggressive and sensual parts.
Full-blown virtue involves the predisposition to virtue that is in the higher part being ordered to the virtue of the lower part. Thus, someone is suited for the virtues of the will by the predispositions found both in the will and in the intelligence; and for the virtues of the aggressive and sensual parts by the predispositions to virtue found both in them and in Although he of course rejects astrological determinism, Aquinas does allow that the heavenly bodies can have some indirect causal influence over human actions. See ST aae ..
On the Virtues in General the higher parts. The converse is not true. From this it is also clear that reason, which is higher, is active in fulfilling all of virtue.
We also need to divide reason from nature as active principles, as is clear from Aristotle [Phys ., a]. The power of reason can be ordered towards opposite things, but nature to only one. Therefore it is clear that virtue is completed not by nature, but by reason.
Replies to objections () The virtues are called natural with respect to the natural predispositions that exist in us, not with respect to their being completed.
The same response will deal with objections () to ().
() (i) We are naturally able to do what is good, simply speaking, because we have a natural capacity for this. Again, (ii) wanting and (iii) knowing are in us by nature in some sense, i.e. with respect to a predisposition in a general sense. This, however, is not enough for virtue: acting well, which is the effect of virtue, also requires us to achieve what is good in a ready and faultless way, for the most part. No one can do that without possessing virtue as a disposition. In the same way, it is clear that someone can know in a general sense how to do some thing that a skill achieves, e.g. giving proofs or carving, but to do this readily and without making mistakes requires that they actually possess the skill. The same is true for virtue.
() To some degree we naturally avoid evil; but to do so readily and reliably requires possessing virtue as a disposition.
() Virtue is not said to come partly from nature in the sense that one part of it is from nature and another not, but because it comes from nature incomplete in respect of what it is, that is, it comes merely as capacity and suitability.
() God is in himself perfect in goodness, which is why God needs nothing else to achieve goodness. The higher beings and those nearest to him need only a few things to acquire perfect goodness from him.
Human beings, who are further from him, need more to acquire complete goodness,sincetheyarecapableofblessedness.Thoselowercreaturesthat are not capable of blessedness need fewer things than human beings. That is why human beings have greater worth than they, even though being in need of more things. Similarly, someone who could achieve perfect health by doing a great deal of exercise is in a better condition than someone
Article who could achieve only a moderate degree of health, but would need only moderate exercise for this.
() There can be a natural inclination to do what is characteristic of one virtue. However, there cannot be such an inclination to do what is characteristic of all the virtues. The reason is that a natural tendency that inclines towards one virtue will incline to conflict with another. For example, someone who is naturally disposed to be courageous, which is shown in pursuing difficult things, will be less disposed towards gentleness, which consists in restraining the emotions of the aggressive faculty.
That is why we see that animals which naturally incline to do what one virtue does also incline towards the vice that is the opposite of a different virtue;forexample,alion,whichisnaturallydaring,isalsonaturallycruel.
This natural inclination to one or other virtue is enough for other animals, which cannot achieve complete goodness in respect of virtue, but follow a good of a determinate sort. Human beings, however, are apt by nature to reach goodness that is complete with respect to virtue: for that reason, they need to possess an inclination to all kinds of virtuous activity. This could not happen by nature. Therefore it needs to happen in accordance with reason; the seeds of all the virtues exist in that.
() The mid-point of virtue is not determined in accordance with nature, as is the middle of the world, towards which heavy things move.
Rather, the mid-point of virtue needs to be determined according to right reason, as Aristotle says [NE .., a]. For what is in the middle for one person is too little or too much for someone else.
() Every sort of good is constituted by measure, type, and order, as Augustine says [NatGood ]. Therefore the measure, type, and order that make up the good of our nature exist in us naturally, and cannot be removed by sin. However, sin is said to be an absence of measure, type, and order in the sense that the good of virtue also consists in these.
() The will, unlike the potential intelligence, does not need to be informed by concepts in order to carry out its activity. That is why there is no need for a natural disposition in the will to produce a natural longing.
This is especially true since the will is moved by a natural disposition of the intelligence, in that the will aims at something that it understands as good.
() Although the principle of virtue, i.e. reason, is inside someone, this principle does not act in the manner of nature; that is why whatever is derived from it is not described as natural.