On the Virtues in General: Article 12: Whether the virtues are properly distinguished from one another
On the Virtues in General However, someone can be more disposed or less disposed towards what is best; accordingly, he has virtue to a greater or lesser degree.
(ii) Or perhaps we should say that 'upper limit' is not meant absolutely, but as 'upper limit of its kind'. For example, within their types, fire is the lightest, i.e. of physical bodies, and human beings are the finest, i.e. of creatures. However, one human being is finer than another.
() The character of virtue is not indivisible in itself, but by reason of its object, insofar as it is aiming at the mid-point. People can be disposed to aim at this in different ways, either better or worse. Moreover, the mid-point itself is not altogether indivisible, for it has a certain breadth: it is enough for virtue that it comes near to the mid-point, as Aristotle says
[NE .., b]. That is why one action can be called more virtuous than another.
() The virtue of charity is infinite from the side of God, that is, of its end. However, charity disposes us in a finite way for that which is infinite.
That is why there can be more or less of it.
() Not everything that is complete in some sense is as complete as possible, but only what is actualised to its upper limit. Therefore nothing prevents something from being complete with respect to virtue, and then being completed still further.
Article : Whether the virtues are properly distinguished from one another Objections It seems not, because:
() Moral activities take their type from their end. Therefore if the virtues are distinguished in type, this should depend on their ends. But this could not depend on their proximate end, because the result would be an infinite number of types of virtue. Therefore it must depend on their ultimate end. But all the virtues share one ultimate end, that is, God or happiness. Therefore there is only one virtue.
() One kind of activity leads to one kind of end. But one kind of activity must depend on one form. Therefore human beings are ordered towards one end by means of one form. But human beings have only a single end,
This argument depends on the range of meaning of perfectus: see Glossary.
Article that is, happiness. Therefore there is only one virtue, because it is the form through which human beings are ordered towards happiness.
()Formsandaccidentsarenumericallydistinctbecauseoftheirmatter or subject. But the subject of a virtue is the soul, or one of its capacities.
Therefore it seems that there is only one virtue, because we have only one soul; or at least, the number of virtues should not exceed the number of capacities in the soul.
()Dispositions,likecapacities,aredistinguishedbytheirobject.Since, then, the virtues are dispositions, it seems that we ought to characterise differences among the virtues and the capacities of the soul in the same way. Consequently, the number of virtues should not exceed that of the capacities of the soul.
() Rejoinder: dispositions are distinguished not by the capacities to which they belong, but by their actions. But on the other hand whatever is based on a principle is distinguished according to that principle and not vice versa; for the unity of a thing has the same source as its being what it is. But dispositions are the principles of actions. Therefore actions should be distinguished according to dispositions rather than vice versa.
() Virtue is necessary for someone to incline in a natural manner to virtuous behaviour. For virtue, as Cicero says [Inv .], is a disposition agreeing with reason in a natural manner. Therefore we do not need virtue to achieve whatever our own capacities naturally incline towards.
But human will naturally inclines towards its ultimate end. Therefore we do not need any virtuous dispositions with respect to our ultimate end.
That is why the philosophers did not posit virtues that had happiness as their object. Therefore neither ought we to posit any theological virtues, because they have as their object God, who is the ultimate end.
() Virtue is a tendency of something complete towards what is best [Phys ., b]. However, faith and hope imply something that is not complete, for faith is about what is not yet seen, and hope about what is not yet grasped. That is why 'When what is complete comes, what is in part will pass away', as Corinthians :puts it. Therefore faith and hope ought not to be posited as virtues.
() No one can be ordered towards God except through his intelligence and his feelings. But faith is enough to order the human intelligence towards God, and charity the feelings. Therefore hope is not needed as a theological virtue on top of faith and charity.
On the Virtues in General () If something is shared generally by all the virtues, it should not be posited as a special virtue. But charity seems to be shared by all the virtues:
Augustine says [MorCath .] that virtue is nothing but the order of love; also, charity is said to be the form of all the virtues. Therefore it should not be posited as one particular kind of theological virtue.
() In God we need to consider more than just the truth to which faith relates, the exaltedness to which hope relates, and the goodness to which charity relates. God also has many other attributes, for example, wisdom, power, and so on. Since all these attributes are one in God, it seems that there should be only one theological virtue. Or else, there should be as many theological virtues as there are attributes of God.
() A theological virtue is one the activity of which is ordered directly towards God. But there are several other virtues of which this is true: for example, wisdom, which contemplates God, and fear, which gives him reverence, and piety which worships him. Therefore there are more than three theological virtues.
() The end provides the reason for things that contribute to the end. Therefore once you possess the theological virtues, which enable someone to be rightly ordered towards God, it seems superfluous to posit any other virtues.
() Virtue is ordered towards what is good. For virtue is what makes both its possessor and what he does something good [NE .., a].
But only the will and the desiring part concern what is good. Consequently, it seems as if there are no other, i.e. no intellectual, virtues.
() Practical wisdom is a kind of intellectual virtue. However, it is classed among the moral virtues. Therefore it seems that the moral virtues are not to be distinguished from the intellectual.
() Moral knowledge has to do only with moral matters. However, moral knowledge has to do with the intellectual virtues. Therefore the intellectual virtues are moral.
() If A is included in the definition of B, then A is not distinguished from B. But practical wisdom is included in the definition of moral virtue; formoralvirtueisadispositionconnectedwithchoice,consistinginamidpoint that is determined in accordance with right reason, as Aristotle says
[NE ..a]; for right reason about what is to be done is practical wisdom, as Aristotle also says [NE .., b]. Therefore the moral virtues are not distinguished from practical wisdom.
Article () Just as practical wisdom is a part of practical knowledge, so also is skill. But in addition to skill there are in the desiring part no further dispositions that are ordered towards skilful activities. Therefore by parallel reasoning, in addition to practical wisdom there are no further virtuous dispositions in the desire that are ordered towards practical activities.
Consequently, it seems that there are no other moral virtues that are distinct from practical wisdom.
() Rejoinder: the reason that there is no virtue in the desire that corresponds to skill is that desire aims at one specific object, whereas skill aims at universals. But on the other hand Aristotle says [Rhet ., a] that anger is always about something specific, but hate is also of universals: for we hate every class of robber. But hate is a part of desire. Therefore desire can function in respect of universals.
() Each capacity naturally aims at its own object. The object of the desire, however, is the good that is apprehended: desire naturally inclines towards the good because it has apprehended it. But practical wisdom is adequate to complete us for apprehending what is good. Therefore we do not need any other moral virtues in our desire apart from practical wisdom, since our natural inclination is adequate for all this.
() Awareness and activity are adequate for virtue. But we have both of these through practical wisdom. Therefore we should not posit any other moral virtues apart from practical wisdom.
() Just as dispositions of our desire are distinguished by their objects, so are dispositions of our cognitive powers. But in moral matters there is only one such cognitive disposition, or kind of moral knowledge, for all moral questions (and also practical wisdom).Therefore there is only one moral virtue in the desire.
() Things that agree in form and differ only in matter are of the same type. But all the moral virtues agree in their formal element, because they all have a mid-point that is given by right reason. Therefore they differ only in their matter. Therefore they do not differ in type, but only numerically.
() Things that are different in type are not described in terms of one other. However, the moral virtues are described in terms of one other. For, as Augustine says [Trin ..], justice ought to be brave and temperate,
The text is puzzling here: 'and also practical wisdom' looks like an afterthought or interpolation.
On the Virtues in General and temperateness ought to be just and brave, and so on for the rest.
Therefore the virtues are not distinguished from each other.
() The theological and the intellectual virtues are more fundamental than the moral virtues. But neither the intellectual virtues nor the theological are called 'cardinal'. Therefore neither ought any of the moral virtues to be called 'cardinal', as if they are fundamental virtues.
() There are held to be three parts of the soul, the rational, the aggressive, and the sensual. Therefore if there are more fundamental virtues than one, it seems that there should be only three.
() Other virtues seem to be more fundamental than {the so-called 'cardinal' ones}, for example greatness of spirit, which achieves great thingsinallthevirtues,asAristotlesays[NE..,b];orhumility, which is the guardian of the virtues; gentleness, too, seems to be more fundamental than courage, since it concerns anger, which gives its name to the aggressive part. Again, liberality and magnificence, which give of what belongs to them, seem to be more fundamental than justice, which restores to others what is owed to them. Therefore it seems that other virtues than those usually so described are in fact cardinal.
() A part is not distinct from its whole. But Cicero [Inv .–] classes the other virtues as parts of these four, i.e. practical wisdom, justice, courage, and temperateness. Therefore the other moral virtues, at least, are not distinguished from these. Therefore it seems that it is not appropriate to distinguish the virtues in the usual way.
But on the other hand Corinthians :says, 'Now, however, there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three', and according to Wisdom :, 'It teaches soberness and practical wisdom, and justice and courage.'
My reply Things are classed by type according to their formal element. But the formal element in something is what completes its definition, since it is its ultimate distinguishing feature that constitutes its type; hence it is through that that the defined item differs in type from other things.
Now if that distinguishing feature can itself in respect of its form be divided according to its diverse characteristics, then the defined item
Article will be divided into diverse types that correspond to the diversity of the distinguishing feature.
The element that completes the definition of virtue and is its ultimate formal element is goodness. For virtue understood in the general sense is defined as follows: virtue is what makes its possessor good and what he does good, as Aristotle says [NE .., a]. That is why human virtue, of which we are speaking, ought to be split into diverse types to correspond to the diverse characters of goodness that it possesses. Now since human beings are human insofar as they are rational, what counts as a human good must be the good of something that is in some way rational.
But the rational, or intelligent, part includes both (i) the cognitive and (ii) the desiring parts. Again, two sorts of desire come under reason:
(a) the will, which is naturally found in the rational part and follows the perceptions of reason; and (b) the desire that is found in our sensory part and is divided into the aggressive and the sensual. For in a human being this second desire too follows the perception of reason insofar as it obeys the commands of reason; in this way it is said to participate, in some sense, in reason. Therefore human goods are goods of both the cognitive part and the desiring parts.
However, a good is not attributed to each part under the same characterisation. It is attributed to the desiring part in a formal sense, in that the good itself is the object at which this part aims {cf. (ii)}. However, it is attributed to the intelligent part not in a formal but only in a material sense, since knowing the truth is a sort of good for the cognitive part {cf. (i)}; qua good, though, it is related to the desiring rather than to the cognitive part, since knowing the truth is itself something desirable.
Therefore the virtues that complete the cognitive part for knowing the truth and those that complete the desiring part for seeking the good must have different characters. That is why Aristotle distinguishes
[NE .., a] the intellectual from the moral virtues. The intellectual are described as completing the intelligent part to know the truth and the moral as completing the desiring part to seek the good.
It is because goodness is more closely connected with the desiring than withtheintelligentpartthatthenameofvirtueismoregenerallyandmore strictly used of the virtues of the desiring part than those of the intelligent part. However, as kinds of completeness, the intellectual virtues are more excellent than the moral virtues, as Aristotle proves [NE .., a].
On the Virtues in General To sub-divide further: () knowledge of the truth does not have the same character in respect of everything. For example, (i) necessary and (ii) contingent practical truths are known under a different characterisation.
Again, the same is true of (ia) necessary truths known in themselves, in the way that the first principles are known by intelligence, and (ib) necessary truths known from something else, like the conclusions known by knowledge, or wisdom about the highest truths. In such cases the character of knowing is different, precisely because we are led to know different things by these different faculties of knowing.
(ii) In the same way, in contingent practical matters the character of knowing how to do things is different (iia) for things that are in us and (iib) for things that are outside us. (iia) In the first case, i.e. where we act and the activity is ours, we can often make mistakes due to our emotions.
Practical wisdom deals with these. (iib) In the second case, i.e. where we make things and skill is responsible, the soul's emotions do not corrupt our good judgement.
Because of all this, Aristotle [NE .., b] posits intellectual virtues, i.e. wisdom, knowledge, intelligence, practical wisdom, and skill.
() Again, the good of the desiring part does not have the same character in all human matters. Its good is sought in these three domains: (i) in the emotions of the aggressive part; (ii) in the emotions of the sensual part; and (iii) in those activities of ours that deal with external things that we happen to use, activities such as buying and selling, renting and letting, and so on.
Human good is found in the emotions, where we are so disposed that the force of our emotions does not divert us from the judgement of reason.
Therefore if there are some emotions that are apt by nature to hinder the good of reason by arousing us to action or to the pursuit of some goal, then in this the good of virtue will particularly consist in restraining us and holding us back {cf. (ii)}. This clearly happens with temperateness, which restrains and curbs the sensual desires. On the other hand, if an emotion is apt by nature to hinder the good of reason by pulling it back, as fear does, then the good of reason in relation to this emotion will consist in supporting reason {cf. (i)}. This is what courage does. In respect of external matters, the good of reason consists in accepting a fair share in whatever is part of a shared human life {cf. (iii)}. That is why it is given the name of justice, because its job is to give guidance and discover what is fair in this area.
Article () We need to consider too that the good of the intelligent part is double, just like the good of the desiring part. There is the good that is the ultimate end and the good that contributes to the end. The character of each is different. That is why we need other virtues besides those we have discussed, which will enable us to pursue the goods that contribute to the end. The additional virtues make us relate well to our ultimate end, which is God. That is why they are called the theological virtues, because they have God not only as their final end but also as the object at which they are aiming.
Now in order to be moved as we should towards our end we need both (i) to know and (ii) to long for the end. Longing for the end requires two things: (a) trust that we will obtain it, since no wise person is moved to pursue something that he cannot achieve; and (b) love of the end, because you only long for things that you love. Consequently there are three theological virtues, i.e. faith, by which we know God; hope, by which we hope that we will attain him; and charity, by which we love him.
From all this, then, it is clear that there are three classes of virtue – theological, intellectual, and moral – and that each class contains within it several types.
Replies to objections () Moral activities take their type from their proximate ends. However, these are not infinite if you look only at the distinguishing features of their forms. For the proximate ends of the virtues are the goods which they each achieve, which differ in their characters in the way I have explained.
() This reasoning holds good where things act by natural necessity, because they achieve their end with a single form by performing a single kind of action. Human beings, however, possess reason because they need to reach their own end through many different things; that is why they need several different virtues.
() Within a single thing, accidents or forms are not multiplied numerically, but only according to their type. That is why we ought not to work out whether there are one or more virtues from the subject, which is the soul or its capacities; that is, except insofar as the different characterisations of good follow the diversity of the capacities. At any rate, it is those characterisations that provide the criteria for distinguishing the virtues, as I have said.
On the Virtues in General () Something is an object of a capacity and of a disposition under different characterisations. For a capacity enables us simply to do something, e.g. be angry or trust. A disposition enables us to do something well or badly, as Aristotle says [NE .., b]. Therefore, a difference in something's characterisation as a good will make it a different object from the point of view of the disposition, though not from the point of view of the capacity. That is why one capacity turns out to possess several dispositions.
() Just because A is the final cause of B, it does not mean that B cannot be the efficient cause of A. Medicine, for example, is the efficient cause of health, while health is the final cause of medicine, as Aristotle says
[NE .., a]. Dispositions, then, are the efficient causes of acts; but acts are the final causes of dispositions. That is how dispositions are distinguished in a formal sense by their acts.
() With respect to the end that corresponds to human nature, our natural inclinations are enough to put us in the right condition. That is why the philosophers do not posit any virtues which have happiness as their object, or discuss these themselves. We, however, hope for blessedness in an end that exceeds the abilities of our nature, that is, in God. That is why, on top of our natural inclinations, we also need virtues that allow us to be raised to our ultimate end.
() To reach God in any way at all, even incompletely, belongs to a higher state of completeness than does obtaining things other than God in a complete way. That is why Aristotle can say [PA ., b] that the little that we see of the higher beings is more valuable than the lot that we know of other things. Therefore nothing prevents faith and hope from being virtues, even though we reach God only incompletely through them.
() Our feelings are ordered towards God through hope insofar as we trust in God and through charity insofar as we love him.
() Love is the principle and root of all the feelings. For we only rejoice when we encounter something good insofar as we love it. The same is obvious for all other feelings. Therefore every virtue that orders any emotion also orders love. But it does not follow from this that charity, which is love, is not a particular virtue. It ought, though, to be the principle of all the other virtues in this sense, in that it moves them all towards its own end.
Article () We do not need to have theological virtues that correspond to all the divine attributes, but only to those which move our desire as their end.
That is why there are three theological virtues, as I have explained.
() Piety has God for its end; however, its object, rather than God, is whatever is offered in worshipping him. That is why it is not a theological virtue. Similarly, wisdom, which allows us now to contemplate
God, does not look directly at God himself; rather, at the present time, we contemplate him through what he brings about. Fear looks at something other than God as its object, for example, punishment, or our own insignificance; by thinking on such things, we are able to submit ourselves with reverence to God.
() Just as in theoretical matters there are principles and conclusions, so in practical matters there are ends and things that contribute to the end. In order to acquire a complete awareness that is readily accessible, it is not enough just to relate properly, through the virtue of intelligence, to the principles of knowledge; one also needs the virtue of knowledge with respect to the conclusions. Similarly, in practical matters we need not only the theological virtues, which make us properly disposed to the ultimate end, but also other virtues, which order us properly towards whatever contributes to the end.
()Althoughthegoodquagoodistheobjectofthevirtuesofthedesire, and not of the virtues of the intelligence, yet something that is good can be found also in the intelligence. For knowing the truth is a kind of good.
In this way, the dispositions that complete the intelligence to know the truth possess the character of virtue.
() Practical wisdom is, according to its essence, an intellectual virtue, but the matter it deals with is moral. That is why it is sometimes included among the moral virtues and sometimes as a mediator between the intellectual and the moral virtues.
() Although the intellectual virtues are distinguished from the moral virtues, they still belong to moral knowledge insofar as their activities are subject to the will. For we use knowledge and the other intellectual virtues when we want to do so. And something is called 'moral' because it is in some way within the scope of the will.
() The right reason of practical wisdom is not included in the definition of moral virtue as something that is part of its essence, but rather as a sort of efficient cause of it, in the sense that moral virtue participates
On the Virtues in General in it. For moral virtue is nothing other than a kind of participation of the desiring part in right reason, as we said above.
() The matter with which skills deal is things that are made externally; the matter of practical wisdom is things that are done in us. Just as skill requires a certain correctness in external things, because it organises them inaccordancewithaspecificform,sopracticalwisdomrequiresthecorrect tendencyofouremotionsandfeelings.Thatiswhypracticalwisdomneeds other moral dispositions in the desiring part, but skill does not.
We accept objection (). For the desire of the intelligent part, that is, the will, can be for the universal good, which is grasped through the intelligence. This is not true, however, of the desire found in the sensory part because the senses do not grasp the universal.
() The desire does indeed naturally move towards the good that is apprehended. However, it needs some virtuous disposition in the desiring part in order to incline in an easy way towards the good that is pursued by reason, by means of a perfected practical wisdom. This is particularly so where true reason is deliberating and proving something good, while the desires are naturally and in themselves drawn in the opposite direction.
For example, the sensual part is apt by nature to be attracted to sensual pleasures, and the aggressive part to vengeance; however, sometimes reason, after deliberation, forbids these things. Similarly, the will is apt by nature to seek for itself, for the necessities of life, whatever is available for human use. Sometimes, however, reason deliberates and commands that such things should be shared with someone else. That is why it is necessary to posit virtuous dispositions in the desiring part, so that it may obey reason with ease.
() Awareness relates directly to practical wisdom; however, activity relates to it indirectly, mediated by the virtues of the desiring part. That is why we need also to posit certain dispositions in the desiring power, and these are called moral virtues.
() In all moral matters (i) what is true has a single character, since in all moral matters the true is a contingent possible action; however, (ii) what is good, which is the object of virtue, does not have a single character.
Therefore there is only one cognitive disposition for all moral matters, but more than one moral virtue.
() The mid-point is found in different ways in different domains of moral concern. Consequently, such differences in the matter of the moral
Article virtues cause differences of form, in keeping with which the moral virtues will differ in type.
() Some particular moral virtues, which are concerned with a particular domain, take on themselves what is common to every other virtue, and the other virtues are described in terms of them also. This is because something that is common to them all can be particularly difficult and praiseworthy in the context of a specific matter. For it is clear that every virtue (i) needs its actions to be modified according to due circumstances
(for it needs to fit the mid-point for these); and (ii) is directed in an ordered way towards its end, or towards something external; and (iii) has some stability. For to act steadily is one of the criteria for virtue, as is clear from Aristotle [NE .., a].
Now to persist stably is particularly difficult and praiseworthy where there is danger of death. That is why the virtue which has this as its matter wins the name of courage {cf. (iii)}. To hold back is particularly difficult and praiseworthy in the area of things pleasurable to touch. That is why the virtue that deals with this matter is called temperateness {cf. (i)}. In the use of external things, what is particularly needed and praiseworthy is correctness, because people use goods of this sort to share their lives together. That is why this is the good at which virtue aims in this area, because here we relate to others directly according to a kind of equality in respect of such goods. Because of this, the virtue in this area is called justice {cf. (ii)}.
Therefore when we talk about the virtues, we use the names of courage and temperateness and justice not in the sense of particular virtues relating to a specific matter, but in the sense of those shared characteristics by which they may be described. That is why temperateness may be called 'courageous', i.e. having a certain stability, or courage may be called
'temperate', i.e. preserving a limit; the same reasoning applies to the other cases.
As regards practical wisdom, it is clear that it is in one sense general, in that it has all moral questions as its own domain, and in that all the moral virtues participate in it in some way, as I have shown. That is the reason why all moral virtue can be described as 'practically wise'.
Fortitudo (courage) is literally 'strength' and temperantia (temperateness) literally 'restraint'.
Iustitia (justice) is related to the verb iungo, 'to join together'.
On the Virtues in General () A virtue is called 'cardinal', i.e. fundamental, because other virtues dependuponitasadoordoesonahinge{Latin:cardo}.Andsinceadooris an entrance to a house, the theological virtues do not possess the character of cardinal virtues, since they are concerned with the ultimate end, and there is no way to move from the ultimate end and enter anything else. It suits the theological virtues that the other virtues rest on them as a solid base. That is why faith is called a 'foundation' in Corinthians :: 'For no one can make any foundation except the one already established'; while hope is called an 'anchor' in Hebrews :: 'We have hope as the anchor of the soul'; again, Ephesians :describes charity as a 'root': 'rooted in and founded upon charity'.
Similarly, the intellectual virtues are not called 'cardinal', because some of them complete us for the contemplative life, for example, wisdom, knowledge, and intelligence. That life, though, is an end, and therefore does not have the character of a door. (The active life, by contrast, for which the moral virtues complete us, is like a door to the contemplative life.) Skill does not have virtues that are dependent upon it, and therefore cannot be called 'cardinal'. However, practical wisdom, which gives guidance in the active life, is counted among the cardinal virtues.
() In the rational part are found (i) a power of desire, which is called the will, and (ii) a power of apprehension, which is called reason. That is why there are two cardinal virtues in the rational part, practical wisdom, which belongs to reason, and justice, which belongs to the will. Then
(iii) in the sensual part, there is temperateness, and (iv) in the aggressive part, courage.
() For each domain there ought to be a cardinal virtue that deals with whatever is most important in it. There are, however, virtues that deal with other elements of the matter, and they are called secondary, or additional, virtues.
For example, among the emotions of the sensual part, the principal ones are the sensual desires and the pleasures that come from touch, and temperateness deals with these. That is why temperateness is posited as the cardinal virtue in this domain. However, playfulness, which concerns the pleasure we get from playing games, can be classed as a secondary or additional virtue.
Again, among the emotions of the aggressive part, the most important concernsfearanddaringinthefaceofmortaldanger,whichistheprovince of courage. That is why courage is posited as the cardinal virtue in the