On Brotherly Correction: Article 1: Whether there is a precept about brotherly correction
On Brotherly Correction The first question is whether there is a precept about brotherly correction.
The second is whether there is a precept about the order for brotherly correction.
Article : Whether there is a precept about brotherly correction Objections It seems not, because:
() Divine precepts are not contraries of one another. But we find a divine precept about not reproving sinners in Proverbs :, which says,
'Do not reprove someone who scoffs, in case he comes to hate you.'
Therefore there is no precept about brotherly correction.
() Rejoinder: that passage prohibits us from reproving a scoffer who scorns being corrected, and therefore becomes a yet worse person. But on the other hand sin is a weakness of the soul, according to Psalm :,
'Have mercy on me, Lord, because I am weak.' But the person who has responsibility for caring for the weak ought not to omit to do so even in the face of being contradicted or scorned, since when someone refuses his medicine, he is in even greater danger. That is why doctors do whatever they can to heal those who are mad. How much more then should someone who has an obligation to heal his errant brother by rebuking him make
The two articles of this question are a commentary on Matthew :–. For the patristic authorities which Aquinas uses, see Catena aurea ad loc.
On Brotherly Correction sure that he does not omit to correct him, however much the brother might scorn this.
() We should not ignore a divine precept because someone else scorns it. After all, we are not excused from living out the truth for fear of scandalising anyone, as Jerome makes clear [CommMatt , on Matt :].
Therefore, if there were a precept about correcting a brother, we ought not to ignore this just because of someone else's scorn.
() We ought not to do evil so that good may come of it, as St Paul makes clear in Romans :. Therefore, by parallel reasoning, we ought not to omit good things to avoid evil coming from them. If brotherly correction were a good that came under a precept, we ought not to omit to do it because of the evil of scandal or the scorn of the person who is corrected.
() We ought as far as we are able to imitate God in what we do, in accordance with Ephesians :, 'Be imitators of God, as his very dear children.' God, however, does not omit the good of infusing into us a rational soul, even though we might then incur the stain of original sin, which is subject to condemnation. Therefore in a similar way human beings ought not to omit the good of correcting one another, if this comes under a precept, even though the other person might then scorn the correction and become even worse.
() The Lord says in Ezekiel :, 'If you make a proclamation to the impious and they are not converted from their impiety, they will die in their own wickedness. However, you will have freed your own soul.'
Therefore we must not omit correction even in those cases where it may not succeed in reforming the person who needs rebuking.
() It is more helpful to correct than to punish an offender. But a judge does not refrain from punishing an offender just because the punishment will not reform him. Therefore, if there were a precept about brotherly correction, one would not have sometimes to refrain from correcting someone else for fear of scandalising or being scorned by him. Therefore it seems that there is no precept about brotherly correction.
() Divine precepts do not oblige us to do what is impossible. But it is impossible to correct every single offender, since 'the foolish are infinite in number', as Ecclesiastes :puts it. Therefore there is no precept about brotherly correction.
() Rejoinder: we do not have an obligation to correct those who need correction but do not cross our path. But on the other hand if there is a precept about brotherly correction, it follows from this precept
Article that each person is in debt to a brother, owing it to him to correct him.
Someone who owes someone else a physical debt ought not to wait to run into him, but ought to look for him in order to pay him back what he owes.
How much more then, if there is a precept about brotherly correction, ought someone to look for the person whom he should correct, and not just wait to run into him?
() If there were a precept about brotherly correction, an improper failure to carry this out would be a mortal sin. That, though, is not true, since we can even find holy men on occasion avoiding doing this:
Augustine says [CG .] that not only the weaker,'but even those who have a higher state in life refrain from criticising others, because they are held by chains of selfishness rather than out of their duty of charity.
This, in consequence, seems to me to be a major reason why even good are lashed along with the wicked.' Therefore there is no precept about brotherly correction.
() Someone who disobeys a precept commits a mortal sin, even if he does not act directly against charity; so, as Bernardtells us, even when
Peter was denying Christ, his charity was not completely extinguished.
Therefore, if there were a precept about brotherly correction, we would sin mortally if we ignored this, even if we did not do so in scorn,acting directly against the precept.
() All the precepts of the divine law can be derived from the precepts of the Ten Commandments [Ex :–, Deut :–]. But brotherly correction does not fall under any of the precepts of the Ten Commandments, as is clear just by running through them. Therefore there is no precept about brotherly correction.
() Whatever is included in a divine precept enables human beings to achieve their end. However, admonishing a brother is not enough to reform him; not even a speech of admonishment can achieve this, as Aristotle tell us [NE .., b] and as Ecclesiastes :says, 'Consider the works of God, because no one can offer correction if God has looked down on him.' Therefore there is no precept about brotherly correction.
() If it is not up to you to judge something, you ought not to interfere in it. But if someone sins against God, it is not up to us to judge this, as Following Augustine's own text; an alternative text reads 'inferiors'.
Actually William of Saint Thierry, in On the Nature and Dignity of Love, ch. .
To act in scorn of the precept would involve explicitly having a thought like 'What do I care for this commandment? I will act however I please to act.'
On Brotherly Correction Jerome says [CommMatt ]. Therefore no human being ought to interfere in such matters. Hence there is no general precept about rebuking a brother.
() No one is excused from observing a precept because of sin. However, someone who is a sinner ought not to correct anyone else; for Isidore says [Sent(Is) ..] that someone who is subject to vices ought not to correct other people's vices. Therefore there is no precept about admonishing a brother.
() No one incurs damnation for observing a divine precept. But some people incure damnation by rebuking others, according to Romans :,
'You condemn yourselves on the very point on which you judge others.'
Therefore there is no precept about brotherly correction.
() We ought not to arrogate to ourselves duties that do not belong to us, according to Corinthians :, 'We, though, do not boast in a measureless way, but according to the standard of the measure which God has measured for us.' But to rebuke offenders seems to be the duty of someone higher up: in the human body the higher parts move the lower, and in the universe the higher bodies move the lower. Therefore people other than superiorsare not obliged to offer brotherly correction.
() If we ought to bestow something on our neighbour because it is owed by charity, we ought to bestow this on everyone. But we do not have to bestow correction on everyone; for Timothy :says, 'Do not take someone senior to task.' The gloss comments on this, 'To avoid his being insulted by being rebuked by someone junior and becoming angry.' That is why Dionysius criticises the monk Demophilus for correcting a priest.
Therefore brotherly correction is not something that is owed by charity.
() The divine precepts are ordered to charity and peace, according to Timothy:,'Theendofthepreceptischarity.'However,thecorrection of a brother frequently disturbs charity and peace, in keeping with the saying of Terence [Andria ..], 'Truth produces hatred.' Therefore there is no precept about brotherly correction.
But on the other hand () Augustine says [Serm ..] that if you fail to offer correction, you become worse than the person who sinned. The person who sinned acted
For example, bishops with respect to their priests, or abbots with respect to their monks.
Article against a precept. Therefore the person who fails to correct him also acts against a precept. Therefore there is a precept about brotherly correction.
() Matthew :says, 'Rebuke him between the two of you alone.'
The gloss comments here, 'In this way, those who see that their brother has sinned and say nothing sin themselves, just as much as if they fail to pardon a sinner.' But someone who fails to pardon a sinner acts against a precept. Therefore someone who does not offer correction also acts against a precept.
() We ought to conform ourselves to God in fulfilling the precept of charity, as Ephesians :says, 'Be imitators of God, as his very dear children.' But according to Proverbs :, 'The Lord rebukes those whom he loves.' Therefore, since we are obliged by the Lord's precept to love, it seems that we are obliged by precept to correct our brothers.
() Ecclesiasticus :says, 'God has charged each person with caring for his neighbour.' Therefore, there is a precept that each of us should exercise concern for our neighbour's salvation by correcting him.
My reply There is a precept about brotherly correction. The reason is that we are obliged by precept to love our neighbour. Love, though, in itself includes wishing the good of the person who is loved: to love someone is to want what is good for him, as Aristotle says [Rhet ., b]. Since the absence of what is bad has the character of something good, as Aristotle also says [NE .., a], it follows that it is also part of the character of love that we should want those we love not to have within them what is bad. However, our wills are neither effective nor true if they are not proved in what we do. It follows that it is also part of the character of love that we should do good for our friends and protect them from what is bad, as Aristotle says [NE .., b]. John :also says, 'Let us not love in words or speech, but in deeds and truth.'
There are three kinds of good for human beings, along with three kinds of evil opposed to these:
(i) One consists in external things, and this is the least valuable. Here, we are obliged to assist our neighbours by distributing alms in the physical sense. John :says, 'If anyone has sufficient of this world's goods and sees that his brother is in need and closes his heart against him, how can
God's charity remain in him?' By parallel reasoning, we are obliged to
On Brotherly Correction assist our neighbours in the face of the loss of temporal goods. That is why Deuteronomy :says, 'You shall not see your brother's ox or sheep straying and ignore it, but you shall take it back to your brother.'
(ii) The second is the good of the body: here again we owe one another help to achieve this and help to protect each other against any harm that opposes it: Proverbs :says, 'Rescue those who are being led to their death, and do not cease from freeing those who are being dragged to destruction.'
(iii) The third is the good of virtue: that is the good of the soul, which is contrary to the evil of sin. We are, though, obliged by charity to help our neighbour to achieve such good and avoid such evil more {than we are in the case of (i) and (ii)}, insofar as this sort of help is more closely related to the reason why we love out of charity.That is why Aristotle says [NE .., b] that someone ought to help a friend avoid sins more than loss of money, to the degree that virtue is closer to friendship.
That is also why the precept of love binds us to assist our neighbours in acquiring virtue by counselling and helping them to act well, in keeping with Isaiah :–, 'Strengthen feeble hands and make firm weak knees, and say, "You of faint heart, be strong and do not be afraid".' For this reason the precept of love obliges someone to draw a brother who is in sin away from sin by correcting him, in accordance with Thessalonians :,
'Rebuke the troublesome, console the faint-hearted.' That is also why the Lord commanded in Matthew :, 'If your brother has sinned against you, rebuke him.' Hence there is a precept about brotherly correction.
However, we need to note that virtuous actions are required of us by positive precepts, while vicious actions are forbidden by negative ones.
Now something that is sinful and vicious in itself is bad, in whatever way it is done, since even single flaws can give this result, as Dionysius says [DivNames .]. Therefore such things are prohibited by a negative precept, because they must not be done at any time nor in any way.
Virtuous actions, on the other hand, are required by a positive precept, and many circumstances together contribute to their correctness. This is because goodness arises from one complete cause as Dionysius says
[DivNames .].That is why when something falls under a positive precept it does not need to be followed at every time and in every way, but Cf. DQChar rep.
See the Introduction, p. xxvi.
Article rather when the appropriate conditions are present regarding persons, places, reasons, and times. For example, 'Honour your parents' does not need to be put into practice at every time and place and in every way, but where the appropriate circumstances are present. Similarly, the precept about brotherly correction, because it is a virtuous action, takes effect in appropriate circumstances. It is not possible to provide a discourse that defines these circumstances, because judging them must take place in individual cases. This is the job of practical wisdom, whether acquired by experience and over time, or, better still, infused: as John :puts it,
'Anointing will teach you concerning everything.'
Replies to objections () Among other circumstances that are needed for virtuous action, the most important seems to be that the action corresponds to the end at which the virtue is aiming. When correcting an offender, charity aims at reforming him. The action would not be virtuous if the offender were corrected in such a way as to make him worse. That is why the wise man says [Prov :], 'Do not reprove someone who scoffs.' As the gloss explains, 'You should not fear that the scoffer may insult you if he is reproved, but rather you should take care not to push him into hatred, which will make him a worse person.'
() There are two ways of correcting an offender. (i) The first is by simply admonishing him; this is brotherly correction, and it has a place only among those people among whom it is accepted that they agree to such admonition of their own free will. (ii) The second sort of correction uses compulsion by inflicting a punishment, as Aristotle says [NE .., a]. This sort belongs to superiors, who ought to make an effort to free from the danger of sin even those who are scornful, just as a doctor makes an effort to heal someone who is mad, even by binding or beating him.
() We should not ignore a divine precept for fear of scandalising someoneelse.However,brotherlycorrectioncomesunderadivinepreceptonly to the extent that it reforms the brother. For this to happen, it must not scandalise him, for the reasons already given in my reply.
() As has already been said, evils must be avoided in every way whatsoever. That is why they should never be done in order that good should come of them. But we do not have to do good in every way whatsoever,
On Brotherly Correction which is why on occasion some good actions can be interrupted, in order to avoid serious evils. Moreover, correcting one's neighbour is not a good unqualifiedly, unless the appropriate circumstances are present, as has been said.
() Moral goods presuppose natural goods. That is why God did not have to omit to infuse in us our souls – which are one of the goods of our nature – for the sake of avoiding the stain of sin. In the same way, people ought not to deprive themselves of vital sustenance in order to avoid sin.
However, from time to time one may refrain from a morally good action in order to avoid some more serious moral evil.
() Augustine says [CG .] that those put in charge of the churches and appointed to them 'have a far more serious cause, to castigate sins and not spare them'. For it is their responsibility to correct others not only with charity, but also with force. The Lord is addressing people of that sort through Ezekiel in this passage, which is why a little earlier it says,
'Children of men, I have given you an overseer over the house of Israel.'
() The judge in punishing has the common good as his principal intention, because the punishment of one person benefits the general public,evenifheorsheisnotreformed.AsProverbs:says,'Ifyoubeat thetroublemaker,thefoolwillbecomewiser.'Brotherlycorrectionisquite different, because its purpose is reforming the person who is rebuked.
() As I said in my reply, there is a precept about brotherly correction thatapplieswhentheappropriatecircumstancesarepresentwithregardto persons, places, and times, just as with almsgiving for the body. Moreover, we ought to bestow acts of kindness, whether spiritual or bodily, on our neighbours in a certain order: that is, first on those who are closer to us, on the grounds that it has fallen to our lot to provide for them, as Augustine says [CT ..]. Next, we ought to provide for others further from us as the opportunity arises. In this way it is clear that the precept about brotherly correction does not oblige us to do something impossible, any more than the precept about giving alms for the body.
() As Augustine says [Serm .], 'Our Lord warns us not to overlook one another's sins, not by looking for things to criticise, but by seeing what to correct.' Therefore, the precept about brotherly correction does not bind us to seek out other people's sins so that we can correct them, or we would turn into spies on other people's lives, in contradiction of Proverbs :, 'Do not search for impiety in the house of the just, and do not destroy their rest.' The reasoning is different from that in the case of
Article a physical debt, because there something specifiable is owed to a specific person, and at a specific time. This is not true with brotherly correction, as I have said in my reply.
() There are three possible ways of failing to provide brotherly correction:
(i) Without sinning at all: for, as Augustine says [CG .], 'If someone spares wrongdoers from castigation and rebuke because he is waiting for a more suitable moment, or because he is afraid that this will make the offenders worse, or else hinder other, weak, people who need to be trained for a good and devout life, and will oppress them and turn them from the faith, this does not seem to be an instance of selfishness, but a policy based on charity.'
(ii) Secondly, for example when 'a smooth tongue and "the human day" [Cor :–] give pleasure, and the judgement of the crowd and torture and the destruction of the flesh bring fear' [CG .] – then, if this sort of thing dominates our mind in such a way as to overwhelm charity towards our brothers, that is a mortal sin.
(iii) Thirdly, it can be venially sinful, for example when such considerations move the mind not so as to take the place of charity towards our neighbour, but so as to make us forget to consider the circumstances and opportunities in which we are obliged to offer correction.
() When someone sins mortally, he sins directly against charity, because he does something that is contrary to charity. However, he does not always sin directly against charity in a strict sense, but only when he intends to act against charity, as happens with those who sin out of ill-will.
() Precepts about bestowing kindness on certain of our neighbours are derived from the precept about honouring parents. However, honouring parents is mentioned explicitly, because this comes immediately into anyone's reasoning; the same is not true of other sorts of kindness.
() A warning speech is not sufficient, according to Aristotle [NE .., a], for those who are hard and have slavish souls. These are the people who get worse when they are admonished, and who need to be controlled by the forcible correction of superiors. That sort of correction too is inadequate without divine assistance.
() It is not up to us to judge whether to forgive sins against God, but it is up to us to judge whether to reprove them.
() We are not absolved from the duty of offering correction because of our sins. Rather, what renders us unworthy of correcting someone else