On the Virtues in General: Article 7: Whether virtue is found in the theoretical intelligence
Article Article : Whether virtue is found in the theoretical intelligence Objections It seems that it is not, because:
() All virtue is ordered towards action; for it is virtue that renders the things that we do good [NE .., a]. The theoretical intelligence, however, is not ordered towards action; for it has nothing to say about imitating or avoiding things, as is clear from Aristotle [Soul ., b].
Therefore virtue cannot exist in the theoretical intelligence.
() It is virtue that makes its possessor good, as Aristotle says [NE .., a]. But the disposition of one's theoretical intelligence does not make one good: someone is not called good just because he possesses knowledge. Therefore such dispositions as the theoretical intelligence possesses are not virtues.
() The theoretical intelligence is completed chiefly by having the disposition of knowledge. However, knowledge is not a virtue: that is clear from the fact that it is divided off from the virtues; for the first type of quality is said to include disposition and tendency, and disposition is said to include knowledge and virtue [Cat , b]. Therefore virtue is not found in the theoretical intelligence.
() All virtue is ordered towards something, because it is ordered towards happiness, which is the end of virtue. However, the theoretical intelligence is not ordered towards anything: for theoretical branches of knowledge are not sought for their usefulness, but for themselves, as Aristotle says [Met ., a]. Therefore virtue cannot exist in the theoretical intelligence.
()Theactivityofvirtueismeritorious.However,understandingsomething is not enough to be meritorious. Indeed, James :says, 'Someone who knows what is good and does not do it sins.' Therefore virtue does not exist in the theoretical intelligence.
But on the other hand () Faith is found in the theoretical intelligence, since its object is the first truth. However, faith is a virtue; therefore the theoretical intelligence can possess virtue.
On the Virtues in General () What is true and what is good are equally excellent. Indeed, they overlap:fortruthissomethinggoodandgoodnessissomethingtrue,while both of them are shared by everything that exists. Therefore if there can be virtue in the will, which has as its object what is good, there can also be virtue in the theoretical intelligence, which has as its object what is true.
My reply We must say that virtue is identified in each thing by reference to its good.
This is because each thing's virtue, as Aristotle says [NE .., a], is what makes it good and what makes whatever it does good. For example, the virtue of a horse makes it a good horse, that moves well and carries its rider well: for these things are what a horse does. Consequently, a disposition will possess the character of a virtue insofar as it is ordered towards good.
This can happen in two ways, either (i) in respect of form, or (ii) in respect of matter. (i) It happens in respect of form when a disposition is ordered towards something good qua good. (ii) It happens in respect of matter when it is ordered towards something that is good, but not towards it qua good.
Only the desiring part of the soul aims at what is good qua good, since the good is what all things desire. Therefore the dispositions that exist in, or depend upon, the desiring part, are directed in respect of form towards whatever is good {cf. (i)}. Therefore they possess the character of virtue in its fullest sense. The dispositions that are not found in, nor dependent upon, the desiring part, can be ordered in respect of matter towards something that is good, but not in respect of form, i.e. towards it qua good {cf. (ii)}. For this reason, they can be called virtues in one sense, but not strictly speaking, as can the first sort of dispositions.
Weneedtoknowalsothattheintelligence,boththeoreticalandpractical, can be brought to completion through a disposition in two ways:
(i') absolutely and in itself, in that it precedes the will, as something that moves the will; (ii') in that it follows the will, as drawing out its own activity at the will's command.
Therefore, as I have said, these two capacities, i.e, the intelligence and the will, are mutually dependent.
Article Those dispositions, then, that are in the practical or theoretical intelligenceinthefirstway{cf.(i')}canbecalledvirtuesinsomesense,although not here in its fullest sense. In this way, knowledge and wisdom exist in the theoretical intelligence, and skill in the practical intelligence. Someone is called intelligent or knowledgeable, then, because his intelligence is perfected for knowing the truth; indeed, that is the good of the intelligence.
It is true that truth may also be something that is wanted, in that someone can want to understand what is true; however, it is not in this respect that the dispositions in question have been perfected. For just because someone is knowledgeable, it does not mean that he automatically wants to think about what is true, but only that he can. Therefore in itself consideration of the truth does not depend on the knowledge's being something willing, but on its focusing directly on its object. The same is true of skill with respect to the practical intelligence: skill does not make someone perfect in the sense of making him want to do good work in accordance with his skill, but only in the sense of making him know how to and be able to.
By contrast, those dispositions that are in the theoretical or practical intelligence insofar as the intelligence follows the will {cf. (ii')} possess the character of virtue more truly. I mean that through them someone becomes not only capable of and knowledgeable about acting rightly, but also willing so to act. This is the case with both faith and practical wisdom, but in different ways.
Faith completes the theoretical intelligence in the sense that the latter receives commands from the will. This is clear in the case of action: for someone only assents with the intelligence to things that are above human reason if he is willing to do so; as Augustine says [TGJn .], someone can only believe if he is willing to. Thus faith will exist in the theoretical intelligence, by being subject to the command of the will, in a way parallel to that in which temperateness exists in the sensual part of the soul, by being subject to the command of reason. Consequently, when it comes to believing, the will commands the intelligence not only in respect of carrying out an action, but also in respect of deciding about its object. For the intelligence assents at the command of the will to a decision on what to believe. Similarly, the sensual part, through temperateness, is drawn towards a moderate limit that is decided by reason.
Practical wisdom, however, is found in the practical intelligence or reason, as I have said. This is not because the will determines the object
On the Virtues in General of practical wisdom; it determines only its end. Practical wisdom itself searches for the object: it assumes as the end a good given by the will, and then looks for ways to achieve and preserve that good.
It is clear in this way that the dispositions that exist in the intelligence relate in different ways to the will:
(i") Some of them do not depend at all upon the will, except for being used. That is something accidental to them, since the use of this sort of disposition depends in one way on the will and in another way on the disposition in question. This is the case, for example, with knowledge, wisdom and skill. For these dispositions in themselves do not complete their possessors to be the sort of people who want to make good use of them. They only make them capable of doing so.
(ii")Someoftheseintellectualdispositionsdependonthewilltoreceive their principle: for the end of action is a principle. This is the case with practical wisdom.
(iii")Someofthesedispositionsaresuchthatthewilldecideswhattheir object is, and they receive this from the will. This is the case with faith.
All these can be called virtues in some sense. However, the last two possess the character of virtue more strictly and more completely. From this, though, it does not follow that they are more excellent or more complete as dispositions.
Replies to objections ()Adispositionofthetheoreticalintelligenceisorderedtowardsitsown distinctive activity, which it makes complete; and this is reflection upon the truth. However, they are not ordered towards some external action as their end, but they have their end in their own distinctive activity.
The practical intelligence is ordered towards a further, external, activity as its end. For reflection on what should be done or made is the job of the practical intelligence only for the purpose of actually doing or making something.
In this way, the dispositions of the theoretical intelligence make their actions good in a more excellent way than do those of the practical intelligence. This is because the former do them as their end, the latter for another end. However, the dispositions of the practical intelligence, because they are ordered to goodness qua goodness, in that they presuppose the will, possess the character of virtue in a stricter sense.
Article () No one is called good without qualification for being partly good, but for being wholly good. This depends upon possessing a good will, since the command of the will actualises all the capacities we have as human beings. This arises from the fact that every actualisation is what is good for the relevant capacity. Therefore someone is only called a good person without qualification if he has a will that is good.
On the other hand, someone who is good in respect of some other capacity, without having a good will, is called good in a relative sense; if he has good eyesight or hearing, he is described as someone who sees or hears well. In this way, it is clear that a man who has knowledge is not for that reason called good, simply speaking, but good in respect of his intelligence, or someone who 'understands well'. The same is true for skill and other dispositions of this sort.
() (i) Knowledge is divided off from moral virtue, yet it is itself an intellectual virtue. Alternatively, (ii) it is divided off from virtue in the very strictest sense, for in that sense it is not itself a virtue, as I have explained.
() The theoretical intelligence is not ordered to something outside itself. Rather, it is ordered towards its own distinctive activity as its end.
Nevertheless, our ultimate happiness, which will be contemplation, consists in the activity of the theoretical intelligence. That is why its present activities are nearer to our ultimate happiness, in the sense of being comparable to them, than are the dispositions of the practical intelligence.
The latter, however, are perhaps closer to it in the sense that they prepare for it or merit it.
() Someone can gain merit through the activities of knowledge, or other similar dispositions, insofar as they are commanded by the will; for nothing that is not commanded by the will merits anything. However, knowledge does not complete the intelligence in this respect, as I have said. For having knowledge is not enough to make someone good at wanting to reflect on it, but only good at being capable of this. That is why an evil will is not incompatible with knowledge or skill, as it is with practical wisdom or faith or temperateness. For this reason Aristotle says
[NE .., b] that someone who errs in what he does because he wants to has little practical wisdom. In the case of knowledge or skill, the opposite is true: a schoolteacher who makes a grammatical mistake without meaning to seems through this to be less knowledgeable about grammar.