On the Virtues in General: Article 2: Whether the definition of virtue given by Augustine is appropriate, i.e. ‘virtue i
Article () Virtue is a mid-point with respect to emotions, but not in the sense that it is itself some middling emotion. Rather it is something active that establishes a mid-point in the emotions.
Article : Whether the definition of virtue given by Augustine is appropriate, i.e. 'virtue is a good quality of mind by which we live rightly, which no one misuses, and which God works in us without our help'
Objections This does not seem to be appropriate, for the following reasons:
() Virtue is a sort of goodness. If then it is itself good, it is so either through its own, or through a different, goodness. If through a different goodness, we have an infinite regress; if through its own, then virtue must be the original goodness, because only the original goodness is good through itself.
() What is common to everything that exists should not be put into the definition of one thing. But 'being' is the class to which every being belongs. Therefore good, which is coextensive with this, ought not to be put in the definition of virtue.
() Goodness works in the same way in the moral domain as it does in the natural domain. Now in the natural domain, good and bad do not differentiate one type of thing from another. Therefore good should not be included in the definition of virtue, as if it were what distinguishes virtue from other types of quality of mind.
() The characterisation of a class does not include the distinguishing features of its types. But 'good', like 'being', is part of the characterisation of quality. Therefore good should not be added to the definition of virtue, in the words 'it is a good quality of mind', etc.
() Good and bad are opposites. But badness does not determine the type that something has, since it is in fact an absence.Therefore neither does goodness; therefore good ought not to be put into the definition of virtue as if it were a constitutive distinguishing feature.
This definition, attributed to Augustine at Sent ..., is actually pieced together from several passages: Rev ..and .., FC .., Ps .., SL ..
Only a positive feature of a thing can determine what type of thing it is. But badness, according to a common medieval view, is not a positive feature of a thing, but a mere absence of some feature needed to make the thing good.
On the Virtues in General () 'Good' is of wider extension than 'quality'. Therefore one quality does not differ from another by being good.Therefore good should not be put into the definition of a virtue as if it were a distinguishing feature between qualities, i.e. of virtue.
() No one thing can come to be through two actualisations. But 'good' implies one actualisation and 'quality' another. Therefore it is a mistake to say that virtue is a good quality.
() Something that is qualified by an abstract predicate is not also qualified by a concrete one, e.g. redness is a colour, but it is not itself coloured.But virtue is qualified by 'goodness' as an abstract predicate.
Therefore it is not qualified by 'good' as a concrete one. Therefore it is a mistake to say that virtue is a good quality.
()Atypedoesnothaveitsdistinguishingfeaturespredicatedabstractly of it. That is why Avicenna says [FirstPhil .] that a human being is not a rationality, but something rational. But a virtue is a goodness. Therefore goodness is not a distinguishing feature of virtue. Therefore it is a mistake to say, 'virtue is a good quality'.
() Badness of behaviour is the same thing as vice. Therefore goodness of behaviour is the same thing as virtue. Therefore good should not be put in the definition of virtue, because then one thing would be defining itself.
() The mind is a part of the intelligence. But virtue rather relates to feelings. Therefore it is a mistake to say that virtue is a good quality of mind.
()AccordingtoAugustine[Trin..],'mind'namesthehigherpart of the soul. But some virtues are found in its lower capacities. Therefore it is a mistake to say that virtue is a good quality of mind.
() The possession of virtue should be attributed to a capacity rather than an essence. But 'mind' seems to identify an essential feature of the soul; for Augustine says [Trin ..] that intelligence, memory and will are in the mind. Therefore mind should not be put into the definition of virtue.
() Something that is distinctive of a type ought not to be put in the definitionofaclass.Butrightnessbelongstojustice.Thereforerightness
See note .
The Latin says 'white' rather than 'red'. However, in English 'white' is often contrasted with 'coloured'.
See the Glossary for the technical sense of 'type' and 'class'.
Article should not be included in the definition of virtue, in the words, 'a good quality of mind, by which we live rightly'.
() For living things to live is to exist. But virtue does not come to completion in being but in doing. Therefore it is a mistake to say, 'by which we live rightly'.
() Someone who is proud of something misuses that thing. But sometimes people are proud of their virtues. Therefore sometimes people misuse virtues.
() Augustine says [FC .] that it is only the greatest goods that no one misuses. But virtue is not one of the greatest goods; for the greatest goods are things that are sought on their own account. This does not fit the virtues, since they are sought on account of something else, i.e. happiness. Therefore it is a mistake to say 'which no one misuses'.
() The same agent is responsible for generating, nourishing, and increasing something. But virtue is nourished and increased by our actions, since reducing selfishness is increasing charity. Therefore virtue isgeneratedbyouractions.Thereforeitisamistaketosayinthedefinition
'which God works in us without our help'.
() 'The removal of an obstacle' is held to be a source of change and a cause. But free judgement in a sense removes obstacles to virtue.
Therefore it is a type of cause. Therefore it is a mistake to say that God works virtue without our help.
() Augustine says [Serm ..] that 'the one who created you without you will not justify you without you'. Therefore etc.
() This definition would be an appropriate one for grace, it seems.
But virtue and grace are not one and the same. Therefore this is not a good definition of virtue.
My reply This definition includes in it the definition of virtue; moreover, if the last clause were omitted, it would also fit the whole of human virtue. For, as we said earlier, virtue perfects a capacity with reference to perfected action. But perfected action is the end of the capacity or of whatever acts. That is why virtue makes both the capacity and the person acting good, as was said above. For that reason something is included in the This article includes no sed contra ('but on the other hand').
On the Virtues in General definition of virtue that relates to the perfecting of the action, and something else that relates to the perfecting of the capacity or of whatever acts.
Two things are required to perfect an action. (i) The first is that the action itself is correct; (ii) the second is that the disposition cannot be the principle of a contrary action. For whatever is the principle of both good and bad actions alike cannot, of itself, be the perfect principle of a good action. This is because whatever perfects a capacity ought to be the principleofagoodactioninsuchawaythatitcouldneverbetheprincipleofabad one. That is why Aristotle says [NE .., b] that opinion, which can be either true or false, is not a virtue; however, knowledge is, as this can only be based on truth. The first requirement is referred to in the words,
'bywhichweliverightly';thesecondinthewords,'whichnoonemisuses'.
Three points should be considered with reference to the claim that virtue makes its possessor good:
(i) the possessor itself: this is specified by the word 'mind'. For human virtue can only exist in something that belongs to a human being qua human; (ii) the perfecting of this is specified by the word 'good', because good means in accordance with an ordering to an end;
(iii) the way in which it is possessed is specified by the word 'quality'; for virtue exists in someone in the manner not of an emotion but of a disposition, as was said above.
All these points, moreover, apply to moral as much as to intellectual, theological, or infused virtues. Augustine's additional phrase, 'which God works in us without our help,' applies only to infused virtues.
Replies to objections () Accidents are not called beings in the sense that they have independent existence, but because something else is something through them. In this way, virtue is not said to be good because it is a good itself, but because other things are good through it. Hence there is no need for virtue to be good through a different goodness from its own, as if a different goodness gave it its form.
() This definition of virtue does not refer to the goodness that is coextensive with being, but rather to the goodness that is restricted to moral acts.
Article () What makes actions different is the form of the thing acting, for example, making something warm or cool. But with the will, good and bad are, so to speak, both its form and its object, because when it acts on or moves something else, it always prints its own form on that thing.
That is why moral actions, which originate in the will, are of different types depending on whether they are good or evil. On the other hand, the origin of natural activities is not the end, but the form, of the thing that acts. That is why natural things are not different in type depending on whether they are good or bad; in moral matters, however, this is the case.
() Moral goodness is not already included in the understanding of quality. That is why the argument misses the point.
() What is bad does not determine something's type by reason of the absence of a positive quality, but by reason of the thing that underlies the lack of such a quality; this is because it does not allow the character of goodness to coexist with it. That is how it determines something's type.
() The objection relies on natural rather than moral goodness; but the latter is meant in the definition of virtue.
() The goodness here does not imply any other goodness than virtue itself, as is clear from what has already been said. For virtue itself is in its essence a quality. That is why it is clear that 'good' and 'quality' do not refer to different actualisations, but only to one.
() This does happen in the case of the transcendentals,which attach to every being. For an essence is a being; and a goodness is good; and a unity is one. However, a redness cannot said to be red in this sense.
The reason is that whatever comes under our intelligence, must also be characterised as 'being', and therefore as both 'good' and 'one'. That is why an essence or a goodness cannot be understood without being understood as characterised as 'good' and 'one' and 'being'. It is because of this that a goodness can be said to be good and a unity one.
For example, if a cataract makes an eye blind, it does so not by giving the lens 'absence of sight', but by giving it an opaque texture that is incompatible with sight.
Transcendentals are features that do not belong to just one of Aristotle's categories, but 'transcend' the categories. The list of transcendentals varies somewhat but generally includes at least the three mentioned here: 'being', 'good', and 'one'. Anything that falls under any of the categories will have being, goodness, and unity in some way.
There are no replies to the remaining objections. Some editors add here, 'The solutions to the other objections are clear from what has been said.' Mandonnet's edition prints a continuation by Vincent de Castro Novo, OP, dated .