On the Cardinal Virtues: Article 3: Whether all the virtues within a person are equal
Article I have said. That is why someone who knows one conclusion need not know another one. That would be necessary if someone who knew the principles had to know the conclusions, as is true in the present case.
() Augustine is speaking there about imperfect virtues, which are particular tendencies to act in a way characteristic of the virtues. That is why he himself elsewhere [Trin ..] can prove the interconnectedness of the virtues.
() The virtues are interconnected by reason of their proximate principle, i.e. something in their own class, that is, practical wisdom or charity, and not by reason of a distant or general principle, i.e. God.
() Practical wisdom is unique among the intellectual virtues in being connected with the moral virtues, by reason of the domain with which it deals, i.e. moral matters.
() In our homeland, when hope and faith pass away, they will be replaced by something more perfect, i.e. vision and possession, which are indeed interconnected with charity.
() The angels and the separated souls do not possess temperateness and courage for the same activities for doing what they do in this life, i.e. for moderating the emotions of our sensory part, but for doing other things, as Augustine makes clear [Trin ..].
() The capacities of the soul and its essence do not reciprocally imply the existence of one another; for although no capacity can exist unless the soul does, the soul can exist without some of its capacities, e.g. without sight or hearing, if those organs which are specifically for actualising the capacities in question are destroyed.
() A person is not 'supreme' just through possessing all the virtues, but through possessing them to a supreme degree.
Article : Whether all the virtues within a person are equal Objections It seems not, because:
() Corinthians :says, 'Now, however, there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity.' There being a greatest, however, rules out equality. Therefore the virtues in one person are not equal.
Reading moralia for mobilia.
On the Cardinal Virtues () Rejoinder: charity is greater in its actualisation, but not as a disposition. But on the other hand Augustine says [Trin ..] that in the case of things that are not great in respect of size, 'greater' means the same as 'better'. But the disposition of charity is better than the dispositions of the other virtues, because it is in closer contact with God, as John : tells us: 'Those who remain in charity remain in God.' Therefore charity is greater than the other virtues also as a disposition.
() Whatever completes something is prior to that thing. But charity makes the other virtues complete, according to Colossians :: 'Have charity on top of everything else, for it is the bond of completeness';
Timothy :, too, says: 'The goal of the precept is charity.' Therefore charity is greater than the other virtues.
() Something that has no incompleteness attached to it is more complete and greater, just as something is whiter when it has no black mixed in with it. But the disposition of charity has no incompleteness mixed in with it. Faith and hope do have some incompleteness mixed in them, because faith is about things that are not seen, and hope about things that are not possessed. Therefore charity, even as a disposition, is more complete and greater than faith or hope.
() Augustine says [CG .], 'If the virtues are not related to God, they are vices.' From this we can take it that the character of a virtue is completed by being ordered towards God. But charity orders us more closely to God than do the other virtues, because it unites us to God, according to Corinthians :: 'Whoever clings to God is one spirit with him.' Therefore charity is a greater virtue than the others.
() The infused virtues originate with grace, which is what makes them complete. But charity shares more completely in grace than the other virtues do, for grace and charity accompany one another inseparably, whereas faith and hope can both exist without grace. Therefore charity is greater than the other virtues. Therefore the virtues are not all equal.
() Bernard says [Cons .] that practical wisdom is the mother of courage, because without practical wisdom courage is over-hasty. But if one thing is the principle and cause of another, it must be greater and more powerful than it. Therefore practical wisdom is greater than courage. Therefore the virtues are not all equal.
() Aristotle says [NE .., a] that justice is the whole of virtue; the other virtues, though, are parts of it. But the whole is greater than the
Article part. Therefore justice is greater than the other virtues; therefore not all the virtues are equal.
() Augustine proves [LCG ..] that if all the things in the universe were equal, they would not be 'all'. But the virtues are all possessed together, since they are interconnected, as I have shown above. Therefore not all the virtues are equal.
() Vices are the opposite of virtue. But not all the vices are equal.
Therefore not all the virtues are equal.
() Virtuous activity ought to be praised. But certain people receive more praise for one virtue than for another. That is why Cassian can say
[MonInst .], 'One person is adorned with the blossoms of knowledge, another is more strongly fortified by reason of his discernment, another possesses as a foundation endurance in all its solidity, yet others are preeminent in the virtues of humility or restraint.' Therefore within one person not all the virtues are equal.
() Rejoinder: that sort of inequality relates to activity, not to dispositions. But on the other hand Aristotle says [Cat , a] that the thought of a relative thing includes the thought of that to which it is relative. But the distinctive character of a disposition relates it towards activity, since it is a disposition that enables you to act when the opportunity arises, as Augustine says [GMarr .]. Therefore if the same person is more active in one virtue than another, it follows that the respective dispositions are also unequal.
() Hugh of St Victor says that activity makes dispositions grow. If, then, we perform different types of virtuous actions unequally, our virtuous dispositions must also be unequal.
() In the area of morals, virtuous dispositions are related to their distinctive activity in the way that in natural things form is related to their distinctive changes or actions. But in natural things, the more that something is characterised by a form, the more powerful the relevant behaviour or change. For example, the heavier something is, the quicker it falls, or the hotter it is, the more it heats. Therefore in moral matters too, the activities of different virtues can only be unequal if the related dispositions are also unequal.
() Whatever completes something corresponds to that thing. The virtues, though, complete the capacities of the soul, which are unequal because reason is superior to the lower powers, which it governs. Therefore the virtues too are unequal.
On the Cardinal Virtues () Gregory says [MorJob ..; HomEzek ..], 'Blessed Job described as "steps" the increases in virtue that he saw were given as a gift from above differently to different people; this was because by means of themweascendtoreachandgainthethingsofheaven.'Butwhenthereare increases and steps, there is no equality. Therefore the virtues are not equal.
() Things that are related such that when one increases the other decreases, must be unequal. It seems, though, that when charity increases, faith decreases, because the situation of our homeland, where charity will be complete, is opposed to the situation on our journey, where faith has a place. When one of two opposites increases, though, the other decreases.
Therefore charity and faith cannot be equal. Therefore not all the virtues are equal.
But on the other hand () Revelation :says that the sides of the city are equal. The gloss comments that these sides signify the virtues. Therefore the virtues are equal.
() Augustine says [Trin ..], 'If two people are equal in courage, they are also equal in practical wisdom and temperateness. For if you say that A and B are equal in courage, but A is superior in practical wisdom, it will follow that B's courage has less practical wisdom. But then they will not be equally courageous, since A's courage will have more practical wisdom. You will find the same with the rest of the virtues, if you run through them all with the same thing in mind.' Now it would not be right to say that those who are equal in one virtue are equal in the others, unless all the virtues were equal in one person. Therefore within one person, all the virtues are equal.
() Gregory says [HomEzek ..] that faith, hope, charity, and activity are all equal. Therefore by parallel reasoning all the other virtues are equal.
() Ezekiel :says that the four little courts were of the same measure, and the gloss comments: 'By which we advance to virtue.' But things that are of the same measure are equal. Therefore they are all equal.
() John Damascene says [OrthF .], 'The virtues are natural and they exist equally in everyone.' But the being of an accidental quality
Article consists in being in something. Therefore the virtues are equal according to their own being.
()Agreaterrewardisduetotheactivitiesofagreatervirtue.Therefore if within one person one virtue were greater than another, it would follow that both a greater and a lesser reward were due to the same person. That makes no sense.
() If B follows from A, then more B follows from more A. But it follows from the fact that one possesses one virtue that one possesses them all, because they are interconnected, as I have argued. Therefore if someone possesses one virtue to a greater degree, one must possess them all to a greater degree. Therefore all the virtues must be equal.
My reply Things are described as 'equal' or 'unequal' with respect to quantity: something that is one in quantity is equal, just as something that is one in quality is similar, and something that is one in substance is the same, as Aristotle makes clear [Met ., a]. Quantity, though, includes the idea of measure, which is found primarily (i) in numbers, secondarily (ii) in sizes, and thirdly (iii) in some sense in all the other classes, as Aristotle also makes clear [Met ., b]. For in every class the thing that is most simple and most perfect is the measure of all the other things, e.g. whiteness among the colours or daily motion among kinds of movement.
That is because a thing is more perfect the more nearly it attains the first principle of its class. From this it is clear that the degree to which something is perfect, measuring this with reference to its first principle, can be described as its 'quantity'. This is what Augustine means [Trin
..] when he says that in things that are great but not in size, 'greater' means the same as 'better'.
In the case of a form that does not exist independently, its being consists in being in its subject or its matter; we can, therefore, consider its quantity or perfection under two aspects: () according to the character of its distinctive type; () according to its being in its matter or subject.
() According to the character of the distinctive type, (◦) the forms of different types are unequal, while of the forms of a single type some (b)
Aquinas's very precise and complex reply draws heavily on Aristotle's Categories, especially , a –and , b–a.
On the Cardinal Virtues can be unequaland some (a) cannot. This is because the principle that governs the type has to be indivisible; anything that makes a difference to this principle will change the type. For this reason, if anything is added to or taken away from this principle, the type will necessarily change. That is why Aristotle says [Met ., b] that types are like numbers, since if you add or take away a unit you change the type.
(a) Certain forms acquire their type through something that is a part of theiressence;thisistrueofallabsoluteforms,whethertheyaresubstantial or accidental. In this sort, it is impossible to find one form greater than another (in the sense under consideration) within the same type. For example, one whiteness, considered in itself, is not more of a whiteness than another.
(b) Other forms acquire their type from something extrinsic towards whichtheyareordered,inthewaythatmovementacquiresitstypefromits termination. That is why one movement is greater than another depending on how far it is from its finishing-point. Similarly, we can find certain qualities which are tendencies ordered towards something, in the way that health is a balance of the humoursordered towards the nature of the animal that is described as healthy. For this reason, the level of balance of the humours that would count as health for a lion would count as sickness for a human being. Health, then, does not acquire its type from the absolute level of the balance of humours, but from the nature of the animal towards which it is ordered. Consequently, it is also the case that the same animal can be healthy to a greater or lesser degree, as Aristotle says [NE .., a] – insofar, that is, as there can be differences in the levels of the balance of the humours consistent with the requirements of the animal'snature. The same situation can be found with a branch of knowledge, which receives its unity from the unity of the subject: that is why knowledge of geometry can be greater in one person than in another, in that the one knows more of the conclusions that are ordered to awareness of the subject-matter of geometry, which is magnitude.
Reading inaequales for aequales.
Absolute forms are those that are what they are without reference to anything extrinsic to themselves, as contrasted with the relative forms discussed under (b).
According to ancient medical theory, health required an appropriate balance among four bodily fluids called 'humours': phlegm, blood, black bile or gall, and yellow bile or choler.
Omitting humanae.
Article () Similarly, with respect to the quantity of perfection which forms of this sort possess insofar as they exist in their matter or subject, some forms of a single type (b) can be unequal insofar as they exist in these to a greater or lesser degree; others, though, (a) cannot exist in them to a greater or lesser degree.
(ai) If a form gives its subject its type, then it cannot exist in it to a greater or lesser degree, because, as I have said, we ought to think of the typifying principle as indivisible. From this it follows that no substantial form admits of more or less. (aii) Similarly, if a form acquires its type from something that is indivisible in its own character, then it cannot be spoken of as more or less. It follows that 'being two', or any other type of numerical value, which gets its type from the addition of units, cannot admit of more or less. The same reasoning holds for figures which are specified through numbers, such as a triangle or square, and for specific quantities, such as two or three cubits, and for numerical relations such as double or triple.
(b) Forms that do not give their subject its type, and do not acquire their type from something that is indivisible in its own character, can exist in something to a greater or lesser degree, as, for example, with whiteness or blackness.
From all this, it is clear that different forms are related in two ways to each of equality and inequality:
(I) There are some forms that do not admit of inequality within the same type, neither in themselves – i.e. one of them cannot be greater than another of the same type – nor in the way that they exist in something else – i.e. they cannot be in the subject to a greater or lesser degree. The substantial forms are all of this sort {cf. (a), (ai)}.
(II) Other forms, such as whiteness or blackness, do not admit of inequality in themselves, but do so only in the extent to which they are found in their subjects {cf. (a), (b)}.
(III) Others do admit of inequality in themselves, but not in the extent to which they are found in their subject: for example, one triangle can be bigger than another, because its lines are longer than the other's, even though both sets of lines are ordered towards a single thing that gives them their type. However, one surface cannot be more triangular than another {cf. (b), (aii)}.
(IV) Other things, such as health and knowledge and movement, admit of inequality both in themselves and in the way they exist in their
On the Cardinal Virtues subjects.For example, movement is unequal either if it crosses a greater distance, or because the moving thing moves faster. Similarly, one person's knowledge is greater than another's either because he knows more conclusions, or because he knows the same, but more securely. Similarly, health can be unequal either because the level of balance in one creature is nearer to the appropriate complete equality than it is in another, or because one of them is more steadily and better related to that level of balance than is another {cf. (b), (b)}.
Once we have seen all this, we must say the following about the equality and inequality of the virtues.
(') If we take the inequality of the virtues with reference to what they are in themselves, then ('◦) virtues of different types can be unequal. For since virtue is the tendency of something complete to what is best, as Aristotle says [Phys ., b], a virtue that is ordered towards a greater good will be greater and more complete. Accordingly, the theological virtues, whose object is God, are superior to the others; and among these, charity is the greatest, because it joins us most closely to God. Again, hope is greater than faith, because hope moves our feelings in some way towards
God, whereas faith makes God present in us in the form of awareness.
Next, among the other virtues, practical wisdom is the greatest, because it moderates the others; and after this justice, because it enables us to be what we should be not only in ourselves but also in relation to others. Next comes courage, which enables us to scorn the danger of death for the sake of something good. After this comes temperateness, which enables us to scorn the greatest of pleasures for the sake of what is good.
('a) Within one type of virtue, however, this sort of inequality cannot be found, in the way, for example, that it is found within one type of knowledge {cf. (b)}. That is because it is not part of the character of knowledge that if you possess one sort of it you will know all the conclusions belonging to that. By contrast, it is part of the character of virtue that someone who possesses one of them will be in a good state in relation to everything relevant to that virtue.
('b) With respect to the perfection or quantity of the virtue from the point of view of its being in its subject, there can be inequality even
Aquinas never quite comes out and says explicitly that virtues belong in this fourth category. The remainder of his reply is devoted to showing exactly how both sorts of inequality are found in virtue.
Article within one type of virtue, in that one of those who possess it can be better disposed than someone else to whatever comes under that virtue; this might be through a better natural tendency, or more practice, or better rational judgement, or the gift of grace. This is because virtue does not give its subject its type {cf. (ai)}, nor is there anything indivisible in its essential character {cf. (aii)} – unless, of course, we agree with the Stoics, who said that no one possesses a virtue without possessing it supremely, and consequently that everyone who possesses a specific virtue possesses it equally. But in fact it does not seem to follow from the character of a virtue, because there is such a variety of ways in which people share in a virtue, following from the factors I have discussed; none of those factors characterise any particular virtue such as chastity.
In this way, then, in different people the virtues can be unequal, i.e. in themselves, with respect to different types of virtues {cf. ('◦)}; and in the way they exist in their subject, even with reference to one type of virtue
{cf. ('b)}.
In one and the same person, on the other hand, according to the quantity or perfection which each virtue has in itself, the virtues can be unequal
{cf. ('◦)}; according to the quantity or perfection in the way each exists in its subject, simply speaking all the virtues must be equal, for the same reason that they are all interconnected: for equality is a sort of connection with respect to quantity. (That is why some people attribute the character of equality to them because they interpret the four cardinal virtues as general ways of being virtuous.This is the reasoning Augustine uses in On the Trinity [..]. In another way, one can attribute this to the dependence of the moral virtues on practical wisdom and of all the virtues on charity. That is why where charity is equal, all the virtues must be equal in terms of the formal perfection of virtue. The same reasoning will hold for practical wisdom in comparison with the other virtues.)
However, the virtues can be unequal in one and the same person, just as they can also be unconnected, in a relative sense, in terms of the inclination of the capacity to be actualised, which comes from nature or some other cause. That is why some people say that the virtues are unequal with respect to their actions; however, we should interpret this only in accordance with this sort of inequality of an inclination to be actualised.
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On the Cardinal Virtues Replies to objections () The argument depends on the inequality that refers to the virtues in themselves, not the inequality related to their existing in something else, which we are speaking about now. For charity, as I have said, is greater in itself than the other virtues; however, when it grows, the other virtues also grow in a correlative way in one and the same person, just as the fingers on a hand are different lengths, but they grow at a correlative rate.
We can give a similar reply to objections () to (), and even (), which proved that practical wisdomwas greater than the other virtues only in this same way.
() We can make a similar reply, namely that it argues in the same way about justice – even if you mean the justice that is defined as the whole of virtue, rather than that which is counted as one of the cardinal virtues.
() Similarly, we can reply that all the virtues exist in a person in such a way that they can be distinguished according to the greater or lesser degree of perfection possessed by each type.
() Similarly, the vices are also unequal in this way.
() People are praised for one virtue rather than for another because they are quicker to act in accordance with it.
() Those who possess a greater disposition should act more in accordance with the inclination of that disposition. However, sometimes someone can have in him something contingently related to the disposition that either hampers him from, or makes him tend to, an action; so, for example, drunkenness can prevent someone from activating the disposition of knowledge that he possesses. Thus, through helps or hindrances to action of this sort, one can sometimes increase one's activity without increasing the related disposition.
() In the case of acquired dispositions, more exercise makes the disposition increase. However, dispositions that have already been acquired through repeated activity can be hindered contingently, so that they do not succeed in being actualised, as I have said.
() In natural things, where a form is equal, there can be inequality in the resulting action because of some contingent obstacle.
() The capacities are unequal in themselves, insofar as one capacity is more perfect than another in its own character. We have agreed that the virtues too are unequal in this sense.
Reading prudentiam, which is needed for the argument.