On the Virtues in General: Article 3: Whether a capacity of the soul can be a possessor of virtue
On the Virtues in General Article : Whether a capacity of the soul can be a possessor of virtue Objections It seems not, because:
() According to Augustine [FC .] virtue is something by which we live rightly. We live, however, not in accordance with a capacity of the soul, but in accordance with its essential nature. Therefore, virtue is not possessed by a capacity of the soul.
() Grace is higher on the scale of being than nature. But the being of nature exists through the essence of the soul, which is superior to its own capacities, in that it is their principle. Therefore the being of grace, which exists through the virtues, does not exist through the capacities of the soul. That is why virtue is not possessed by a capacity.
() An accident cannot be a possessor of attributes. But the capacities of the soul come under the class of accidents: in fact, both natural capacities and the lack of these belong to the second type of quality. Therefore virtue cannot be possessed by a capacity of the soul.
() If one capacity of the soul is the possessor of virtue, any one of them will be. This is because every capacity of the soul opposes the vices, and the virtues are directed against the vices. However, not every capacity of the soul can possess virtue, as will become clear later. Therefore virtue cannot be possessed by a capacity.
() The active principles in natural things, e.g. heat and cold, are not the possessors of other accidental qualities. But the capacities of the soul are a kind of active principle, since they are the principles of whatever the soul does. Therefore they cannot be the possessors of other accidental qualities.
() Capacities are possessed by the soul. Therefore, if a capacity is the possessor of another accidental quality, by parity of reasoning we will have one accident being the possessor of another one, and in this way we will have an infinite regress, which is inappropriate. Therefore virtue is not possessed by a capacity of the soul.
() Aristotle says [PostAn ., a] that there are no qualities of qualities. But a capacity of the soul is some quality of the second type of quality, while virtue is one of the first type of quality. Therefore virtue cannot be possessed by a capacity of the soul.
Article But on the other hand () The principle of an action belongs to the doer of the action. But the actions of the virtues belong to the capacities of the soul. Therefore so do the virtues themselves.
() Aristotle says [NE .., a] that the intellectual virtues are rational in their essential nature, whereas the moral virtues are rational by sharing in reason. But 'rational in their essential nature' and 'rational by sharing' describe certain capacities of the soul. Therefore the virtues are possessed by capacities of the soul.
My reply A possessor of accidental qualities is related to them in three ways:
(i) as sustaining them: an accident cannot exist by itself, but is supported by its possessor; (ii) as a capacity to its actualisation; for the possessor is qualified by the accidents in the way that a capacity is by its actualisation; in this way, an accident can be described as a form; (iii) as a cause to its effect; for the principles of a possessor of accidents are through themselves principles of the accidents in question.
With reference to (i), one accident cannot be the possessor of another.
For, since no accident has independent existence, it cannot sustain something else in existence; one might perhaps say, though, that insofar as it is sustained by its possessor, it can then sustain another accident.
With respect to (ii) and (iii), one accident is related to another as its possessor. For one accident has a capacity to be qualified by another, as 'transparent' is by 'light' or 'surface' by 'colour'. Again, one accident can be the cause of another, as wetness of flavour. In this way we can say that one accident can possess another. This is not because one accident can sustain another, but because its possessor receives the one accident through the mediation of the other.
In this way a capacity of the soul can be said to possess its accidents. Let me explain: {cf. (ii)} a disposition relates to a capacity of the soul as something that actualises it. The capacity is in itself not determined; its dispositiondeterminesitonewayortheother.Furthermore,{cf.(iii)}acquired dispositions have as their cause the principles of the relevant capacities.