Introduction: Natural law and practical wisdom
Introduction So justice, which modifies the intellectual desire, must trickle down into the sensory desire as well if we are to be aimed at the good according to reason.
So far I have shown how the theory of natural law motivates Aquinas's doctrine of justice and its relation to the affective virtues. But as was also true for temperateness and fortitude, natural law theory does not merely motivate the doctrine of justice; it also supplies part of the content of the virtue. Aquinas derives many of the precepts of justice from his conception of the institutional or social necessities without which human beings cannot achieve the good of reason by living in a well-ordered community.
Consider, for example, the moral rules concerning murder and permissiblehomicide.Somehomicideismorallyjustifiable,evenpraiseworthy.In ST aae , Aquinas offers two criteria by which to distinguish between permissible and impermissible (unjust) homicide. First, if a homicide is to be permissible, it must be done by someone acting at the behest of the community as a whole, not by any private person (aae .). Second, the person killed must have been lawfully convicted of some serious crime and shown to pose a threat to the community (.).
The arguments for both criteria come from Aquinas's conception of the common good. Human beings are parts of a whole; that whole is the community. And parts exist for the sake of the whole. Just as you should not impair the body's integrity for just any old reason (chop off your hand just because you feel like it), but you should amputate if that is the only way to save the body, so also you should excise dangerous people if that is necessary for the safeguarding of the community (.). People who have so deviated from the order of reason have fallen into the state of the beasts
(.ad ). They have in effect put themselves outside the community of the truly human. They do not literally become animals, of course – that is why killing them is of greater significance than killing a stray animal and requires the judgement of the community (.ad ).
Natural law and practical wisdom As I have said, the relation Aquinas envisions between the common good and the individual good means that justice, which directs us to the common good, sets the end for temperateness and fortitude. But what in turn
See especially ae ., . xviii
Introduction sets the end for justice, and through justice for temperateness and fortitude as well? Aquinas argues that the end of the moral virtues is the human good. And since the human good is simply to be in accordance with reason, it follows that the end of the moral virtues must 'pre-exist in reason' (ST aae .). That is, the end of the moral virtues is established by certain self-evident, naturally known principles of practical reason. These are the precepts of the natural law, which are known through synderesis.
There are three important points about the ends that are set for us by synderesis. First, the self-evident principles are general. They are things like 'Do no harm', not things like 'Return property entrusted to you unless the person has become insane in the meantime.' We therefore need something that will allow us to see how the principles are to be applied in particular circumstances.
Second, they are capable of being realised in a variety of ways.
Synderesis tells us, for example, that we should live in accordance with reason, but there are any number of ways to live in accordance with reason. We therefore need something that will allow us to specify and make concrete the initially indeterminate goods set by synderesis.
Third, all of these goods can be realised in a properly human way only in and through action. That is, synderesis tells us not merely what we should be, but how it is good and reasonable for us to act. And action here means rationally guided, conscious, deliberate action for an end, not just instinctive acts (which according to Aquinas should not be called human acts at all, but rather acts of a human being). We know this because of the hierarchy among the principles set by synderesis. As I discussed earlier, because the good of reason is the highest good, rational activity is in a sense the specific end of human beings. So the human good is not simply theactualisingofdistinctivelyhumanpotentialities,fullstop,asthebovine good is simply the actualising of distinctively bovine potentialities. The human good is the actualising of distinctively human potentialities as the individual human being's reason directs.
The specifics of Aquinas's account of practical wisdom make complete sense when understood against this background. Because the ends set by synderesis are both non-specific and open-ended (points and above), we need a kind of reasoning that takes us from the secure starting points set by synderesis to the particular conclusions that can guide action (point ).
That is what practical wisdom is. xix
Introduction The details of Aquinas's account of practical wisdom depend on his account of the cognitive processes involved in deliberate action. The latter account, in all its rich and intriguing detail, lies well beyond the scope of this introduction. But fortunately Aquinas himself offers us a sort of summary from which he then derives an overview of the aspects of practical wisdom (aae .). In deliberate action we apprehend the end; wetakecounselabouthowthatendcanberealisedandmadeconcretehere and now; having taken counsel, we are then in a position to judge what is to be done; and finally, having judged that such-and-such is to be done, we command the external bodily members to do such-and-such. (The taking counsel part is optional. In order to determine what is to be done in order to act temperately when I am offered a third slice of cheesecake, I can immediately judge that the cheesecake is not to be taken, and I order my vocal apparatus to utter 'No thanks.')
Practical wisdom has no role to play at the level of apprehension, because that has to do with the end, which as we have seen is set by synderesis. But the other three acts of reason all require dispositions by which they are properly guided in matters pertaining to the end. So practical wisdom in the broadest sense is the intellectual virtue that ensures that we counsel well, judge well, and command well. The sub-virtue by which we counsel well is euboulia, excellence in deliberation. There are two virtues by which we judge well: in ordinary cases the practically wise person exercises synesis and in exceptional cases gnome. The subvirtue by which we command well is practical wisdom itself, in the strict sense.
There are corresponding sub-vices for each of the three acts as well.
Foolish haste or 'precipitation' is a failure in the act of taking counsel: you do not stop and think. Thoughtlessness is a failure in the act of judgement: youcannotbebotheredtopayattentiontotherelevantconsiderationsthat count towards the right judgement. Inconstancy is a failure in the act of command: you judge what is to be done but you do not follow through with it.
What is interesting is that Aquinas thinks of all these defects as arising from moral defects. Anger, envy, and especially lust divert the reason from its proper role in governing action. They cause us to bypass rational consideration (counsel), ignore or misperceive relevant evidence (judgement), or veer away from what we have determined is to be done (command). What this shows, of course, is that practical wisdom is not possible xx