On Charity: Article 6: Whether charity can coexist with mortal sin
On Charity Article : Whether charity can coexist with mortal sin Objections It seems so, because:
() Origen says [Prin ..], 'I do not think that any one of those who stand on the highest and best possible level can immediately be emptied and fall, but it is necessary that they slip down gradually, bit by bit.' However, someone can commit a mortal sin immediately simply by consenting to it. Therefore someone who is in the best possible condition because of charity cannot fall from charity through a single act of mortal sin. Therefore charity can coexist with mortal sin.
() Bernardsays that when Peter denied Christ, his charity was not extinguished, but only put to sleep. But Peter committed a mortal sin by denying Christ. Therefore charity can remain along with mortal sin.
() Charity is stronger than a morally virtuous disposition. But a morally virtuous disposition is not removed by one vicious act, since it is not created by one single act. For virtue comes into existence and is destroyed by doing the same acts, but in the opposite way, as Aristotle says
[NE .., b]. Therefore much less will the dispositions of charity be removed by a single mortal sin.
() One thing opposes one thing. But charity is one particular virtue, as I have shown. Therefore it has one particular vice that opposes it.
Therefore it is not removed by other sorts of mortal sin. In this way, it seems that mortal sin can coexist with charity.
() Opposites are only incompatible if they relate to the same subject.
But some sins are found in a different subject from that of charity: for charity is found in the higher part of the reason, when it is turned towards
God. But mortal sin can exist in the lower part of reason, as Augustine says [Trin ..–.]. Therefore not every mortal sin is incompatible with charity.
() Something very strong cannot be driven out by something very weak. But charity is very strong: as the Song of Solomon :puts it,
'Love is as strong as death.' Sin, however, is very weak, because evil is weak and powerless, as Dionysius says [DivNames .–]. Therefore mortal sin does not exclude charity; therefore they can coexist.
Actually William of Saint Thierry, in On the Nature and Dignity of Love, ch. .
Article () We identify dispositions by their actions. But the actions of charity can coexist with mortal sin: for a sinful person can still love God and neighbour. Therefore charity can coexist with mortal sin.
() Charity above all makes us take pleasure in the contemplation of God. But nothing is contrary to the pleasure of thinking about things, as Aristotle says [Top ., a]. Therefore nothing is contrary to charity.
Therefore charity cannot be excluded by mortal sin.
() Something that moves things generally can be blocked in moving one thing but not another. Charity moves all the virtues generally, as I have said. Therefore if it is blocked by some sin from moving one virtue, this need not stop it moving the others. Therefore charity can remain alongside a sin that opposes, say, temperateness, in that it can still move the other virtues.
() Faith and hope as well as charity have God as their object. But faith and hope can exist in an unformed way. Therefore by the same reasoning so can charity: it can coexist with mortal sin, because every virtue that can exist in an unformed way can coexist with mortal sin.
() Everything that lacks the completeness that it is apt by nature to have is unformed. But while we are on our journey, charity still lacks the completenessthatitisbynatureapttohavewhenitreachesourhomeland.
Therefore it is unformed, and so it seems to be able to coexist with mortal sin.
() We identify dispositions by their actions. But the actions of someone who possesses charity may be imperfect, for very often even those who possess charity are motivated by impatience or conceitedness. Therefore the disposition of charity can be imperfect and unformed. In this way, charity seems to be able to coexist with mortal sin.
() Just as sin opposes virtue, so ignorance opposes knowledge. But not every sort of ignorance removes knowledge completely. Therefore not every mortal sin will remove virtue completely. That is why, although charity is the root of the virtues, it does not seem that every mortal sin must remove it.
() Charity is the love of God. But even while having love for something,itispossibletoactagainstthatthingthroughlackofself-control.For example, even if we love ourselves we can still through lack of self-control act against our own good. Similarly, even if we love another community, it is possible through lack of self-control to act against it, as Aristotle says
On Charity [Pol ., b]. Therefore it is possible to act against God by sinning, even while still possessing charity.
() You may be in the right state as regards the universal, but go wrong about something in particular: for example, those without selfcontrol have a correct rational belief about a universal question, holding, for example, that fornication is bad. But they still choose fornication here and now as if it were a good, as Aristotle says.But charity gives us the rightattitudeasregardstheuniversalend.Thereforewhilestillpossessing charity, someone could sin in a particular instance. In this way, charity could coexist with a mortal sin.
() Contraries are found within the same class. But sin comes under the class of an act: for a sin is something that is said or done or desired in contradiction of the law of God. But charity comes under the class of dispositions. Therefore sin is not the contrary of charity. Therefore it is not incompatible with it. Therefore it can coexist with it.
But on the other hand () Wisdom :says, 'The Holy Spirit of teaching will flee from what is false and will turn away from your unintelligent thoughts and will be rebuked' (that is, driven out) 'by the wickedness that is present.' But we have the Holy Spirit within us as long as we possess charity; for the Spirit of God dwells in us through charity. Therefore charity is driven out by wickedness when it appears. Therefore it cannot coexist with mortal sin.
() Anyone who possesses charity is worthy of eternal life, according to St Paul in Timothy :: 'For the rest, a crown of justice is laid up for me which God will give me on that day, as the just judge. Not only to me, but also to those who love his appearing.' But whoever commits a mortal sin is worthy of eternal punishment, according to Romans :: 'The wages of sin are death.' But no one can be worthy simultaneously of eternal life and of eternal punishment. Therefore we cannot possess charity at the same time as mortal sin.
My reply Charity cannot at all coexist with mortal sin. To show this we need first to reflect that every mortal sin is directly opposed to charity. Whenever
The reference is presumably to NE ..–, aff., although Aristotle's actual example there is of overindulgence in sweets, not fornication.
Article someone chooses A in preference to B, he loves A more than B. Consequently, as we love our own lives and their continuance more than sensual pleasure, we would withdraw from a sensual pleasure, however great it were, if we reckoned that it would certainly kill us. Hence Augustine says
[DQ .] that there is no one who does not fear pain more than he loves sensual pleasure. Sometimes we see that even the fiercest animals withdraw from enormous pleasures for fear of pain.
Someone sins mortally by choosing something else in preference to living in accordance with God and to clinging to him. Therefore it is clear that those who sin mortally, by that very fact love some other good more than God. Indeed, if they loved God more, they would choose to live according to God rather than to possess any sort of temporal good. The character of charity means that God is loved above everything else, as is clear from the above. Therefore all mortal sin is contrary to charity.
Now charity is infused in us by God. Whatever is infused by God needs God's action not only at its beginning, to bring it into being, but the whole time that it lasts, to keep it in being. Similarly, the air needs the sun to be present for it to be illuminated, not only when this first happens, but also as long as it continues. That is why if some obstacle gets in the way and prevents the air from looking directly at the sun, so to speak, the air ceases to be lit. A similar thing happens when mortal sin occurs, because it prevents the soul from looking directly at God. When people choose something else ahead of God, the inflow of charity is blocked and they cease to possess charity, in keeping with Isaiah :, 'Your sins have made a division between you and your God.' But when their minds return to look straight at God, by loving him above all else (which cannot happen without God's grace), they themselves return once more to a state of charity.
Replies to objections () Origen's words should not be taken to mean that those, however completely good, who sin mortally do not immediately lose charity, but rather that it does not happen easily that those who are completely good will commit a mortal sin straight away and at once. Rather, they will first become disposed to this through carelessness and various venial sins, so that finally they slip into mortal sin.
On Charity () Bernard's claim does not seem sustainable, unless we understand 'charity was not extinguished in Peter' to mean that it was very quickly resurrected. For things that are separated by very little seem to have no distance between them at all, as Aristotle says [Phys ., b].
() Moral virtue, which we acquire through activity, consists in the inclination of a capacity to be activated. This inclination is not completely removed by a single act. The inflow of charity from God, on the other hand, is blocked by a single act; that is why a single sinful act can remove charity.
() The opposite of charity, speaking generally, is hatred, but indirectly all sins are opposed to charity insofar as they are connected with scorning
God, who ought to be loved above all else.
() (i) The higher reason, where charity is found, moves the lower.
That is why sin, insofar as it opposes charity's moving of the lower part, is incompatible with charity.
(ii)Orperhapsweoughttorespondthatmortalsinrequiresconsent, and this belongs to the higher part of reason, where charity is found.
() Sin does not drive out charity through its own power, but by the fact that a person willingly submits to the sin.
() Those who sin mortally do not love God above all else, as he ought to be loved from charity. Rather, they prefer something else to the love of God, and scorn the commands of God on account of this.
() The pleasure we take in thinking about something is not contrary to something in the same class; at least, thinking about something else is not incompatible with it. That is because the concepts of two contrary things in the intelligence are not themselves contraries. So, for example, to take pleasure in thinking about whiteness is not incompatible with taking pleasure in thinking about blackness. But because the activity of the will consistsinthesoul'smovingtowardssomething,iftwothingsarecontrary in themselves, the movements of will towards them will also be contrary: so, for example, a longing for something sweet is contrary to a longing for something bitter. It is in this way that the love of God is incompatible with the love of sin, which keeps us from God. Thinking does indeed not have a contrary; but thinking is not, strictly speaking, an activity of charity in the sense of being drawn out by charity. Rather, it is something commanded by charity as its effect.
() When charity, which is the general moving cause of the virtues, is blocked in connection with one virtue through mortal sin, it is then
Article blocked in respect of its object in general. For this reason it is blocked in general, in every respect. This is a different case from when something that is moveable in general is blocked in respect of one particular effect, without being blocked in connection with its power in general.
() Although faith and hope have God for their object, it is not their role to be the form of the other virtues, which is the role of charity, for the reasons given above. Therefore although charity cannot exist in an unformed state, faith and hope sometimes can.
()Itisnotjustanylackofcompletenessthatmakesavirtueunformed, but only that sort of lack that prevents its being ordered towards its ultimate end. That ordering does exist in charity when we are on our journey, even though it does not yet possess the completeness it will have in our homeland, which will result from enjoying as completely as possible its own proper object.
() Someone who has charity can indeed act in an imperfect way, but the actions in question will not be done from charity. For not every action of a given agent is an action of every form that exists in the agent. This is particularly true in the case of a rational nature, which has the freedom to use or fail to use the dispositions that it possesses.
() It is true that not every sort of ignorance of particular principles excludes a whole branch of knowledge; however, the ignorance of its general principles does. For someone ignorant of those must be ignorant of the skill itself, as Aristotle says [SR , a]. Now the ultimate end functions as an utterly general principle. That is why someone who, through mortal sin, ceases to be ordered towards the ultimate end will lose charity entirely. However, if they fail to be so ordered only in a particular area this will not happen, as is clear with venial sins.
() Those who through lack of self-control act against a good that they love must in fact reckon that they will not lose that good completely by acting in this unselfcontrolled way. For if those who loved some city or the safety of their own bodies were to reckon that they would lose one of these through a certain action, then either they would avoid the action entirely, or else they must love the thing they do more than their own safety or the city. In this way, when people know that they will lose God through mortal sin (which is what it is to know that one is sinning mortally), but The argument here is obscure.