On the Virtues in General: Article 9: Whether we acquire the virtues by our actions
On the Virtues in General This response is appropriate for ().
() The wickedness of such people was natural to the extent that it had become habitual; for a habit is something 'second nature' to us. We were 'children of wrath', however, through original sin, which is a flaw in our nature.
() It is natural for the lower powers to be liable to be subject to the higher, but not natural for them to be subject to them through a disposition.
() A change is called natural because of A's natural suitability for it, when B moves A to an end in a way determined in the manner of nature.
For example, B might be whatever generates in the case of the elements, or whatever moves the heavenly bodies. However, this is not the case for what we are discussing, therefore the reasoning does not apply.
() The natural inclination to virtue, which makes some people brave or temperate almost as soon as they are born, is not enough for complete virtue, as I have argued.
() Nature does not leave us lacking in necessities; however, it does not give us everything that is necessary, but gives us enough to be able to acquire all that we need, i.e. reason and whatever is subject to that.
Article : Whether we acquire the virtues by our actions Objections It seems not, because:
() Augustine saysthat virtue is a good quality of mind by which we live rightly, which no one can misuse, and which God works in us without our help. But if something comes about through our actions, then God does not work this in us. Therefore virtue is not brought into being through our actions.
() Augustine says, commenting on Romans :, 'Everything that is not from faith is sin','The life of all those without faith is sin, and nothing is good without the highest good; wherever knowledge of the truthislacking,thenanyvirtueisfalseevenifone'sbehaviourisexcellent.'
From this it follows that there can be no virtue without faith. However, See note .
Augustine, according to the gloss; in fact, the quotation is from Prosper of Aquitaine, Sentences
Drawn from Saint Augustine .
Article faith does not come from anything we do, but from grace, as Ephesians :makes clear: 'You are saved by faith, and not through yourselves; nor should anyone boast, for it is a gift of God.' Therefore virtue cannot be brought into being through our actions.
() Bernard says [SermSS ..] that all those who do not realise that it is from the Lord that they should hope to obtain virtue are labouring in vain for it. Anything that we hope for as needing to be obtained from God is not brought into being through our actions. Therefore virtue is not brought into being through our actions.
() Self-control is something less than virtue, as Aristotle makes clear [NE .., b]. However, self-control exists in us only by God's gift, since Wisdom :says, 'I know that I cannot be self-controlled unless
God grants this.' Therefore we cannot acquire the virtues either through our own actions, but only by God's gift.
() Augustine saysthat no one can avoid sin without grace. However, virtue enables us to avoid sin; for no one can be vicious and virtuous at the same time. Therefore virtue cannot exist without grace. Therefore it cannot be acquired through actions.
() We reach happiness by means of virtue, since happiness is the reward of virtue, as Aristotle says [NE .., b]. Therefore if we could acquire virtues through our own actions without grace, we would seem to be able to reach eternal life, which is the ultimate happiness for human beings, without grace. That contradicts the words of St Paul [Rom
:], 'The grace of God is eternal life.'
() Virtue is counted among the greatest goods according to Augustine [FC .], because no one misuses it. But the greatest goods are from God, according to James :, 'Every excellent gift and every perfect gift comes from above, coming down from the Father of lights.' Therefore it seems that there is virtue in us only by the gift of God.
() Augustine says [FC .] that nothing is able to give itself form. But virtue is a kind of form of the soul. Therefore we cannot cause virtue in ourselves by our own actions.
() Just as the intelligence from the outset has in its essence the capacity for knowledge, so the same is true for the power of feeling with respect to virtue. But the intelligence, although it has in its essence this capacity for knowledge, also needs an external trigger to bring it to actual knowledge,
In many places. See, for example, PHJ and NatGr.
On the Virtues in General i.e. a teacher, so that it actually acquires the knowledge. In a similar way, someone needs an external agent in order to acquire virtue; our own acts, then, are not enough for this.
()Weacquirethingsbyreceivingthem.Butwedonotactbyreceiving; rather the action is discharged by or goes out from the agent. Therefore we do not acquire virtue by performing some action.
() If we acquire virtue in us through our actions, we acquire it either (i) from one action, or (ii) from many. (i) Not from one, because no one acquires a worthy character by doing something once, as Aristotle says
{cf. NE .., b}. (ii) Nor again, from many actions, because when many actions occur at different times, they cannot produce an effect at the same time. Therefore it seems that there is no way for virtue to be brought into being through our actions.
() Avicenna says that virtue is a capacity attributed essentially to things, for them to carry out their activities. But what is attributed to a thing essentially is not brought into being through its own activity.
Thereforevirtueisnotbroughtintobeingthroughtheactivityofsomeone who already possesses virtue.
() If virtue is brought into being through our actions, this is achieved through either (i) virtuous or (ii) vicious actions. (ii) Not through vicious ones, because they rather destroy virtue; again, (i) not through virtuous ones, because they presuppose virtue. Therefore there is no way that virtue can be brought into being in us through our own actions.
() Rejoinder: virtue may be brought into being through actions that are virtuous in an incomplete way. On the other hand nothing acts in a way that is beyond its type. Therefore if the actions that precede the virtues are incomplete, it seems that they cannot bring into being complete virtue.
() Virtue is the upper limit of a capacity, as Aristotle says [Heav ., a]. But a capacity is natural. Therefore virtue is natural and is not acquired through actions.
() As Aristotle says [NE .., a], virtue makes its possessor good. But human beings are good because of their nature. Therefore the virtue of human beings is in them by nature, not acquired through their acts.
() No one acquires new dispositions from repeatedly doing an action that is natural.
Article () Everything has its being from its form. But the form of the virtues is grace; for without grace, the virtues are formless. Therefore virtues arise because of grace not because of our actions.
() According to St Paul [Cor :], 'Virtueis made perfect in weakness.' However, weakness is something we experience rather than something we do. Therefore virtue comes more from what we experience than from what we do.
() Since virtue is a quality, a change in respect of virtue seems to be an 'alteration', for an alteration is a change of quality {cf. Cat , b}.
But an alteration is something that is experienced, and only in the sensory part of the soul, as is clear from Aristotle [Phys ., b]. Therefore if we acquire virtue by our actions through experiencing something and being altered, it will follow that virtue is found in the sensory part. That contradicts Augustine, who says that it is a good quality of mind.
() Virtue enables someone to make the right choice about an end, as Aristotle says [NE .., a]. But we do not seem to have the power to choose rightly about the end: as Aristotle says [NE .., b], the end will appear to each person in a way that corresponds to what he is like. This happens to us because of our natural temperament or through the influence of the heavenly bodies. Therefore it is not in our power to acquire the virtues. Therefore they are not brought into being through our own actions.
() We neither acquire nor lose natural things through habit. But some people possess natural inclinations to certain vices, as to certain virtues.
Therefore inclinations of this sort cannot be removed through acting habitually in a certain way. If they remain in us, we cannot also possess the virtues. Therefore we cannot acquire virtue for ourselves by our actions.
But on the other hand () Dionysius says [DivNames .] that what is good is more powerful than what is bad. But vicious dispositions are caused in us through bad actions. Therefore virtuous dispositions are caused in us through good actions.
() According to Aristotle [NE .., a; {cf. .., a}] it is what we do that causes us to become a worthy person. This, though,
Virtus here translates the Greek dunamis, meaning 'power' or 'strength'.
On the Virtues in General happens through virtue. Therefore virtue is caused in us through our actions.
() Generation and destruction must be the consequences of contrary things. But virtue is destroyed through bad actions. Therefore it is generated through good actions.
My reply Virtue is the upper limit of a capacity, and the upper limit towards which everycapacityreachesistocarryoutitsactivityinacompleteway,whichis whatitisforsuchactivitytobegood.Consequently,itisclearthatathing's virtue is what enables it to do well what it does. For everything exists for the sake of its own activity; but each thing is good to the extent that it is properly related to its own end. It should be the case, then, that each thing is good, and does what it does well, through its own distinctive virtue.
However, the distinctive good of one thing is different from that of another. After all, if the things capable of perfection are diverse, what perfects them will also be diverse: the good of a human being is different from that of a horse or of a stone. Moreover, what is good for human beings comes in different sorts depending on what aspect of them is under consideration. For example, (i) someone's good qua human being is different from (ii) his good qua citizen. (i) The good of a human being qua human being is to have reason perfected for knowing the truth and the lower appetites governed by the rule of reason. For a human being is human precisely by being rational. (ii) The good of a human being qua citizen, however, is to be ordered to everyone else in a way appropriate to the city. That is why Aristotle says [Pol ., b; {cf. NE .., b}] that the virtue of a human being qua good person is different from that of a human being qua good citizen.
Furthermore, a human being is not only a citizen of the earthly city, but is also a member of the heavenly city of Jerusalem, which is governed by the Lord and has as its citizens the angels and all the saints, whether they are already reigning in glory and at rest in their homeland, or still pilgrims on earth, as St Paul says in Ephesians :, 'You are fellow-citizens of the saints and members of the household of God', and so on. But for us to become members of this heavenly city, our own nature is not enough; we need to be lifted up to this by the grace of God. For it is clear that the virtues of a human being qua member of this city cannot be acquired just
Article through what is natural to him. These virtues, therefore, are not caused through our actions, but infused in us by God's gift.
On the other hand, the virtues of a human being qua human being or qua citizen of the earthly city do not exceed the capacities of human nature. That is why we can acquire them through what is natural to us, by our own actions, as is clear from the following.
Our natural potential for being perfected in some way depends upon either:
(i') only a passive principle. In this case, we are perfected not by what we do ourselves, but rather by what some other, external, natural agent does. This is like the way in which air receives light from the sun; or (ii') active and passive principles together. In this case, we are perfected by what we do ourselves. This is like the way in which a sick person's body is naturally suited to getting better. Because people are naturally able to become healthy through the natural active power that is in them of getting better, it sometimes happens that sick people are cured without any external agent doing anything.
We showed in the previous question that we have a natural potential for virtue that depends upon both active and passive principles {cf. (ii')}.
This is clear from the way our capacities are ordered. For the intelligent part possesses a passive principle, so to speak, in the potential intelligence, which is perfected by means of the active intelligence. Next, the intelligence, when it is actualised, moves the will, since something understood as good is the end which moves the desire. Then, when the will is moved by reason, it naturally moves the sensory desire, i.e. the aggressive and sensual parts, which are apt by nature to obey reason. From this it is clear that any virtue, in making us do things well, has an active principle in us; and this can, by its own actions, bring the virtue into active existence, whether in the intelligence, the will, or the aggressive and sensual parts.
However, the virtues in the intelligent part and those in the desiring part are brought into active existence in different ways:
(i") The activity of the intelligence – or of any cognitive power – is what assimilates it somehow to something that is knowable. That is why intellectual virtue is in the intelligent part insofar as the active intelligence enables intelligible concepts to develop here, whether actively or as dispositions.
(ii") The activity of the virtues of the desire, however, consists in a certain inclination towards something desirable. That is why, in order for
On the Virtues in General the desiring part to have virtues in it, it needs to be furnished with an inclination towards something determinate.
We need to know also that the inclination of a natural thing follows from its form. That is why it is directed towards one thing, in keeping with the demands of its form. As long as the form remains, the inclination cannot be removed, nor the opposite inclination brought into play. Because of this, natural things neither acquire nor lose anything through habit. For however often a stone is thrown upwards, it will never get into the habit of this, but will still always incline to fall downwards.
Bycontrast,thingsthatcangoineitherdirectiondonotpossessthekind of form that makes them incline in one determinate direction. Rather, it is their own motivating force that directs them in one determinate direction.
But the very fact that they are directed towards this, in some way also disposes them towards this. Then, when they repeatedly incline and are directed in the same direction by their own motivating force, then their inclination in that direction becomes determinate and reinforced. In this way, they acquire a tendency towards it, like a sort of form, similar to a natural one, which tends in a single direction. Because of this, we speak of habit as 'second nature'.
Now because the power of desire is one that goes in any direction, it tends in one direction only where reason determines it to do so. And so when reason makes the desiring power incline repeatedly in one direction, then a reinforced tendency develops in the power of desire, which makes it incline in the one direction that has become habitual. Now a virtuous disposition is just a tendency that is reinforced in this way. That is why, if we think about it properly, the virtue of the desiring part is simply a kind of tendency or form that is sealed and stamped by reason on the power of desire. It follows that however strong a tendency in one direction there is in the power of desire, this will not have the character of virtue unless it possesses what is rational. That is why reason is included in the definition of virtue: for Aristotle says [NE .., a] that virtue is a disposition that chooses, consisting in a mid-point determined by reason in the way that a wise man would decide.
Replies to objections () Augustine is speaking here of those virtues through which we are ordered to eternal blessedness.
Article The same reply should be given to objections () to ().
() Acquired virtue does not make us avoid sin always, but only for the most part; for it is also true of natural occurrences that they happen for the most part. It does not follow from this that someone is both virtuous and vicious, because a single action is not enough in a capacity to remove the disposition of a vice or of an acquired virtue. Also, one cannot avoid all sin through an acquired virtue; for acquired virtues do not save us from the sin of lack of faith, or from the other sins that are opposed to the infused virtues.
() We do not reach heavenly happiness through acquired virtues, but only the kind of happiness that we can naturally acquire in this life by our own natural qualities, through the actualisation of perfected virtue, as Aristotle discusses [Met ., b].
() Acquired virtues do not constitute the greatest good in an absolute sense, but the greatest in the class of human goods. Infused virtues constitute the greatest good in an absolute sense, in that they order us towards the supreme good, which is God.
()Oneandthesamethingcannot,assuch,giveitselfform.Sometimes, though, one thing possesses both an active and a passive principle, and then it can form itself because it has parts: that is, one part does the forming and another is formed. An example would be when something moves itself in such a way that one part does the moving and another part is moved, as Aristotle says [Phys ., b; {cf. ., a; ., b}]. This is the case in the generating of virtue, as I have shown.
() In the intelligence, knowledge can be acquired both by finding out for oneself and through being taught, that is, by someone else. Similarly, in acquiring virtues, a person is helped by being corrected and trained, that is, by someone else. The more that people are disposed in themselves to virtue, the less they need this. Similarly, the clearer someone's own intellect, the less he needs teaching by someone else.
() The active and the passive powers work together within a person's activity. It is true that the powers reach out and do not receive anything, insofar as they are active; however, the passive powers, insofar as they are passive, quite appropriately acquire things by receiving them. That is why a capacity that is only active, such as the active intelligence, does not acquire a disposition through activity.
() The more effective an agent's activity, the more quickly it brings into being a form. Thus, we see in intelligible matters that one proof is
On the Virtues in General effective, as it is enough to give us knowledge. However, in dialectic one syllogism is not enough to make us have an opinion, even though that is less than knowledge.Several of them are needed, because they are not very strong on their own.
In practical matters too, what the soul does is not effective in the way that a proof is. This is because practical things are contingent and no more than plausible, and therefore one action is not enough to create virtue; several are needed. Even if they do not all occur at once, they can still bring into being the disposition of virtue. This is because the first action creates a tendency; the second, finding its matter disposed in that way, so disposes it even more; and the third still more. In this way, the final action, acting on the strength of all the previous ones, completes the process of generatingvirtue;itworksinthewaythatmanyraindropscanhollowouta stone.
() Avicenna intended to define natural virtue, which follows something's form, which is the principle of its essence. For this reason the definition is irrelevant to the argument.
() Virtue is generated by actions which are virtuous in one sense and not in another. The actions that occur before virtue exists are virtuous from the point of view of what is done, e.g. the person is doing just or brave things. They are not virtuous from the point of view of how it is done; for before someone has acquired the disposition of a virtue, he does not do the things that virtue does in the way that a virtuous person does them, that is, readily, without any hesitation, with pleasure, and without difficulty.
() Reason is more excellent than the virtue that is generated in the desiring part, since this sort of virtue only exists because it participates in reason. Therefore the activities that precede virtue are able to cause virtue to the extent that they are rational. For reason is what gives it whatever perfection it has. The lack of perfection here is found in the desiring capacity, where this still lacks the disposition that enables it to carry out promptly and with pleasure whatever reason commands.
() Virtue is called the upper limit of a capacity not because it exists always,aspartoftheessenceofthecapacity,butbecauseitinclinestowards the point that the capacity is able to reach at its upper limit.
A genuine proof offers certainty about its conclusion, so only one is required in order for someone to gain knowledge in a full-blown sense. Dialectical arguments, by contrast, merely offer 'good points' in favour of their conclusions; for that reason, it may take several dialectical arguments to establish that the weight of evidence supports their conclusion, rather than its denial.
Article () Human beings are good in their own nature in some sense, but not absolutely. In order for something to be good absolutely, it needs to be complete in all respects. Similarly, in order for something to be beautiful absolutely, it cannot have any part that is misshapen or ugly. A person is called good absolutely and in every respect if he has a good will, because it isthroughthewillthathumanbeingsexercisealltheirothercapacities.For that reason, it is a good will that makes someone good in an absolute sense.
Consequently, the virtue of the desiring part, which is what makes the will good, is the thing that makes its possessor good in an absolute sense.
() The actions that precede the arrival of virtue can be called natural in that they derive from natural reason, if you contrast 'natural' with 'acquired'. However, they cannot be called natural in the sense that 'natural' is contrasted with 'rational'. In this sense we say that we do not through habit lose or acquire natural things, i.e. in the sense of 'natural' that is contrasted with 'rational'.
()Graceissaidtobetheformofaninfusedvirtue.Thisisnotso,however, in the sense that it gives the virtue its type, but rather insofar as the activity of that virtue is somehow informed by grace. That is why it is not appropriate for civic virtue to come about through the infusion of grace.
() (i) Virtue is made perfect in weakness not because weakness causes virtue, but because it gives opportunities for a specific virtue, i.e. humility.
(ii) It is also the matter of another virtue, i.e. endurance, and also of charity, when someone comes to the help of a neighbour who is in a state of weakness.
(iii) Weakness is also naturally a sign of virtue, because the weaker someone's body when he attempts an act of virtue, the more virtuous the soul is shown to be.
() Strictly speaking, something is not said to 'alter' insofar as it achieves its own distinctive fulfilment. That is why, since virtue is the fulfilment distinctive of human beings, human beings are not said to 'alter' when they acquire virtue. This might, though, occur per accidens, insofar as changes in the sensitive part of the soul, where the emotions of the mind are found, are a part of virtue.
() Someone's character can be described as 'like' something:
(i) according to what his intelligent part is like. In this sense, someone is not so described on account of the body's natural temperament, or the influence of the heavenly bodies, since the intelligent part is independent of any body; or