On the Virtues in General: Article 5: Whether the will is a possessor of virtue
On the Virtues in General requires not only the emotions of anger and of boldness, but also that of hope.
() These words should be taken in an extended sense, not strictly.
Every capacity of the soul indeed seeks its own good; and so the aggressive part seeks victory just as the sensual part seeks pleasure. However, the sensual part is drawn towards things that are good for the whole animal simply or absolutely; that is why all seeking of the good is attributed to it.
() It is true that the aggressive and the sensual parts, considered in themselves, are acted upon but do not act. However, in human beings to the extent that these parts share in some way in reason, they also in some sense act; they are not entirely acted upon. That is another reason why
Aristotle says [Pol ., b; ., b] that the rule of reason over these powers is 'political'; for such powers have some movement of their own, and so they do not obey reason entirely. The rule of the soul over the body, however, is not regal, but despotic, because the limbs of the body obey the soul immediately when they move.
() Although non-human animals do possess these powers, in them those powers do not share in reason at all. That is why non-human animals cannot have the moral virtues.
() (i) All bad things are related to sensual desire as being their primary root, not their proximate principle. For all emotions arise from the aggressive or the sensual parts, as we showed when we discussed the emotions in the soul [ST aae –, esp. .–]. Indeed, the corruption of the reason and the will usually happens as a result of emotions.
(ii) Alternatively, one can say that by 'sensual desire' the gloss means not only what is distinctive to the power of sensual desire, but also what is shared by all the powers of desire. Sensual desire for something can be found in each part of this, and sin is connected with sensual desire: for no one can sin except by some sort of desire for something.
Article : Whether the will is a possessor of virtue Objections It seems so, because:
() Something that commands needs to be more complete in order to command in the right way than does something that carries out the command in order to carry it out in the right way. This is because the
Article latter depends upon the former. But in a virtuous action, the will is in the position of giving commands, while the aggressive and sensual parts are in the position of obeying them and carrying them out. Since, then, virtue is in the aggressive and sensual parts, in the sense that they possess it, it seems that a fortiori it should be in the will.
() Rejoinder: the natural inclination of the will towards good that is its end is enough for it to do things in the right way, since we naturally seek an end. That is why we do not need any extra virtuous disposition to make us do so in the right way. But on the other hand the will responds not only to the ultimate end, but also to other ends. The will may be in the right condition or not with respect to the desire for other ends; after all, good men set themselves good goals, but bad men bad goals, as Aristotle says [NE .., b]: 'How the end appears to people reflects the sort of people they are.' Therefore for the will to be in the right condition, it needs to have a virtuous disposition to complete it.
() The soul's cognitive capacity possesses a certain natural knowledge, that is, of first principles. However, we do possess a kind of intellectual virtue with respect to this knowledge, that is our intelligence, which is the disposition relevant to principles. There ought, then, to be a virtue in our will too that relates to whatever it naturally inclines towards.
() Just as there are moral sorts of virtue relevant to emotions, such as temperateness and courage, so there are virtues relevant to activities, such as justice. Activity that is independent of emotions is the province of the will, just as activity that depends upon emotions is the province of the aggressive or sensual parts. Therefore just as there are moral virtues in the aggressive and sensual parts, so there must be also in the will.
() Aristotle says [NE .., b] that love or affection stems from emotions. However, friendship stems from choice. Choice,which is independent of emotion is, however, an activity of the will. Therefore since friendship is either actually a virtue or inseparable from virtue, as Aristotle says [NE .., b], it seems that virtue is found, in the sense of possessed by, the will.
() Charity is the strongest of the virtues, as St Paul says [Cor :].
However, it can only be the will that possesses charity: it cannot be Reading electio for dilectio; this seems to be the only way of making sense of the argument. Cf. also
ST aae ., ; aae ..
On the Virtues in General possessed by the lower, sensual, part of the soul, for this covers only goods perceived by the senses. Therefore virtue is possessed by the will.
() According to Augustine we are joined to God through the will in a more immediate way. But it is virtue that joins us to God. Therefore it seems that virtue is found in, in the sense of possessed by, the will.
() Happiness, according to Hugh of St Victor, lies in the will. However, the virtues are a kind of tendency to happiness. Since therefore a tendency to something and its fulfilment must both be found in the same place, it seems that the will has, i.e. possesses, virtue.
() According to Augustine [Rev ..], it is the will that enables us either to sin or to live rightly. Living in the right way, however, is the job of virtue, which is why Augustine says elsewhere [FC .] that virtue is a good quality of mind by which we live rightly. Therefore virtue lies in the will.
() Contrary qualities occur by their nature in the same sorts of thing.
Sin, however, is contrary to virtue. Therefore since all sin is found in the will, as Augustine says [TwoSouls .], it seems that virtue should be found there too.
() Human virtue ought to lie in that part of the soul that is distinctive of human beings. But the will, like reason, is distinctive of human beings; indeed, it is closer to reason than are the aggressive and sensual parts.
Therefore since virtue is possessed by the aggressive and sensual parts, a fortiori it seems to be possessed by the will.
But on the other hand () It is clear from Aristotle [NE .., a] that all virtue is either (i) intellectual or (ii) moral. (i) Moral virtue, however, is possessed by something that is rational not in its essence but by sharing in something else's reason. (ii) Intellectual virtue, by contrast, is possessed by something that is rational in its essence. Therefore, since the will cannot be counted as either of these, as neither is it a cognitive capacity (which would be rational in its essence) nor does it belong to the irrational part of the soul
(which would be rational by sharing in reason), it seems that the will cannot in any way possess virtue.
() Several different virtues ought not to be directed to the same action.
However, that would follow if the will possessed virtue. This is because (as I have shown) there are virtues in the aggressive and sensual parts.
Article Since the will is in some way related to actions characterised by those virtues, there would need to be virtues in the will that related to those actions. Therefore we should not say that the will possesses virtue.
My reply When a capacity possesses a virtuous disposition, it is that disposition that enables it to act in a complete way. That is why it does not need a virtuous disposition insofar as it achieves something just by being the capacity that it is. Virtue directs our various capacities towards the good: it both makes its possessor a good person and renders his work good. But the will, just by being the capacity that it is, already has what virtue accomplishes for the other capacities. This is because it aims at the good; therefore inclining to the good is related to the will in the way that inclining to pleasure is related to the sensual part, or attending to sound is related to the hearing.
That is why the will does not need any virtuous disposition to make it incline towards the good; not, at any rate, towards the good that is on its own level, because it aims at this just by being the capacity that it is.
However, it does need a virtuous disposition to aim at a good that surpasses the level of its own capacity. Now a thing's desire aims at its own distinctive good. We can, then, say that a good can exceed the level of the will in two ways: (i) in terms of the species; (ii) in terms of the individual.
(i) The first happens when the will is raised to aim at a good that exceeds the boundaries of human good, where by 'human' I mean something that human nature can achieve by its own powers. The good that is higher than human is divine good, and it is charity that raises the human will towards this, and similarly hope.
(ii) The second happens when someone seeks a good that belongs to someone else, but without the will's being drawn beyond the boundaries of human good. In this case, justice is needed to complete the will, along with all the virtues that are directed at other people, for example liberality.
For justice is another's good, as Aristotle says [NE .., a].
There are therefore two virtues that the will possesses, namely charity and justice. Evidence for this is that although those virtues belong to a faculty of desire, unlike temperateness and courage they do not deal with the emotions. That is why it is clear that they are found not in the sensory desire, where the emotions are found, but rather in the rational desire, that
On the Virtues in General is the will, where there are no emotions. (For all the emotions are located in the sensory part of the soul, as Aristotle proves [Phys ., a].)
By the same reasoning, the virtues that relate to the emotions, for example courage to fear and boldness or temperateness to sensual desires, ought to be located in the sensory desire. The will does not in fact need a virtue to deal with those emotions; this is because what is good in the area of those emotions is simply what accords with reason. The will naturally aims at that good just by virtue of its own capacities, for that is the good that belongs distinctively to the will.
Replies to objections () The judgement of reason is enough for the will to command, since the will naturally desires whatever is good according to reason, just as the sensual part desires whatever is pleasurable according to the senses.
() The will naturally inclines not only towards the ultimate end, but also to any good that reason presents to it. For the will aims at whatever is understood to be good, and it is naturally directed towards this. It does this in the same way that every capacity is directed towards its own object, so long as that is its own distinctive good (as we said above). However, someone can go wrong in respect of this when emotions get in the way of the judgement made by reason.
() Knowledge takes place through concepts. The capacity of the intelligenceisonlysufficientbyitselfforknowledgeifitcanreceivetheconcept from the objects of the senses. That is why, even in the case of things that we know naturally, we need a disposition that also takes its principle in a way from the senses, as Aristotle says [PostAn ., a]. However, the will does not need any such concept for willing; therefore the cases are different.
() The virtues that relate to emotions are in the lower desire. For the reasons already given, no other virtue is needed, for matters of this sort, in the higher desire.
() Friendship is not a virtue strictly speaking, but a result of virtue: it follows from the fact that someone is virtuous that he loves others who are like him. The case is different with charity, which is a kind of friendship with God, and which raises human beings to a level above their natural measure. That is why charity is in the will, as we have said.
Article () and () The same point makes it clear how to reply to the sixth and seventh objections; for the virtue that joins the will to God is charity.
() (i) When it comes to happiness, some things, like tendencies, are prerequisites, such as the activity of the moral virtues. This allows us to remove obstacles to happiness, specifically those emotions or external disturbances that unsettle the mind.
(ii)Thereissecondsortofvirtuousactivitythat,atitsfullest,isinits essencehappinessitself;thisistheactivityofreasonorintelligence.Forthe happiness of contemplation consists precisely in the fullest contemplation ofthehighesttruth;whilethehappinessofactionconsistsintheactivityof thatpracticalwisdomthathumanbeingsexerciseinorganisingthemselves and other people.
(iii) A third element is found in happiness as something that completes it. This is pleasure, which makes happiness complete, as beauty does youth, to quote Aristotle [NE .., b]. This does indeed belong to the will. Charity completes the will by directing it towards this, if we are talking about the happiness of heaven, which is promised to the saints.
However, if we are discussing the happiness of contemplation with which the philosophers have dealt, then the will is directed to enjoyment of this sort by its own natural longing.
From all this, it is clear that not all the virtues are to be found in the will.
() We live rightly, or else sin, through our will, in that it commands all virtuous or wicked actions. However, it does not draw them out. That is why the immediate possessor of a virtue need not be the will.
() All sin lies in the will as its cause, in that all sin comes about with the will's consent. All sin, however, need not lie in the will as its possessor: for example, gluttony and lust are in the sensual part, while anger and pride are in the aggressive part.
() Since the will is so near to reason, it happens that the will agrees with reason, just by being the capacity that it is. Therefore it does not need to acquire a virtuous disposition in addition, unlike the lower capacities, i.e. the aggressive and sensual parts.
In response to the points under 'But on the other hand'
() Charity and hope, which exist in the will, are not included under Aristotle's categorisation, because they are in another class of virtues, called the theological virtues. Justice, however, is included in the moral