On the Virtues in General: Article 13: Whether virtue is found in a mid-point
Article aggressive part. Gentleness, which deals with anger, is not, even though anger gives its name to this part of the soul because it is the last of its emotions.Neither are greatness of spirit or humility cardinal virtues, relating as they do in some way to hoping and trusting in something great.
The reason is that anger and hope do not affect us as deeply as the fear of death does.
Thirdly, in actions that relate to those external things that we use for living, the first and most important thing is that everyone is given what is his due. Justice ensures that. Indeed, if justice is not done, then there is no place for liberality or magnificence. That is why justice is the cardinal virtue and the others are additional.
Finally, in rational activity, the most important thing is to give instructions or to decide, and that is what practical wisdom does. For the part that consults, where good counsel is in charge, and judgement about the advice given, where good sense is in charge, are both ordered towards these. That is why practical wisdom is the cardinal virtue, and the others are additional.
() The other virtues that are additional and secondary are classed as parts of the cardinal virtues, but they are not integral or subjective parts of them since they have their own specific matter and their own activity.
They are potential parts, as it were, in that they participate in a limited and imperfect way in the measure that belongs chiefly and completely to the cardinal virtues.
Article : Whether virtue is found in a mid-point Objections It seems not, because:
() Aristotle says [Heav ., a], that virtue is the upper limit of a capacity. But an upper limit is not a mid-point but rather an extreme.
Therefore virtue does not lie in a mid-point but in an extreme.
See ST aae .ad : anger arises after other emotions of the aggressive part, e.g. hope and fear, and thus gives its name, ira, to the aggressive part, irascibilis.
Integralpartsarewhatwewouldordinarilycallparts:componentsorconstituents.Subjectiveparts are species within a genus (for example, ox and lion are subjective parts of animal) or individuals within a species (for example, Socrates and Plato are subjective parts of human being). Aquinas's point here is that the secondary virtues are neither components nor subspecies of the cardinal virtues. Rather, they are what he calls potential parts: associated virtues that deal with matters closely related to the principal virtue but do not fully meet the definition of the principal virtue.
On the Virtues in General () Virtue has the character of something good: for it is a good quality, as Augustine says.But good has the character of an end, because it is an upper limit, and therefore an extreme. Therefore virtue lies in an extreme rather than in a mid-point.
() Good is contrary to evil, and there is a mid-point between them that is neither good nor evil, as Aristotle argues [Cat , a]. Therefore goodness has the character of an extreme. Thus, virtue, which makes its possessor good and what he does good [NE .., a], does not lie in a mid-point, but in an extreme.
() Virtue is the good of reason, for what is virtuous is what accords with reason. However, reason is not in human beings as a mid-point, but as a pinnacle. Therefore the character of a mid-point does not fit virtue.
() All virtue is either theological or intellectual or moral, as is clear from what I have already said.
(i) Now theological virtue does not lie in a mid-point, because, as Bernard says [LovGod ], the measure of charity is not to have a measure.
Charity, though, is the chief of the theological virtues and their root.
(ii) Similarly, the character of a mid-point does not seem to fit the intellectual virtues. For a mid-point is between two contrary things. But things are not contraries insofar as they are in the intelligence, nor is the intelligence damaged by understanding something outstandingly good, as Aristotle says [Soul ., b].
(iii) Similarly, the moral virtues do not seem to lie in a mid-point. For some of them consist in a maximum: courage, for example, concerns the greatest of dangers, the danger of death; magnanimity concerns great honours; magnificence concerns great expenses; filial duty concerns the very great respect that is owed to parents, whom we can never adequately repay; similarly, piety deals with what is great in the worship of God, to whom we cannot give too much service. Therefore virtue does not lie in a mid-point.
() If the character of virtue is found in a mid-point, then more elevated virtues ought to come closer to the mid-point. Virginity and poverty are more elevated virtues, because they count as counsels, which have to be concerned with a higher good. Therefore it would follow that virginity and poverty lie in a mid-point. That seems false, because virginity consists of completely abstaining from its relevant matter, i.e. erotic love, and so See note .
Article it is an extreme; similarly, with poverty and its matter, i.e. possessions, since it renounces them completely. Therefore it does not seem to be part of the character of virtue to consist in a mid-point.
() Boethius proposes [Ar .ff.] three senses of 'mid-point':
(i) the arithmetic mid-point; for example, is the mid-point between and because it is an equal distance between the two;
(ii) the geometric mid-point; for example, is the mid-point between and , because is distant from and by the same ratio
(namely, :), although not by the same quantity; (iii) the harmonic, or musical, mid-point; for example, is the mid-point between and , because the ratio of one extreme to the other
{i.e.:},isthesameastheratiobetween,thedifferencebetweenand {i.e. –} and , the difference between and {i.e. –}.
Virtue preserves none of these three sorts of mid-point. The mid-point of virtue need not be equidistant from extremes, whether measured by quantity {cf. (i)} or by the ratio between either terms {cf. (ii)} or by differences {cf. (iii)}. Therefore virtue is not found in a mid-point.
() Rejoinder: virtue consists in a mid-point according to reason, not one according to the thing, which is what Boethius is discussing. But on the other hand according to Augustine [FC .], virtue is counted among the greatest goods, which no one can misuse. If, then, the good of virtue lies in a mid-point, it ought to be the case that the mid-point of virtue possesses the character of a mid-point to the greatest degree. But the mid-point of the thing possesses the character of a mid-point more completelythanthemid-pointaccordingtoreason.Thereforethemid-pointof virtue is the mid-point of the thing rather than the mid-point of reason.
() Moral virtue deals with the emotions and the activities of the soul, which are indivisible. In indivisible things, however, there cannot be extremes or a mid-point. Therefore virtue does not lie in a mid-point.
() Aristotle says [Top ., b] that when it comes to sensual pleasure, it is better to be doing than to have done, or to be experiencing it than to have experienced it. Now there is a virtue that deals with sensual pleasures, and that is temperateness. Therefore since virtue always seeks something that is better, temperateness will always be seeking the present experience of sensual pleasure. But that is to hold to an extreme, not to a mid-point. Therefore moral virtue does not lie in a mid-point.
() We find a mid-point wherever we find less and more. We find less and more, though, also in vices: some people are more lustful or greedy
On the Virtues in General than others. Therefore in the area of greed or lust, and of the other vices too, we can find a mid-point. Therefore if it is the character of a virtue to be found in a mid-point, it seems that we must find virtue among the vices.
() If virtue consists in a mid-point, this can only be in the midpoint between two vices. This cannot be right for every moral virtue, since justice, for instance, is not between two vices, but has only one vice opposed to it: taking more than is yours is vicious, but having something that is yours taken away from you is not. Therefore it is not the character of moral virtue that it lies in a mid-point.
()Amid-pointisequidistantfromextremes.Butvirtueisnotequidistant from extremes. For a courageous person is nearer to a daring one than to a coward, and a liberal person nearer to a prodigal one than to someone tight-fisted, and the same is obvious for the other virtues {cf. NE .., a}. Therefore moral virtue does not consist in a mid-point.
() You can only cross from one extreme to another by way of the mid-point. If, then, virtue lies in the mid-point, there will be no way to cross from one vice to its opposite except via virtue. It is clear that this is false.
() The mid-point and the extremes of something belong to the same class. However, courage and cowardice and daring are not in the same class, because courage is in the class of virtue, while the others are in the class of vice. Therefore courage is not a mid-point between them.
The same objection can be made for the other virtues.
() In the case of quantities, just as the extremes are indivisible, so is the mid-point. For both the mid-point and the end of a line are points.
Therefore if virtue consists in a mid-point, it consists in something indivisible. This also seems to follow from what Aristotle says [NE .., b] that it is difficult to be virtuous, just as it is difficult to hit the mark or to find the centre in a circle. If, then, virtue consists in what is indivisible, it seems that virtue cannot be increased or reduced. But that is clearly false.
() In things that are indivisible, there is no diversity. Therefore if virtue lies in the mid-point as something indivisible it seems that there can be no diversity in virtue, so that what is virtuous for one person would be virtuous for someone else. That is clearly false, for the same thing may be praised in one person but criticised in another.
() Whatever is extended even a little from an indivisible point, e.g. from the centre, is then outside the indivisible point and the centre. If,
Article then, virtue lies in a mid-point as in something indivisible, it seems that whatever falls away even a little from what is done in the right way is outside virtue. This would mean that we could only act very rarely in accordance with virtue. Therefore virtue does not lie in a mid-point.
But on the other hand Every virtue is either moral or intellectual or theological. (i) Now moral virtue lies in a mid-point. For moral virtue, as Aristotle says [NE .., a], is a disposition that chooses, consisting in a mid-point. (ii) Intellectual virtue also seems to lie in a mid-point, which is why St Paul says in Romans :, 'Do not be wiser than you ought, but be wise as far as is sober.' (iii) Similarly, theological virtue seems to lie in a mid-point, since faith approaches the mid-point between two heresies, as Boethius says
[TwoNat ]. Hope is also a mid-point between presumption and despair.
Therefore all virtue lies in a mid-point.
My reply (i)Themoraland(ii)theintellectualvirtueslieinamid-point,although in different ways. (iii) The theological virtues, however, do not lie in a mid-point, except maybe contingently.
To make this clear, we need to see that if something has a standard or measure applicable to it, the good of that thing consists in meeting the standard or measure in question. That is why we say that what is good is what is neither more nor less than it should be.
(i) Next we need to note that the domain of the moral virtues is human emotions and activity, just as the domain of skill is things that can be made. Now in the area of skill, what is good consists in whatever is made conforming to the measure that the skill in question demands; for skill is the standard for the things that are made. In just the same way, then, in the area of human emotions and activities the limits set by reason identify whatisgood;forreasonisthemeasureandstandardofallhumanemotions and activities. For since we are human by virtue of possessing reason, what is good for human beings ought to accord with reason. Conversely, when something in human emotions or activity exceeds or falls short of the limits of reason, this is bad.
Therefore since the good for a human being is human virtue, it follows that moral virtue consists in a mid-point between excess and deficiency,
On the Virtues in General taking'excess','deficiency',and'mid-point'withreferencetothestandard given by reason.
(ii) Next, the intellectual virtues: these are found in the reason, and can be divided into (a) practical, i.e. practical wisdom and skill; and (b) theoretical,i.e.wisdom,knowledge,andintelligence.Humanemotionsand activities, or whatever needs to be made, are the matter of the practical virtues, while the matter of the theoretical virtues is necessary things.
Reason is related differently to each of these two. It relates to the things that it puts into effect {cf. (a)} as being their standard and measure, as I have said. By contrast, it relates to the things about which it reflects {cf.
(b)}, as something that is measured and regulated relates to its standard and measure. For the good of our intelligence is what is true, and our intelligence attains that precisely by corresponding to the thing that it understands.
(a) As the moral virtues lie in a mid-point determined by reason, so the same mid-point is relevant to practical reason – the practical intellectual virtueinmoralmatters–totheextentthatitfindsthemid-pointinthearea of actions and emotions. Aristotle's definition of moral virtue [NE .., a] makes this clear: it is a disposition that chooses, consisting in the mid-point as a wise man would reckon it. Therefore the mid-point for practical wisdom and for moral virtue is the same, but practical wisdom imposes the mid-point, while moral virtue has the mid-point imposed upon it. Similarly, the same correctness belongs to skill, which makes something correctly, and to an artefact that is correctly made.
(b) In the area of the theoretical intellectual virtues, the mid-point will be what is actually true, which is grasped to the extent that it matches up to its own measure. This mid-point does not fall between two things that are contrary with respect to the thing. The contraries on either side of the mid-point of virtue relate to what is measured {i.e. the intelligence} rather than to the measure {i.e. the true thing}. The question is: does the thing measured exceed or fail to reach the measure? This is clear from what was said about the moral virtues. Therefore we ought to understand the contraries on either side of the mid-point of the intellectual virtues as contraries with respect to the intelligence.
Aristotle makes clear [Int , b] that the contraries found in the intelligence are opposites in the sense of affirmation and denial. The mid-point of the theoretical intellectual virtues, i.e. whatever is true, is found between opposing denials and affirmations. For example, it is true
Article to say that something is, if it is, and that it is not when it is not. It will be false by excess to say that something is that is not; false by deficiency to say that it is not when it is. Thus it is only because we find in the intelligence contraries that belong to it, distinct from contraries in respect of the thing, that we can accept that there are a mid-point and extremes in the intellectual virtues.
(iii) Now it is clear that the will has no such contraries belonging to it (except in the sense that it can be ordered to contrary things that it might want). This is because, while the intelligence knows something as it is in itself, the will is moved towards something insofar as it is in the will.
Therefore if there is any virtue in the will that relates to the standard and measure of the will itself, this virtue would not consist in a mid-point.
For it cannot have extremes on the part of what is measuring {i.e. the will itself}, but only on the part of what is measured {i.e. the thing wanted}, when that exceeds or fails to reach the measure.
Finally, then, the theological virtues: these are ordered towards their own matter or object, which is God, by the mediation of the will. It is clear that this is true of charity and hope; we can say the same of faith. For although faith is found in the intelligence, however, it is there through being commanded by the will. For no one believes unless he is willing to.
Therefore since God is the standard and measure of the human will, it is clear that the theological virtues do not consist in a mid-point, speaking per se. Sometimes, it might happen that one of them consists in a mean for contingent reasons, as I will explain later on.
Replies to objections () The upper limit of a capacity means the furthest that a capacity can extend. This is what is most difficult for it, because it is most difficult to find the mid-point, and easy to fall away from it. That is why virtue is called the upper limit of a capacity, which lies in the mid-point.
() What is good possesses the character of an upper limit in relation to the movement of the desire, but not in relation to the matter in which this goodness is instantiated. Therefore it ought to be found in a mid-point with respect to the matter, neither exceeding nor being exceeded by the appropriate standard and measure.
By definition, for Aquinas, faith is an intellectual assent brought about not by the compelling character of the thing believed but by the will's choice.
On the Virtues in General () Considered in relation to the form that it derives from its measure, virtue has the character of an extreme. In this way it is opposed to what is bad as the formed is to the unformed, or the measured to the unmeasured.
On the other hand, considered in relation to the matter on which this measure is imposed, virtue does consist in a mid-point.
() The argument understands 'pinnacle' and 'mid-point' with reference to the order of the capacities of the soul, not to the relevant matter; it is on the latter that the limit of virtue is set as a kind of mid-point.
()(i)Amongthetheologicalvirtues,thereisnomid-point,asIhavesaid.
(ii) Among the intellectual virtues, there is a mid-point, not between contrary things insofar as they are in the intelligence, but between the contraries of affirmation and denial, as I have said.
(iii) As for the moral virtues, it is found to be common to all of them that they consist in a mid-point. As for the fact that some of them hit a maximum, they do so in its character as a mid-point, insofar as they hit this maximum by following the standard of reason. For example, brave people deal with the greatest of dangers in a rational way, that is when they ought, as they ought, and for the reasons that they ought. Excess and deficiency apply here with reference not to the quantity of the thing, but to the standard of reason. So, for example, it would be 'excessive' if someone were to face danger at the wrong time or for an inadequate reason; it would be 'deficient' if he failed to face danger when and in the way that he should have done.
() Although virginity and poverty are extremes with respect to the thing, they fall under a mid-point with respect to reason. Virgins abstain from all erotic love for an adequate purpose and in the way that they should. Their purpose is God, and they abstain as they do with pleasure.
If, though, they were to abstain for a bad reason, for example, because they hated erotic love in itself, or the idea of having children or a spouse, then this would be an example of the vice of unfeelingness. But to abstain from all erotic love for a proper end is virtuous. Indeed, men who do this in order to devote themselves to warfare for the benefit of their country are praised for their civic virtue.
() The types of mid-point laid down by Boethius refer to things. For this reason they do not apply to the mid-point of virtue, which is a midpoint according to reason. The possible exception is justice, in which there is both a mid-point of the thing and a mid-point of reason, since
Article its rational mid-point is an arithmetical one when dealing with exchange, and a geometric one when dealing with distribution, as Aristotle makes clear [NE ..–, bff.; {cf. ST aae .}].
()Themid-pointbelongstovirtuenotquamid-pointsimplyspeaking, but qua mid-point according to reason, since virtue is the good of a human being, and this is to live in accordance with reason. That is why something is not closer to virtue by having to a greater degree the character of a midpoint, but only by being a mid-point according to reason.
() The emotions and activities of the soul are indivisible per se, but divisible per accidens, insofar as one can find different degrees in them in respect of different circumstances. It is in this sense that virtue keeps to a mid-point in emotions and activities.
() In the case of sensual pleasure, if we say that it is better to be experiencing it than to have experienced it, we use the word 'better' not with reference to the activity of honourable goodness, which is part of virtue, but of pleasurable goodness, which is part of sensual pleasure.
For sensual pleasure is something we experience. When the essence of something lies in its actually being experienced, then when it is over, it no longer exists. That is why the good of sensual pleasure consists in present rather than in past experience.
() Not every type of mid-point belongs to virtue, but only the midpoint according to reason. This type of mean cannot be found in vices, because by their very character they are outside reason. And so virtue ought not to be found within vice.
() Justice fails to hit the mid-point in external things in the case where you take too much for yourself, because your will is not well ordered.
Consequently that is an instance of vice. But when something is taken from what belongs to you, that is outside your will. That is why it does not in itself involve you in any disordered vice. But the emotions, with which the other virtues deal, are within us. That is why when excess or deficiency appears in them, it does make the person succumb to vice.
That is also why the other moral virtues fall between two vices. Justice, though, does not. However, it does in its own domain hold to a mid-point that in itself belongs to virtue.
() The mid-point for a virtue is the mid-point according to reason, and not the mid-point of the thing. That is why it does not have to be equidistant from each extreme, but rather it should accord with reason.
On the Virtues in General Thus in cases where the good of reason particularly consists in restraining emotions, virtue comes closer to deficiency than to excess. This is clear in the cases of temperateness and gentleness. But in cases where it is good to go in the direction that emotion is pushing you, virtue is closer to excess, as is clear for courage.
() Just as Aristotle says [Phys ., a], where something is changing continuously, it changes into a mid-point before it changes into its ultimate state. Thus it is in only in cases where the movement is continuous that it is inevitable for something moving from one extreme to another to go through the mid-point. But a change from a vice to a virtue is not a continuous movement, and neither are changes in the will or the intelligence when they are drawn in different directions. Therefore it is not necessary that something goes through virtue on the way from one vice to another.
() Virtue, even if it is a mid-point with respect to the matter in which the mid-point is instantiated, is an extreme with respect to its form, i.e. as being placed in the class of what is good, as Aristotle says [NE .., a].
() Although the mid-point in which virtue consists is something indivisible, however, virtue can become more or less intensive as someone is better or worse prepared for hitting that indivisible point, just as a bow can be more or less stretched for hitting an indivisible point on the target.
() The mid-point of a virtue is not the mid-point of a thing, but the mid-point according to reason, as I have said. This mid-point consists in having things and emotions properly proportional to and measured in accordance with the person. The appropriate measurement is different for different people. What is too much for one person is too little for someone else. That is why what is virtuous is not exactly the same for everyone {cf. NE .., a}.
() Since the mid-point for a virtue is the mid-point according to reason, we should regard the indivisibility of this mid-point according to reason. But something that involves imperceptible distance such as cannot cause an error is regarded as indivisible according to reason, just as, for example, the earth as a whole is regarded as an indivisible point in relation to the whole of the heavens. That is how the mid-point of virtue has a certain breadth.
Article We accept what was said under But on the other hand, as far as the moral and intellectual virtues go, but not for the theological virtues. For it can happen that faith comes between two heresies; but it does not do so in itself, through its being a virtue. Similarly, we ought to say that hope may be between two extremes, but that is with respect to the tendency of its subject towards hoping for the things of heaven, and not in its relation to its object.