On the Virtues in General: Article 4: Whether the aggressive or the sensual parts of the soul can be the possessors of v
On the Virtues in General In this way, we conclude that the virtues are possessed by the capacities of the soul, because virtue exists in the soul, through the mediation of capacities.
Replies to objections () In the definition of virtue, the reference to living refers to activity, as I have already said.
() Being spiritual comes through grace, not through the virtues. For grace is the origin of something's being filled with the spirit, while virtue is the principle of its acting in a spirit-filled way.
() A capacity is a possessor of attributes not in itself, but insofar as it is sustained by the soul.
() Now we are speaking about the human virtues. Therefore the capacities that cannot in any way be specifically human, in the sense that the command of reason cannot in any way reach them (e.g. those powers of life that are below the conscious level), cannot possess virtues. If any opposition arises as a result of these powers, it will be mediated through our sensory desire which can be affected by the command of reason (and can therefore be described as 'human', and a possessor of human virtue).
() The only capacities of the soul that are active are (i) the active intelligence and (ii) the pre-conscious powers of life; these do not possess any dispositions. Other capacities of the soul are passive. However, they can be principles of the soul's actions insofar as they are moved by what activates them.
() There should not be an infinite regress because one will reach an accidentthatisfoundinitscapacitywithoutreferencetoanotheraccident.
() One quality is not said to be of another in the sense that one through itself possesses the other. That is not a part of our hypothesis, as I have explained above.
Article : Whether the aggressive or the sensual parts of the soul can be the possessors of virtue Objections It seems that they cannot, because:
() Contraries by their nature occur in the same sorts of things as each other. But mortal sin is contrary to virtue, and this cannot exist in the
Article sensory part of the soul (which consists of the aggressive and the sensual parts). Therefore virtue cannot be possessed by the aggressive and the sensual parts.
() Dispositions will be located in the same capacities as their related acts. But the principal act of virtue is choice, according to Aristotle [NE
.., a; .., a]. This cannot be an act of the aggressive or sensual parts. Therefore nor can virtuous dispositions exist in the aggressive and sensual parts.
() Nothing perishable can possess something everlasting. That is how Augustine proves [IS .] that the soul is everlasting, because it is the possessor of truth, which is everlasting. But the aggressive and sensual parts,justliketheothersensorycapacities,donotremainafterthebodyhas gone, or so some people think. However, the virtues do remain. For justice is everlasting and immortal, as Wisdom says [:]. The same reasoning holds for the other virtues. Therefore virtues cannot be possessed by the aggressive and sensual parts.
() The aggressive and sensual parts have their own bodily organs.
Therefore if the virtues exist in the aggressive and sensual parts, they will be in those bodily organs. If so, they can be grasped by imagination; hence, they are not graspable only by the mind. However, Augustine says about justice that it is a correctness graspable only by the mind.
() Rejoinder: virtue can be possessed by the aggressive and sensual parts insofar as they share in some way in reason. But on the other hand the aggressive and sensual parts are said to share in reason insofar as they are ordered by reason. However, the ordering of reason cannot be what sustains virtue, since it does not itself exist independently. Therefore virtue cannot be possessed by the aggressive and sensual parts of the soul even insofar as they share in reason.
() Just as our aggressive and sensual parts, which are parts of the sensory desire, obey reason, so do our capacities for sense-perception.
But virtue cannot be found in any of our capacities for sense-perception.
Therefore it cannot be found in the aggressive and sensual parts.
() If the aggressive and sensual parts are able to share in the ordering by reason, then it will be possible to reduce the rebelliousness in regard to phantasia, the capacity that stores forms taken in by the senses and can combine them. Since I have seen both the colour gold and a mountain, I have images of both stored in my phantasia, which can combine the two images to make an image of a golden mountain.
Actually Anselm, in On Truth .
On the Virtues in General reason of our sensual nature, which includes these two powers. Now that rebellion is not infinite, since our sensual nature is only a finite power, and a finite power cannot produce an infinite activity. Therefore it will be possible to quell this rebellion completely; for everything that is finite disappears if you take away bits of it sufficient times, as Aristotle makes clear [Phys ., b]. In this way, it would be possible to heal our sensual nature completely in this life. But that is impossible.
() Rejoinder: God, who infuses virtue in us, could totally quell the rebellion in question. It is from our side, however, that it cannot be completely quelled. But on the other hand human beings are human precisely insofar as they are rational; that is how they acquire their type. The more, then, that that which is in a human being is subject to reason, the more fully does it belong to human nature. The lower parts of the soul would then be supremely subject to reason if the rebellion in question were completely quelled. Therefore this would be supremely fitting for human nature. In this way there is no obstacle from our side to quelling the rebellion in question completely.
() Mere avoidance of sin is not sufficient to characterise virtue. For the fullnessofjusticeconsistsintheconditiontowhichPsalm:summons us with the words, 'Turn away from evil and do good.' It is the role of the aggressive part, however, to hate what is bad, as it says in the book On the Spirit and the Soul [SS ]. Therefore, in the aggressive part at least virtue cannot exist.
() It says in the same book [SS , ] that to seek the virtues lies in reason, but to hate the vices in the aggressive part. But the seeking of virtue and virtue itself are in the same part, since everything seeks what perfects it. Therefore all virtue is in reason and not in the aggressive and sensual parts.
() No capacity can have a disposition that is only acted upon and does not act: a disposition is something that enables you to act when you wish to, as Averroes says [AverSoul .]. But the aggressive and sensual parts do not act; they are acted upon. Therefore, as Aristotle says [NE .., a], the senses are not in control of any actions. Therefore a virtuous disposition cannot exist in the aggressive and sensual parts.
() Whatever is a distinctive feature belongs to a distinctive subject.
Now virtue belongs to the reason, and not to the aggressive and sensual parts, which are shared with us by non-human animals; virtue, therefore,
Article only exists in human beings (as does reason). Therefore all virtues are found in the reason, and not in the aggressive and sensual parts.
() Romans says, according to the gloss [Rom ], that the law is good, and, when it prohibits sensual desire, it prohibits all evil. Therefore all vices belong to the sensual part, where sensual desire is found. But virtues and vices are located in the same kinds of thing. Therefore the virtues are not in the aggressive part, but at mostin the sensual part.
But on the other hand () Aristotle says [NE .., b] that temperateness and courage belong to the non-rational parts of the soul. The non-rational parts, i.e. the sensory desire, consist of the aggressive and the sensual parts, as Aristotle also explains [Soul ., b]. Therefore the virtues can exist in the aggressive and sensual parts.
() Venial sin makes someone tend to mortal sin. But a tendency and its fulfilment are found in the same thing. Therefore since venial sin is found in the aggressive and sensual parts (for the first movement of sin is an act of the sensual faculty, as the gloss says [Rom ]), it follows that there can be mortal sin there too. Therefore there can also be virtue, which is contrary to mortal sin.
() A mid-point and its extremes are found in the same thing. But virtue is a kind of mid-point between contrary emotions, just as courage is between fear and boldness, and temperateness between excessive and insufficient sensual desires. Therefore since this sort of emotion is found in the aggressive and sensual parts, it seems that virtue must be found there too.
My reply On this question, in some respects there is general agreement, in others opinions conflict with each other.
Everyone agrees that there are some virtues in the aggressive and sensual parts, e.g. temperateness in the sensual and courage in the aggressive.
People differ over the following: some distinguish two sets of aggressive and sensual parts, (i) one in the higher and (ii) the other in the lower part
The text reads ad minus, but 'at least' gives the wrong sense.
On the Virtues in General of the soul. (i) Thus they say that the aggressive and sensual parts that are in the higher part of the soul, since they belong to rational nature, can possess virtue. (ii) Those in the lower part, however, cannot; they belong to our sensitive and non-rational nature. This has been discussed in another question [DQTruth .; ST a .], i.e. whether two powers can be distinguished in the upper part of the soul, of which one is aggressive and the other sensual, speaking strictly. However, whatever is said about this, we ought still to put some virtues in the aggressive and sensual parts of the lower desire, as Aristotle says [NE .., b], and as other people also agree.
The following makes this clear: virtue (as I said above) refers to the fulfilment of a capacity; a capacity is directed towards its actualisation.
Therefore we ought to locate human virtue in the capacity that is the principle of human activity. An act is called human not just because it is done in any old way by or through a human being – for some things are shared with non-human animals, and even plants – but because it belongs distinctively to a human being. What is distinctive about human beings, compared to these other things, is that human beings are in control of their own actions. Actions are distinctively human, then, when human beings are in control of them, and not so when human beings are not in control of them, even when they happen in them (e.g. digesting or growing). Human virtue, then, can be located in whatever is the principle of an action of which a human being is in control.
We need to know that the principle of such an action can mean three things:
(i)thethingthatfirstmovesandcommandsit,invirtueofwhichhuman beings are in control of their actions. This is reason or will;
(ii) something that moves something else but is also moved, e.g. the sensorydesire,whichismovedbyahigherdesireinsofarasitobeysreason, and which then in its turn moves the limbs of the body at its command;
(iii) something that is only moved, i.e. the limbs of the body.
Both of the latter two, i.e. the limbs of the body and the lower desires, are moved by the higher part of the soul; however, this happens in different ways. For the limbs of the body – unless something obstructs them – obey the higher power that commands them immediately and without any conflict, according to the order of nature, as is clear with a hand or foot. The lower desire, though, has an inclination of its own from its own nature, which means that it does not obey immediately the higher power
Article that commands it, but it sometimes resists it. That is why Aristotle says
[Pol ., b] that the soul controls the body as a master his slave, with a despotic rule (the slave, indeed, has no ability to resist any of his master's commands). Reason, however, controls the lower parts of the soul with a royal or political rule, i.e. as kings or princes of cities control free men, who have the right and the ability to resist with respect to some of the orders a king or prince may give. Therefore with the limbs of the body nothing is needed to complete a human action except their own natural tendency; this allows them to be moved, as is natural to them, by reason. In the lower desire, which can resist reason, it is necessary to have something extra that enables it to carry out without any conflict whatever reason commands it to do.
For if the immediate principle of what is done is incomplete, the action itself will be incomplete, no matter how complete the higher principle is.
That is why unless the tendency of the lower appetite to carry out the commandsofreasonwerecomplete,anyactionthathadthelowerdesireas its proximate principle would not be completely good: the sensory desire would offer some resistance. As a result, the lower desire would suffer a kind of unease because it was being forced, so to speak, by the higher one.
This happens to someone who has strong sensual desires, but does not follow them because reason forbids this.
When therefore someone has to deal with the objects of the sensory desire, he needs, in order to do this well, a kind of tendency or completeness in the sensory desire that will enable it to obey reason easily. That is what we call virtue.
Take, then, any virtue concerned with something that belongs distinctively to the aggressive power (as courage is concerned with fear and confidence, or greatness of spirit with difficult aspirations, or gentleness with anger). Such a virtue will be said to be possessed by the aggressive part. Now take any virtue concerned with something that belongs distinctively to the sensual part. Such a virtue will be said to be possessed by the sensual part (e.g. chastity, which relates to the pleasures of sex, or abstinence and soberness, which relate to the pleasures of food and drink).
Replies to objections () Virtue and mortal sin can be thought of in two ways: (i) according to the action in question; and (ii) according to the disposition in question.
On the Virtues in General (i) If an action of the sensual or aggressive parts is examined in itself, it will not involve mortal sin. However, it can cooperate with an act that is mortally sinful when, under the influence of or with the consent of reason, it is directed against divine law. In a similar way the actions of these parts when considered in themselves cannot be virtuous acts; they can only be so when the parts cooperate to carry out the commands of reason. That is the way in which acts that are either mortally sinful or virtuous can belong to the aggressive and sensual parts.
(ii) That is why a virtuous or sinful disposition can also be found in the aggressive and sensual parts.
It is relevant here, though, that just as a virtuous act consists in the fact that the aggressive or sensual parts follow reason, so a sinful act consists in the fact that reason is drawn to follow the inclination of the aggressive and sensual parts. That is why sin is more often assigned to reason, as its proximate cause; and so, for the same reason, is virtue assigned to the aggressive and sensual parts.
() As I have already said, a virtuous act cannot belong to the aggressive or sensual parts independently, without reason. Indeed, the prior element in a virtuous act is something rational, that is, choice; for whenever A does something to B, the activity of A is prior to the passive experience of B.
Reason, then, commands the aggressive and the sensual parts. Therefore when virtue is said to exist in these parts, this does not mean that they bring about either the whole of the virtuous act or the element prior to it; rather, the virtuous disposition makes the virtuous action as completely good as possible. It does so insofar as the aggressive and sensual parts follow the direction of reason without any struggle.
() Let us assume that the aggressive and sensual parts do not remain active in the separated soul. They do, however, remain in it as their root: for the essence of the soul is the root of its capacities. In the same way, the virtues that are assigned to the aggressive and sensual parts remain in reason as their root. For reason is the root of all the virtues, as will be shown later.
() There is a sort of scale of forms. Some forms and virtues are entirely reduced to the material, when all their activity and their accidental qualities are material. This is clear in the forms of the elements. The intelligence, though, is entirely free from matter; that is why its activity is not involved with physical things. The aggressive and sensual parts, however, have an intermediate position. The bodily changes that accompany their
Article actions show that they use bodily organs. But the fact that they are moved by commands and obey reason shows that that they are also in some sense raised above what is material. Virtue is found in them, then, just to the extent that they are raised above the material and obey reason.
() It is true that the ordering of reason in which the aggressive and sensual parts share does not exist independently, and cannot in itself possess accidents. However, it can be the reason why something else possesses accidents.
() The cognitive powers of the senses naturally precede reason, since reason receives data from them; the powers of desire, however, naturally follow the order of reason, as a lower desire naturally obeys a higher.
Therefore the cases are not the same.
() The rebellion of the aggressive and sensual parts against reason cannot be quelled entirely by means of virtue; for since through their own nature those parts aim at what is good according to the senses, they sometimes conflict with reason. It could possibly happen, though, by means of divine power, which can even change something's nature. In any case, the rebellion is reduced through virtue, insofar as the powers in question become accustomed to obeying reason. Then they have what they need for virtue, from something outside, i.e. from the rule of reason over them. In themselves, however, they retain something of their own movements, which are sometimes contrary to reason.
() Although the principle in human beings is what is rational, the whole of human nature needs not only reason, but also the lower powers of the soul and indeed the body. That is why when human nature is in the state of being left to itself, the result is that something in the lower powers of the soul rebels against reason, as long as the lower powers of the soul move in their own way. It is different in the state of innocence, or of glory, when reason, by being joined to God, acquires the power to keep the lower powers entirely under itself.
() To detest what is bad, insofar as this is said to be the role of the aggressive part, implies not only a withdrawal from what is bad, but also a movement of the aggressive part to destroy what is bad: take, for example, someone angry who not only runs away from something bad, but also is stimulated to root out the evil by avenging it. This, though, is to do something good. Although it is the role of the aggressive part to hate what is bad, this is not the only activity in which it engages.
For its role also includes lifting one to achieve a difficult good; this