On the Cardinal Virtues: Article 2: Whether the virtues are interconnected in such a way that if you possess one of them
On the Cardinal Virtues threatenus.Buttheyalsopossesssomethingmorethanthis,whichenables them to drive out the evils that threaten, in whatever way they ought to.
() It is obvious from the fact that magnanimity is an embellishment of the other virtues that it presupposes, and so is based on, the other virtues.
From this it is clear that the other virtues are more fundamental than it.
Article : Whether the virtues are interconnected in such a way that if you possess one of them, you possess them all
Objections It seems not, because:
() Bede comments [CommLuke ] on Luke :that the saints are more humbled by not having certain virtues than they are elated at having thosetheydohave.Thereforetheypossesssomeandnotothers.Therefore the virtues are not all interconnected.
() After repentance, people are in a condition of charity; however, they still find it difficult to do things in a given areabecause of their previous habits, as Augustine tells us [AJ .]. This difficulty seems to come from a disposition contrary to the virtue, which has been acquired through bad habits, and which cannot coexist with the virtue to which it is contrary.
Therefore it is possible for someone to possess one of the virtues, i.e. charity, while lacking the others.
() Charity can be found in all the baptised. But some of the baptised do not possess practical wisdom, as is especially clear in the case either of people who are half-witted or of the young, who according to Aristotle
[NE .., a] cannot have become practically wise. It is also the case in adults who are rather simple, who do not seem really to have practical wisdom, since they are not good at taking counsel, which is one of the jobs of practical wisdom. Therefore someone can possess one virtue, i.e. charity, and not all the others.
() Aristotle says [NE .., b] that practical wisdom is right reason in doing things just as skill is right reason in making things. But it is possible to possess right reason in making one sort of thing, for example tools, but not for other types of artefact. Therefore it is possible to possess practical wisdom in one class of things that one does, for example, just de his: the text is difficult at this point.
Article things, and not in another, for example, courageous things. Therefore someone could have one virtue without the others.
() Aristotle says [NE .., a] that not every person who is liberal with money is also a magnificent benefactor. But both liberality and magnificence are virtues. Again, some people are moderate without possessing greatness of spirit. Therefore some people possess one virtue without possessing them all.
() St Paul says in Corinthians :, 'There are distinctions among gifts', and then adds, 'The Spirit gives some the gift of speaking with wisdom, others of speaking with knowledge' (and these are intellectual virtues)'othersthegiftoffaith'(andthatisatheologicalvirtue).Therefore someone may possess one virtue and not another.
() Virginity is a kind of virtue, as Cyprian says [Virg, passim]. But many people who do not possess virginity have other virtues. Therefore someone may have one virtue but not all of them.
()Aristotlesays[NE..,b]thatwecallAnaxagorasandThales wise but not practically wise. But both wisdom and practical wisdom are intellectual virtues. Therefore someone can possess one virtue and not others.
() Aristotle says in the same book [NE .., b; .., b] that some people have an inclination towards one virtue and not another.
Therefore it can happen that someone engages in activities characteristic of one virtue but not in activities characteristic of another. But we acquire certain of the virtues by practising the relevant activity, as is clear from Aristotle [NE .., a]. Therefore at least the acquired virtues are not interconnected.
() Even if a natural aptitude for virtue comes (i) from nature, the completeness of virtue does not, as Aristotle says [NE .., a].
It is also clear that it does not come (ii) from fortune, because matters of fortune are outside our choice. Therefore the remaining possibility is that we acquire virtue (iii) through our own undertaking, or (iv) from God.
If (iii) by our own undertaking, however, it seems that we can acquire one virtue without another, because someone can aim to acquire one virtue and not another. Similarly, even if we acquire them (iv) from God: we can seek one virtue from God and not another. Therefore in each of these ways one virtue can exist without another.
() The relation between an end and virtuous activity in the area of morals is comparable to the relation between the principle and the
On the Cardinal Virtues conclusions in the area of demonstrable knowledge. But someone can know one conclusion and not another. Therefore one can have one virtue and not another.
() Augustine says [Let ..] that when it says, 'Whoever has one virtue has them all', this is not a divinely inspired opinion; someone can have one without another, e.g. mercy without self-control, just as one of the limbs of the body, but not another, may be lit by beauty or health.
Therefore the virtues are not interconnected.
() When things are interconnected, this is by reason (i) of a principle, or (ii) of a subject, or (iii) of an object. But here it is not (i) by reason of the principle, which is God, because in this sense all good things, which come from God, are interconnected. Nor is it (ii) by reason of the subject, which is the soul, because in this respect the virtues are not all interconnected.
Nor is it (iii) by reason of their object, because it is their objects that distinguish the virtues, and the same thing cannot be the principle of both distinguishing and connecting things.
()Theintellectualvirtuesarenotconnectedwiththemoralvirtues,as is particularly clear from the fact that it is possible to have understanding of principles without having moral virtues. But practical wisdom is an intellectual virtue, and is counted as one of the cardinal virtues. Therefore it does not have a connection with the other cardinal virtues, which are moral virtues.
() In our homeland we will not have faith and hope. We will, however, have charity there. Therefore the virtues will not be interconnected when we are in our most perfect condition.
() The angels, who do not possess sensory powers, and similarly the separated souls,possess charity and justice, which lasts forever and does not die. However, they do not possess temperateness and courage, because thesevirtuesbelongtoournon-rationalparts,asAristotlesays[NE.., b]. Therefore the virtues are not interconnected.
() The body possesses virtues just as the soul does. However, the virtues of the body are not interconnected: for example, some people can see but not hear. Therefore neither are the virtues of the soul.
() Gregory says [HomEzek ..] that no one becomes 'supreme' suddenly. Psalm :says, too, 'They will go from virtue to virtue.' Therefore
The souls of the dead, which are separated from their bodies.
Article people do not acquire all the virtues at the same time, but one after the other. Therefore the virtues are not interconnected.
But on the other hand () Ambrose says [CommLuke .], 'The virtues are interconnected and interlinked, so that someone who has one seems to have them all.'
() Gregory says [MorJob ..] that if someone possesses one without another, then it is either not a virtue, or it is imperfect. But perfection is part of the character of a virtue: for a virtue is a sort of perfection, as Aristotle says [Phys ., b]. Therefore the virtues are interconnected.
() The gloss comments on Ezekiel :, 'The two wings of each were joined', as follows: 'The virtues are interconnected, so that someone who lacks one lacks another.'
My reply We can speak about the virtues in two ways: (i) about the virtues as imperfect; (ii) about them as perfect. The perfect virtues are interconnected, but the imperfect virtues are not necessarily interconnected.
To show this we need to know that since virtue is something that makes a person and what he does good, perfect virtue is something that makes a person and what he does perfectly good. Imperfect virtue, though, makes a personandwhathedoesgoodnotunqualifiedly,butinsomerespect.Good isfoundunqualifiedlyinhumanactivitieswhentheymatchuptooneofthe standards that govern human activities: one of those corresponds strictly to human nature, and this is right reason; the other, though, is the first measure, which transcends us, so to speak, and this is God. It is through practical wisdom that we attain right reason, because it is, precisely, right reason in doing things, as Aristotle says [NE .., b]. It is through charity,though,thatweattainGod,inaccordancewithJohn::'Those who remain in charity remain in God, and God in them.'
In this way, then, there are three levels of virtue. (i) Virtues which are wholly imperfect exist without practical wisdom, and so do not achieve right reason, for example, the inclinations that some people have even from when they are born to act in a way characteristic of a certain virtue, as Job :tells us: 'Since I was a baby my compassion has grown with me, and it left the womb together with me.' Inclinations of this sort are not
On the Cardinal Virtues found all together in everyone; rather some people have an inclination of onesort,othersofanother.Theseinclinationsdonotpossessthecharacter of a virtue, because no one can misuse a virtue, according to Augustine
[Rev .]. Someone can, though, misuse this sort of inclination even in a harmful way, if one uses it without discernment, just as a horse that is blind bangs into things harder the faster it runs. That is why Gregory says [MorJob ..] that unless the other virtues do in a practically wise way whatever they are aiming to do, they cannot be virtues. That is why such inclinations, when they lack practical wisdom, do not possess the character of a virtue in a perfect way.
(iia) The second level of virtue consists in virtues that achieve right reason, but do not reach God himself through charity. These are perfect in one way, in relation to human good, but not unqualifiedly perfect, because they do not attain the first standard, which is our ultimate end, as Augustine says in Against Julian. That is why they fall short of the true character of a virtue, just as moral inclinations without practical wisdom fall short of the true character of a virtue.
(iib) The third level consists of virtues that are unqualifiedly perfect, and these are combined with charity. For such virtues make a human action unqualifiedly good, in that it is something that attains our ultimate end.
We need to consider further that just as the moral virtues cannot exist without practical wisdom, for the reason given, so practical wisdom cannot exist without the moral virtues: for practical wisdom is right reason in doing things. But right reason concerning any class of things requires someone to make a correct evaluation or judgement about the principles on which the reasoning is based. For example, in geometry no one can make a correct evaluation without possessing right reason concerning the principles of geometry. In actions, though, the principles are the ends, and we can take our reasons for acting from them. But it is through the disposition of a moral virtue that we can evaluate ends correctly, because, as Aristotle says [NE .., b], how the end appears to a person depends upon what that person is like. Thus a good in keeping with virtue seems a desirable end to a virtuous person, as does one in keeping with vice to a wicked person. This is like healthy or infected taste. That is why anyone who possesses practical wisdom needs the moral virtues as well.
Similarly, anyone who possesses charity ought also to possess all the other virtues. Charity is infused into us by God, according to Romans
:, 'The charity of God is poured into our hearts through the Holy
Article Spirit, who has been given to us.' Now when God gives a thing A an inclination towards something B, he also gives A certain forms, which are the principles of acting and moving towards whatever God is making A incline to {i.e. towards B}. In this way, he gives fire its lightness, which enables it to rise up quickly and easily. That is how, as Wisdom :tells us, 'He prepares everything in a way that brings delight.' Therefore in a similar way it is appropriate for other forms to be poured into us, along with charity, as dispositions that are readily able to do the things towards which charity makes us incline. Now charity inclines us towards all sorts of virtuous activity, because it commands the activities of all the other virtues, since it is concerned with the ultimate end: for a skill or a virtue that includes a certain end, also governs whatever concerns that end, just as military skill commands horsemanship and a horseman's skill that of the saddler, as Aristotle says [NE .., a]. That is why the dispositions of all the other virtues are infused into us along with charity, because God's wisdom and goodness does whatever is fitting. For this reason, Corinthians :says, 'Charity is patient and kind', etc.
If, then, we take the virtues as (iib) unqualifiedly perfect, they are connected because of charity, because no virtue can be of this sort without charity, and once you possess charity you possess all the virtues. However, if we take the virtues as (iia) perfect at the second level, with reference to the human good, they are connected through practical wisdom, because no moral virtue can exist without practical wisdom and we cannot possess practical wisdom if any of the moral virtues are lacking.
On the other hand, if we take the four cardinal virtues as implying certain general criteria for virtues, they are interconnected in that one of these criteria alone is not enough for any virtuous action: all need to be present. This seems to be Gregory's grounds for connecting them
[MorJob ..].
Replies to objections () Anyone may be inclined by nature or by the gift of grace more to one sort of virtuous activity than another; therefore anyone may turn out to be readier for one sort of virtuous action than another. In this sense, where the saints are quicker to act virtuously in one specific way, they are said to possess the related virtue. They are said not to possess the virtue relevant to the actions they are less quick to perform.
On the Cardinal Virtues () A disposition in itself makes us do things readily and with pleasure; however, some additional factor can interfere with this. For example, someone who possesses the disposition of knowledge can be hindered from using it by being sleepy or drunk or whatever. In this way, those who repent receive charity, along with the grace that makes them pleasing to God, and also the dispositions of all the other virtues. However, they can still find it difficult to exercise the virtues which they have received as dispositions,becausethetendenciesresultingfromtheirearliersinfulactivity remain with them. This does not happen with virtues that are acquired through engaging in virtuous activity, because through such activity the opposing tendencies are removed at the same time as the dispositions of the virtues come into existence.
() Someone who is baptised receives practical wisdom and all the other virtues along with charity. But it is not necessary for practical wisdom that someone is good at taking counsel in every area, e.g. commerce or war, but only in those matters that are necessary for salvation. Those who are dwellingingracedonotlackthat,howeversimpletheyare,inkeepingwith
John :: 'Anointing will teach you about everything.' Of course, some of the baptised could be prevented from acting with practical wisdom because of the bodily limitations due to their age, as with children, or to a deformed condition, as with people who are half-witted or crazy.
() The products of skill, where they fall under different classes, are based on totally unconnected principles. That is why nothing stops us possessing a skill to do with one class of things and not with another.
Moral principles, on the other hand, are mutually ordered, so that a failure in one leads to failures in others. For example, those who fail to hold to the principle, which is part of temperateness, that they should not chase after sensual desires, will from time to time, by doing just that, end up acting unjustly and therefore violating justice. Similarly, within one and the same skill or branch of knowledge, e.g. geometry, a mistake in one principle leads to mistakes throughout the discipline. That is why no one can have practical wisdom to a satisfactory degree in the domain of one virtue if they do not have practical wisdom in respect of all the virtues.
() With respect to activity, it is indeed possible to say that someone is liberal with money, but not a magnificent benefactor: for if you are not As throughout, 'disposition' here translates habitus, and 'tendency' dispositio.
Article very wealthy, you can be liberal with what you have, but not magnificent.
Perhaps, however, you possess the disposition that would enable you to give with magnificence if you had the means. We can say the same about moderateness and greatness of spirit. This response holds good generally for all the infused virtues. However, with the virtues that are acquired through activity, one can say that those who have acquired the disposition of liberality in making use of their modest possessions have not yet acquired the disposition of magnificence; rather, by possessing the disposition of liberality, they are well prepared for acquiring the disposition of magnificence through a small amount of activity. Whateverwe are near to possessing, then, we already seem to possess, since when only a little is lacking, it seems as if nothing is, as Aristotle says [Phys ., a].
() In the verse from St Paul, wisdom and knowledge should not be takenastheintellectualvirtuesofthatname,whicharenotinterconnected, as I said above; nor as gifts of the Holy Spirit, which are interconnected through charity; but rather as graces freely given, such that someone may overflow with knowledge or wisdom in such a way as to be able to support others in their faith and awareness of God and to refute those who argue against these. That is why St Paul did not say, 'Some are given wisdom and others knowledge', but rather, 'Some are given the gift of speaking with wisdom and others of speaking with knowledge.' For this reason also
Augustine says [Trin ..] that most of the faithful are not well endowed with this sort of knowledge, even though they are well endowed with faith.
We should not take 'faith' there to refer to unformed faith, as some do, because the gift of faith is shared by everyone; we should take it to mean a certain steadfastness or certainty of faith, with which sometimes even sinners can be full to overflowing.
() (i) According to some people 'virginity' is not the name of a virtue, but of a particular state of perfection of a virtue. Now to possess a virtue, you do not need to possess it to a perfect degree. That is why you can possess chastity and the other virtues without virginity.
(ii) Or else, if you grant that virginity is a virtue, this will be true in so far as it involves a disposition of mind that allows someone to choose to preserve virginity for the sake of Christ. This disposition can also exist in someone who is not a virgin in the physical sense, in the way that someone can possess the disposition of magnificence without being very rich.
Reading quod for quia.
On the Cardinal Virtues () The intellectual virtues are not mutually interconnected. This is for three reasons:
(i) because they concern different classes of things, and therefore are not mutually coordinated, as we have already said in the case of crafts;
(ii) because in branches of knowledge, principles and conclusions do notmutuallyimplyoneanothersuchthatwhoeverpossessestheprinciples also possesses the conclusions. I have explained, though, that that is the case with moral matters; (iii) because intellectual virtues are unrelated to the charity that orders us towards our ultimate end. The virtues of this sort are ordered to particular goods, for example, geometry to diameters, metaphysics concerning abstract things, physics concerning things that change, and so on.
That is why, by the same reasoning as with the imperfect virtues, these virtues are not interconnected, as I said above.
() (i) Certain virtues, for example, temperateness, justice, and gentleness, order us in ordinary areas of human life. In this area, while one is engaged in one type of virtuous activity one must either (a) also be actively engaged in exercising the other virtues; thus one will acquire the dispositions of all the virtues at the same time; or else (b) do well in respect of one and badly in respect of the others. In the latter case, one will acquire a disposition that is contrary to one of the virtues, and therefore destructive of practical wisdom. But without practical wisdom the tendency acquired through acting in accordance with the other virtues will not have the distinctive character of virtue, as I have explained.
(ii) However, when we have acquired such dispositions in ordinary areas of human life, then we possess other virtuous dispositions – those of the virtues that are not often actually exercised in ordinary social life – in a virtual way, by possessing tendencies that are close to them, as I have said about magnificence and greatness of spirit.
() (i) The acquired virtues are caused by what we undertake. It must also happen that if someone undertakes to acquire one of them, this will cause all of them to exist at the same time: the one will only be acquired if practical wisdom too is acquired at the same time, and all the others are possessed along with that, as I have argued.
(ii) The infused virtues, though, are caused directly by God, and are also caused by charity, as their shared root, as I said in my reply.
() In theoretical areas of knowledge, principles and conclusions do not mutually imply one another as does happen in the area of morals, as