On Charity: Article 5: Whether charity is a specific virtue, distinct from the other virtues, or not
Article () Charity is not one thing (i) by continuity. It can, however, be said to be one thing (ii) by indivisibility, in that it is one simple form; for it cannot in fact be called finite or infinite in respect of size, but only in respect of the amount of virtue. But that is not how we will deal with the virtue of charity here: rather, we will say that it is (iii) one in meaning. It is not, indeed, numerically one, like something that is both a tunic and a garment. However, it is one in type, as Socrates and Plato are one in that the meaning of 'human being' applies to them both.
() The argument would work if the temporal thing were the object of charity for its own sake and not for the sake of something eternal, as I have explained.
() We cannot have friendship in the full sense with many people, in the sense of having it with each person for his own sake. But the fuller a friendship is with one person for his own sake, the more it can, for his sake, be extended to others. In this way, charity, which is friendship in the fullest sense towards God, extends to all those who are able to see God, and not only to those we do not know, but even to our enemies.
() A virtue that acts with pleasure concerning a principal object may do things without pleasure, but also without distress, where some additional object is concerned. In this way, charity acts with pleasure concerning its principal object; with a secondary object, even though it may suffer some difficulty, it is enough in this case if it manages to act without distress.
Article : Whether charity is a specific virtue, distinct from the other virtues, or not Objections It seems not, because:
() Something that is included in the definition of every virtue is not a specific virtue, because virtue in general is included in the definition of any specific virtue. But charity is included in the definition of every virtue.
For Jeromesays: 'To state concisely a general definition of virtue: virtue Actually it is Augustine who says something like this in a letter to Jerome (Let ..): 'And so as to state briefly the conception I have of virtue . . . virtue is the charity by which one loves what ought to be loved.' That charity is love of God and love of neighbour is a pervasive theme in Augustine.
On Charity is charity, by which we love God and neighbour.' Therefore charity is not a specific virtue, distinct from the others.
() The charity by which we love a neighbour is not a virtue distinct from the charity by which we love God, because charity makes us love a neighbour for the sake of God. But every virtue makes us love a neighbour for the sake of God. Therefore no virtue is distinguished from charity.
() Distinctions between dispositions derive from the activity of those virtues. But charity brings about the activity of all the other virtues: as Corinthians :says, 'Charity is patient and kind.' Therefore charity is not a virtue distinct from the others.
() The good is an object shared generally by all the virtues: for virtue is something that makes its possessor and what he does good. But the object of charity is goodness. Therefore charity has a general object, and is therefore a general virtue.
() Each one thing that perfects something corresponds to one thing that is to be perfected. But charity perfects many different things, i.e. all the virtues. Therefore it is not one thing.
() The same disposition cannot exist in different subjects. But charity is found in different subjects: for we are told to love God with all our mind, all our soul, all our heart, and all our strength. Therefore charity is not a single virtue.
() Virtue is ordered towards removing sins. But charity is sufficient to remove all sins, since a tiny amount of charity can resist any temptation.
Therefore charity does the job of all the virtues. Therefore it does not seem to be a particular virtue.
() Each particular virtue has a particular sin opposed to it. But all sins are contrary to charity, since any mortal sin destroys it. Therefore charity is not a particular virtue.
() Virtues are needed only for acting rightly. But charity alone is sufficient to make us act rightly; as Augustine says [TEpJn .], 'Have charity and do whatever you wish.' Therefore there is no other virtue except charity. Consequently, charity is not a particular virtue distinct from others.
() The dispositions of the virtues are needed for someone to act readily and with pleasure. For no one is just who fails to take pleasure in doing things in a just way, as Aristotle says [NE .., a]. But charity is sufficient for doing everything readily and with pleasure, since,
Article as Augustine says [Serm .], 'Everything that is harsh and daunting, love makes easy and practically nothing.' Therefore no other virtue is needed besides charity.
() Things that can be distinguished from one another come into being and disappear separately. But charity and the other virtues do not come into being or disappear separately, because the other virtues are both infused and destroyed in us together with charity. Therefore charity is not a particular virtue.
But on the other hand St Paul in Corinthians :separates charity from other virtues, saying,
'Now, though, faith, hope, and charity remain, these three.'
My reply Charity is a particular virtue, distinct from other virtues. To show this, we need to reflect that whenever an act depends on several principles which are interrelated in a certain order, for the act to be perfect requires every element of those principles to be so also. The act will be imperfect if there is any imperfection in the first or last of the principles, or in any intermediate ones. Similarly, whether a craftsman lacks experience of his skill, or whether there is something wrong with his tools, either way his work will be imperfect.
(i) We need to think about this point also in relation to the capacities of the soul. If the reason, which moves the lower powers, is in good order, but the sensual desire is out of kilter, someone will act in accordance with reason, but his action will be imperfect. This is because it will be hindered by the sensual desire pulling in the opposite direction. This is clear from the case of self-control.That is why, in order to behave as we should with regard to sensual pleasures, we need not only practical wisdom, which brings reason to perfection, but also temperateness, if we are to act readily and without hindrance.
(ii) Then we need to consider the same point in relation not only to different capacities, where one moves another, but also to different
The self-controlled person (continens) acts in accordance with reason but must overcome some contrary desire in order to do so. In someone who has the virtue of temperateness, by contrast, desire has been brought under the guidance of reason, so there is no contrary desire to be overcome.
On Charity objects, where one is ordered towards another as its end. For one and the same capacity, insofar as it is concerned with that end, not only moves other capacities, but also moves itself to whatever contributes towards the end. That is why in order to do things rightly, we need to be well disposed not only towards the end, but also towards the things that contribute to the end. If not, we will be hindered in what we do. This is clear in the example of someone who is well disposed towards desiring health, but poorly disposed to take the measures needed to become healthy.
In this way, it is clear that those who are disposed through charity to have the right attitude towards the ultimate end, also need to possess other virtues in order to be properly disposed towards whatever contributes towards the end. Therefore charity is different from the virtues that are ordered towards what contributes to the end. Yet the virtue that is ordered towards the end is preeminent and architectonic {cf. NE .., a} in relation to those that are ordered towards the things that contribute to the end: compare medicine in relation to pharmacy or soldiering in relation to horsemanship. Therefore it is clear that charity needs to be a particular virtue distinct from the other virtues, but in relation to them their principle and moving cause.
Replies to objections () The definition refers to the cause, insofar as charity is the moving cause of all the other virtues.
()Inlovinganeighbour,charityhasGodastheobjectformallydefined, and not only as its ultimate end, as is clear from what I have already said.
However, the other virtues have God not as their object formally defined, but as their ultimate end. That is why, when charity is said to love a neighbour because of God, the 'because of' refers not only to the final cause but also, in one sense, to the formal cause. However, when we say about the other virtues that we exercise them because of God, the 'because of' refers only to the final cause.
() Charity does not bring about the acts of the other virtues by drawing them out, but only by commanding them. For a virtue only draws out those acts that are done by reason of its own form, for example, with justice acting correctly, or with temperateness acting temperately. But a
Article virtue is said to 'command' all those actions that it summons towards its own end.
()Itisnotthecommongoodthatistheobjectofcharity,butthehighest good. That is why it does not follow that charity is a general virtue, but is rather the highest of the virtues.
() Charity perfects the other virtues as something not intrinsic, but rather extrinsic, to them, as I said above. Therefore the argument does not follow.
() The only capacity that possesses charity is the will. But the will moves the other capacities by commanding them. That is why we are told to love God with our whole mind and heart, so that all our powers may be summoned to obey God's love.
() Just as charity commands the actions of the other virtues, so, by giving commands, it excludes the sins opposed to them. In this way, charity resists temptations. But we still need the other virtues, because they exclude sins directly and by drawing out their opposite.
() Just as the acts of the other virtues are ordered towards the end which is the object of charity, so the sins that are contrary to the other virtues oppose the end that is the object of charity. That is why the things that are contrary to the other virtues, i.e. sins, also drive out charity.
() It is true that charity is capable, by giving commands, of governing us in all areas of a life lived rightly; but in order for us to act readily and withouthindrance,westillneedothervirtuesthatcarryoutthecommands of charity, by drawing out actions.
() Something that is difficult and distressing in itself is indeed sometimes done for the sake of a further end: someone may, for example, willingly swallow a bitter medicine for the sake of health, even though he finds actually drinking it very unpleasant. Charity, then, makes everything pleasurable from the point of view of its end. However, it needs the other virtues in order to render virtuous activities pleasurable in themselves, so that we can act more easily.
() Charity comes into being together with the other virtues not because it is not distinct from them, but because God's deeds are perfect. Therefore when he infuses charity into us, at the same time he also infuses into us everything that is needed for salvation. Charity disappears at the same time as the other virtues because the same things are contrary to both charity and to the other virtues, as I have said.