On the Virtues in General: Article 10: Whether some virtues are infused into us
On the Virtues in General (ii) according to the tendency of his sensory part. In this sense, one can be so described according to the natural temperament of one's body, or the influence of one of the heavenly bodies. However, because this part naturally obeys reason, the tendency that is in this part is also subject to human reasoning, and it is therefore capable of being diminished or completely removed through habitual activity.
From this the reply to objection () is clear. For on account of the tendency that is in their sensitive part, some people are said to possess a natural inclination to some vice or some virtue.
Article : Whether some virtues are infused into us Objections It seems not, because:
() Aristotle says [Phys ., a], 'Each thing is complete when it attains its own distinctive virtue.' The distinctive virtue of something, though, is what naturally completes it. Therefore our natural virtue is enoughtocompleteusashumanbeings,andnaturalprinciplesareenough to bring this into being. Therefore infused virtues are not needed to complete us as human beings.
() Rejoinder: human beings need virtue in order to be complete in the way that they are ordered not only towards their natural end, but also towards their supernatural end. That is the blessedness of eternal life, and it is through the infused virtues that we are ordered towards this. But on the other hand nature does not lack what is necessary. If we need something to achieve our ultimate end, then that is necessary to us. Therefore we can achieve this through natural principles; therefore we do not need infused virtues for this.
()Aseedactsbythepoweroftheorganismthatproducedit.Otherwise, just by its own action, the seed of an animal, since it is undeveloped, could not grow into a developed instance of its species. The seeds of the virtues, though, were put into us by God. For the gloss says on Hebrews :,
'Since he is the splendour of glory', 'God sowed in every soul the seeds of intelligence and wisdom.' Since, then, an acquired virtue is brought into being from seeds of this sort, it seems that acquired virtue is able to lead us to the enjoyment of God, which is what constitutes the blessedness of eternal life.
Article () Virtue orders human beings towards the blessedness of eternal life insofar as it consists of meritorious activity. But the activity of acquired virtues can merit eternal life if it is informed by grace. Therefore we do not need to possess the infused virtues to achieve the blessedness of eternal life.
() Charity is the root of merit. Therefore if we needed to possess infused virtues to deserve eternal life, it seems that charity alone would be enough. For this reason we do not need to possess any other infused virtues.
() Moral virtues are necessary for the lower powers to be subordinated to reason. This is achieved adequately by the acquired virtues. Therefore no infused moral virtues are needed. To order reason towards an end proper to us, it is enough for human reason that it is directed towards its supernatural end. That, though, is adequately achieved through faith.
Therefore we do not need the other infused virtues.
() Something that happens by divine power does not differ in type from something that happens through the activity of nature. For example, health that is miraculously restored is of the same type as health that is brought about naturally. If, then, there were some, infused, virtues which were in us from God, and other virtues that we acquired through our own activity, the two would not for this reason differ in type: take, for example, acquired temperateness and infused temperateness. But two forms of a single type cannot exist at the same time in the same subject.
Therefore the same person cannot possibly possess both acquired and infused temperateness.
()(i)Werecognisethetypeofacapacityorofavirtuefromitsactivities.
(ii) But acquired and infused temperateness carry out activities of the same type.
(iii) Therefore they themselves are of the same type. To prove the minor premise (i.e. (ii)): when two things agree in both matter and form, they are of the same type. But the activities of acquired and infused temperateness agree in their matter, for they both deal with things that are pleasurable to touch. They also agree in form, because they both consist in a mid-point. Therefore the activities of infused and of acquired temperateness are of the same type.
The text is problematic. The translation modifies it slightly to make better sense of the argument.
On the Virtues in General () Rejoinder: they differ in type because they are ordered towards different ends; for in moral matters the type depends upon the end. But on the other hand things can indeed differ in type according to whatever their type depends upon. Now in moral matters the type depends upon not the ultimate, but the proximate end. Otherwise, all the virtues would be of a single type, for they are all ordered towards blessedness as the ultimate end. Therefore we cannot say that in moral matters things are of the same or of different types because of the way they are ordered with respect to the ultimate end. That is why infused temperateness does not differ in type from acquired merely because it orders human beings towards a higher form of blessedness.
() No moral disposition acquires its type from being affected by some other disposition. For it can happen that one moral disposition is affected or governed by dispositions that differ in type. For example, a disposition of intemperateness is affected by a disposition of avarice in the case where someone fornicates in order to be able to steal; or by a disposition of cruelty in the case where someone fornicates in order to kill. Conversely, dispositions that differ in type can be governed by one and the same disposition. For example, one person may fornicate, and another may kill, both in order to steal. Now temperateness and courage, like the rest of the moral virtues, do not have their own actions ordered towards the blessedness of eternal life, except insofar as they are governed by charity, which does have the ultimate end as its object. Therefore they do not take their type from that end. Thus infused moral virtue does not differ in type from acquired virtue merely on the grounds that it is ordered towards eternal life as its end.
() Infused virtue exists as something possessed by the mind: for Augustine says that virtue is 'a good quality of mind, which God works in us without our help'. But the moral virtues are not possessed by the mind: temperateness and courage belong to the non-rational parts, as Aristotle says [NE .., a]. Therefore the moral virtues are not infused.
() Contraries share a single character. But vice, which is contrary to virtue, is never infused, but is brought about only through our actions.
Therefore virtues cannot be infused either, but are all brought about through our actions.
() Before someone acquires any virtue, he possesses a capacity for the virtues. However, a capacity and its actualisation belong to the same
Article class: for every class is divided into capacity and actualisation, as Aristotle makes clear [Phys ., a; {cf. Met ., b}]. Since, therefore, the capacity for virtue does not come from being infused, it seems that neither can virtue itself come from this.
() If the virtues are infused, they should all be infused at the same time as grace. Grace, though, is infused into someone who is in a state of sin by an act of repentance; the dispositions of the moral virtues are not, however, infused in him at that same time. For even after repenting, we are still troubled by the emotions; this is the experience of someone who is self-controlled, but not of someone who is virtuous. For the self-controlled person differs from the temperate one in that the former experiences inappropriate emotions but is not led astray by them, while the temperate person does not even experience them, as Aristotle explains
[NE .., a]. Therefore it seems that the virtues are not infused in us by grace.
() Aristotle says [NE .., b] that when someone begins to take pleasure in what he does, we should take this as a sign that he has acquired the relevant disposition. However, we do not immediately after repenting begin to take pleasure in behaving in a way appropriate to the moral virtues. Therefore we do not yet possess the dispositions of those virtues.
Therefore the moral virtues are not brought into being in us through the infusion of grace.
() Take those who have acquired some vicious disposition from performing a number of bad actions. It is clear that their sins are forgiven and grace infused in them through a single act of repentance. However, an acquired disposition cannot be wiped out by a single action, just as it cannot be generated by a single action. Since, then, the moral virtues are infused along with grace, it would follow that a morally virtuous disposition would coexist with the disposition that is its opposing vice; but that is impossible.
() Virtue is generated and destroyed by the same thing, as Aristotle says [NE .., b]. If, then, virtue is not brought into being in us through our actions, it seems to follow that it is not destroyed through our actions either. From this, it follows that someone who commits mortal sin does not lose virtue; but that is wrong.
()Mores{Latin:mos}andhabitsseemtobethesamething.Therefore moral virtue and habitual virtue are the same thing. But habitual virtue gets its name from habit, because it is brought about through repeatedly
On the Virtues in General doing something well. Therefore all moral virtue is brought about through actions, and therefore not by the infusion of grace.
() If some virtues are infused, the activity that depends upon them must be more effective than the activity of someone without virtue. But the activity of someone without virtue is what brings about a virtuous disposition in him. Therefore the activity of the infused virtues, if they exist,willhavethesameeffect.ButAristotlesays[NE..,a;.., b; .., b; .., b; .., b] that dispositions lead to activity that is of the same kind; again, activity causes dispositions that are of the same kind. Therefore dispositions that are brought about through the activities of an infused virtue must be of the same type as that infused virtue. It follows that two forms of the same type will exist in the same subject at the same time. But that is impossible. Therefore it seems impossible for there to be any infused virtues in us.
But on the other hand () Luke :says, 'Remain here in the city until you are clothed with virtue from on high.'
() Wisdom :says of divine Wisdom that it 'teaches soberness and justice', and so on. The spirit of Wisdom, though, teaches virtue by bringingitintobeing.Thereforeitseemsthatthemoralvirtuesareinfused in us by God.
() The activities of any virtues at all ought to be meritorious in such a way that we are led by them to blessedness. But there can be no merit except through grace. Therefore it seems that the virtues are brought about in us through the infusion of grace.
My reply As well as the virtues that we acquire by our actions, which I have already discussed, we need to posit other virtues that are infused in us by God.
We can accept as the reason for this the fact that virtue, as Aristotle says [NE..,a],issomethingthatmakesitspossessorgood,andmakes whatever he does good. Therefore since human beings have different sorts of good, they also need different sorts of virtues. For example, it is clear thatahumanbeinghasonegoodquahumanbeingandanotherquacitizen.
It is clear that some activities can be appropriate for a human being qua
Article human being, but not qua citizen. That is why Aristotle says [Pol ., b] that the virtue that makes someone a good person is different from the virtue that makes him a good citizen.
We must note that the human good is twofold: (i) what corresponds with our own nature; (ii) what exceeds the abilities of our own nature. The reason for this is that something that is acted upon is made complete by the agent in question in different ways that correspond with the different powers of the agent. That is why we see that when a natural agent acts on something, it completes it and gives it form in a way that does not exceed its natural abilities. For a natural active power corresponds to a natural passive capacity {cf. (i)}. However, a supernatural agent, whose power is infinite, that is to say, God, completes something and gives it form in a way that does exceed the abilities of its nature {cf. (ii)}. That is why the rational soul, which is brought into being directly by God, exceeds the limits of its matter, that is to say, the material body cannot wholly contain and enclose it: there remains a certain power and activity in it that the material body does not share. This is not true for any of the other forms, which are brought about through natural agents.
Just as human beings acquire the first thing that completes them, i.e. the soul, from the action of God, so they also acquire the last thing that completes them, that is complete human happiness, directly from God, and they rest in him. This is clear from the fact that the natural longing of a human being cannot rest in anything else except in God alone.
For human beings have an innate longing that moves them from the things that have been brought into being to seeking their cause. Therefore this longing will not rest until it reaches the first cause, which is
God.
Itisappropriate,then,thatjustasthefirstthingthatcompletesahuman being, which is the rational soul, exceeds the abilities of the material body, so the last state of completeness that human beings can attain, which is the blessedness of eternal life, should exceed the abilities of human nature as a whole. Now, each thing is ordered to its end by what it does, and the things that contribute to the end ought to correspond in some way to that end.
Consequently, it is necessary for there to be some sorts of completeness in us that exceed the abilities of the principles natural to us and that order us towards our supernatural end. This could only be the case if God infused in human beings certain supernatural principles of activity on top of the natural ones.
On the Virtues in General Now our natural principles of activity are the essence of the soul and its capacities, i.e. the intelligence and will, which are the principles of human activities qua human. They could not be this unless the intelligence also possessed an awareness of the principles through which it is directed in natural activities, and unless the will also possessed a natural inclination to the good that corresponded to its own nature, as I discussed in a previous question.
On the other hand, to enable us to carry out activities that are ordered towards the end of eternal life, the following are divinely infused in us: first (i') grace, through which the soul acquires a certain spiritual way of being; then (ii') faith, hope and charity. Thus by faith, the intelligence may be enlightened concerning the knowledge of supernatural matters, which function at that level just as naturally known principles do at the level of our natural activities. By hope and charity, the will acquires a certain inclination towards that supernatural good; the human will just by its own natural inclination is not sufficiently ordered towards this.
Insum:weneednotonlythenaturalprinciples,butalsothedispositions of the virtues, in order to be completed as human beings in the way that is natural to us, as I said above. Similarly, then, we have poured into us by God not only the supernatural principles just mentioned, but also certain infused virtues, through which we can be completed for doing whatever is ordered to the goal of eternal life.
Replies to objections () Human beings are completed in respect of the first thing that completes them {i.e. their soul} in two ways: (ia) in being nourished and having sense-perception. To be complete in these areas does not exceed the abilities of the natural body; (ib) in being intelligent. To be complete in this does go beyond their natural and bodily parts. Through (ia) we are completed in a relative sense, through (ib) in an absolute sense. Similarly, we may be completed in two ways with respect to the completeness of our end:(iia)accordingtotheabilitiesofourownnature,and(iib)accordingto a supernatural completeness. Through (iia) we become complete in a relative sense; through (iib) in an absolute sense. That is why human beings can possess two types of virtue: one (iiia) relates to the first kind of completeness, and this is not complete virtue; the second (iiib) relates to the second kind of completeness, and this is true and complete human virtue.
Article () Where nature provides what is necessary for us, it does so in accordance with its own power. That is why in respect of those things that do not exceed the abilities of our nature, we receive from nature not only receptive principles, but also active ones. In respect of those things that exceed the abilities of nature, we receive from our nature the fact that we are suited for receiving them.
() The seed of a human being is active with all the power possible for a human being. However, the seeds of virtue that are naturally placed in the human soul do not act with all the power possible for God. That is why it does not follow that they are able to cause anything that God is able to cause.
() Since we can merit nothing without charity, the actions of an acquired virtue cannot have merit without charity. However, the other virtues are infused in us together with charity; that is how the actions of an acquired virtue can be meritorious only by means of an infused virtue. For a virtue that is ordered towards a lower end can only bring about actions that are ordered to a higher end if this is done by means of a higher virtue. For example, the courage that is a virtue of a human being qua human being does not order its actions to the civic good except by means of that courage that is the virtue of a human being qua citizen.
() When an action is produced by several different agents that are ordered towards each other, it is possible that something that hampers one of these agents will spoil the perfection and goodness of the action as a whole, even if another of the agents is perfect. For however perfect a craftsman, he will not do his work perfectly if his tools are flawed.
Inthecaseofthosehumanactivitiesthatneedtobegiventheirgoodness by virtue, we need to consider that what is done by a higher capacity does not depend on a lower capacity, but vice versa. That is why perfecting the actions of the lower, i.e. the aggressive and sensual, powers, needs the intelligence, through faith, and the will, through charity, both to be ordered to the ultimate end; it also needs the lower, i.e. the aggressive and sensual, powers to carry out their own activities in such a way that their actions are good and can be ordered to the ultimate end.
From this the answer to objection () is also clear.
() Wherever nature produces a form, God is able to produce one of the same type by himself, without nature's doing anything. Thus, when
God miraculously makes someone better, the resulting health is of the same type as the health that nature produces. It does not follow from this
On the Virtues in General that nature can produce every form that God can produce. That is why infused virtue, which comes directly from God, does not need to be of the same type as acquired virtue.
() Infused and acquired temperateness agree in their matter, for they both deal with things that are pleasurable to touch. They do not, however, agree in the form of their effects or actions. For although they both seek the mid-point, each, however, looks for that mid-point by different reasoning. Infused temperateness looks for the mid-point that accords with the reasons of God's law, which we take as ordered towards the final end.
Acquired temperateness, however, takes a mid-point according to lesser reasons, ordered towards the good of this present life.
() The ultimate end does not determine the type in moral matters except insofar as the proximate end corresponds duly to the ultimate end. For whatever contributes to an end ought also to correspond to it.
Good counsel also requires someone to achieve the end by a means that is suitable, as Aristotle says [Top ., a; NE .., b].
() The actions of any disposition, qua being governed by another disposition, receive their moral type, formally speaking, from the disposition itself. Thus when someone fornicates in order to steal, although thisactionbelongsasregardsmaterialtointemperateness,asregardsform it belongs to avarice. But although the intemperate action takes its type
{i.e. is avaricious} from being governed by avarice, this does not mean that intemperateness itself should take its type from the fact that its action has been governed by avarice. Therefore when the actions of temperateness or of courage are governed by charity, which orders them to their final end, the actions take their type, as regards form, from that; for formally speaking they are actions of charity. It would not follow from this, however, that temperateness or courage themselves should take their type from that.
Consequently, infused temperateness and courage do not differ in type from acquired temperateness and courage just in the fact that their actions are governed by charity. The difference, rather, is that reason determines the mid-point for their actions in a way that can order them towards the ultimate end, which is the object of charity.
() Infused temperateness is found in the sensual part, just as infused courage is found in the aggressive part. However, the aggressive and sensual parts are called 'rational' insofar as they share in reason in some way, by obeying it. Similarly, they are called 'mental' insofar as they obey
Article the mind. That is the sense in which Augustine's words are true, that infused virtue is a good quality of mind.
() Human vices drag us down to lower things; human virtue raises us up to higher things. That is why virtue alone, and not vice, can exist by infusion.
() Something that is acted upon is apt by nature to be developed in differentwayswhendifferentagentsaffectit.Then,thedifferenceswithin and the ordering of the passive capacities in that thing will correspond to the differences within and the ordering of the active capacities in the agents; for the active capacity responds to the passive one. For example, it is clear that water and earth have one natural capacity to be changed by fire, and another to be changed by the heavenly bodies, and a third to be changed by God. For something can be made out of water or earth by the power of the heavenly bodies in a way that cannot happen by the power of fire. Similarly, something can be made out of them by the power of God in a way that cannot happen by the power of any natural agent. For this reason we say that the whole of creation has some capacity to obey, insofar as every creature obeys God, to the extent of receiving in itself whatever
God wills.
Consequently, there exist within the soul: (i) capacities which are apt by nature to be actualised by another natural agent. This is how the capacities for the acquired virtues exist in the soul; (ii) capacities which are apt by nature to be actualised only through divine power. This is how the capacities for the infused virtues exist in the soul.
() Those emotions that incline us towards evil are not completely removed either through acquired or through infused virtue, except, maybe, by a miracle. For the struggle of the flesh against the spirit always remains, even when we possess moral virtue. St Paul says about this in Galatians :, 'The flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh.' But emotions of this sort are modified both by acquired and by infused virtues, so that we are not stirred by them in an unrestrained way.
However, (i) acquired virtue achieves this in one way and (ii) infused virtue in another. (i) For acquired virtue is effective to the extent that the struggle is felt less. This comes about from its own particular cause: when someone becomes accustomed to virtue through repeated actions, they then become unaccustomed to obey those emotions, and accustomed to resist them. The consequence of this is that they feel less troubled by them. (ii) Infused virtue, by contrast, is effective to the extent that even if
On the Virtues in General emotions of this sort are felt, they do not take control. For infused virtue means that we refrain totally from obeying sinful desires, and as long as it remains in us, we do so unfailingly. (Acquired virtue can fail in this way, but rarely, in the way that all natural inclinations occasionally let us down.) That is why St Paul says in Romans :–, 'When we were in the flesh, the sinful emotions which arose through the Law acted in our limbs to produce fruit for death. Now, however, we are freed from the law of death that held us, so that we may serve in the new life of the spirit, and not in the old life of the letter.'
() Since infused virtue does not always remove the experience of the emotions straight away in the way that acquired virtue does, it does not in the same way give pleasure straight away. However, this is not inconsistent with the character of virtue, because sometimes it is enough for virtue that it does what it does without regret, and unnecessary for it to take pleasure in doing what it does, when this feels burdensome. Similarly, Aristotle says [NE .., a; .., b] that it is enough for bravery if someone acts without regret.
() It is true that a single, simple, action is not enough to destroy an acquired disposition. However, an act of repentance is, by virtue of grace, able to destroy a vicious disposition that has been generated. That is why, if someone has the disposition of intemperateness, when he repents it no longer remains there alongside the infused virtue of temperateness in the character of a disposition. Rather, it is already in the process of being destroyed, and has become instead a sort of tendency. However, a tendency is not the contrary of a full-blown disposition.
() Although infused virtue is not brought about through our actions, our actions can still dispose us to it. That is why it is not inappropriate for it to be destroyed by our actions. This is because form is removed when the matter is inappropriately disposed, just as the soul separates from the body when the body is inappropriately disposed.
() 'Moral' virtue gets its name from 'mores' as referring not to habit, but to the inclination of the power of desire. In this sense, the infused virtues too might be called 'moral', although they are not caused by habit.
() The activities of infused virtues do not bring about any disposition, but strengthen a pre-existing disposition. Indeed not even the actions of an acquired virtue actually generate a further disposition; otherwise, our dispositions would be multiplied indefinitely.