On Charity: Article 3: Whether charity is the form of the virtues
Article clear from Galatians :, 'The fruit of the Spirit is charity and joy, peace and endurance.'
()Theobjectatwhichcharityaims,i.e.God,transcendseveryhuman ability. That is why, however much the human will tries to love God, it will never succeed in loving him as he ought to be loved. As a result, we say that charity has no limit, because there is no fixed limit to the love of God, to overstep which would be against the character of virtue (as does happen with the moral virtues, which lie in a mid-point). Indeed, the measure of charity just is to have no measure, in this sense. Therefore we cannot conclude that charity is not a virtue, but rather that, unlike the moral virtues, it does not consist in a mid-point.
() Charity is called 'patient and kind', as if using other virtues to describe it because it brings about the acts performed by the virtues.
() Charity is not a virtue of human beings qua human beings, but insofar as, by sharing in grace, they become gods and the children of God, in keeping with John :, 'You see what charity the Father has bestowed on us, so that we are called, and have become, the children of God.'
() The love of the highest good, insofar as it is a principle of our natural existence, is in us by nature. But, insofar as the highest good is the object enjoyed by a blessedness that surpasses all the abilities of our created nature, it is not in us by nature, but over and above our nature.
()Thegiftscompletethevirtuesbyliftingthembeyondhumanlimits; so, for example, the gift of intelligence does this to the virtue of faith, and the gift of fear to the virtue of temperateness (when someone refrains to a degree that surpasses human limits from whatever gives pleasure). But with regard to the love of God there is no shortfall that needs any gift to complete it. That is why love is not counted as a gift, but a virtue; however, it is a virtue that surpasses all the gifts.
Article : Whether charity is the form of the virtues Objections It seems not, because:
() A form gives the thing to which it belongs its being and its type.
But charity does not give to each virtue its being and its type. Therefore charity is not the form of the other virtues.
On Charity () There is no form of a form. But all the virtues are forms, for they perfect things. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.
() A form is included in the definition of the thing to which it belongs.
But charity is not included in the definition of the virtues. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.
() Things that are distinguished by being opposed are not related in such a way that one is the form of another. But charity is divided from the other virtues by being opposed to them, as is clear from Corinthians
:, 'Now, though, there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three.'
Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.
() Rejoinder: charity is the form of the virtues, not as intrinsic to them, but as their exemplar. On the other hand an exemplar bestows its type on its copies. If charity were the form of the virtues as their exemplar, it would bestow on all the virtues their type. But then all the virtues would be the same in type, which is false.
() A form in the sense of exemplar is the basis of something else's coming into being. It is only needed, then, when a thing comes into being.
Therefore if charity is the exemplary form of the virtues, it will only be needed for producing the virtues; when we already have them, we will no longer need charity. That is clearly false.
() Someone making something needs an exemplar, but not someone using something that is already made. For example, we need an exemplar for transcribing a book, but not for using a book that is already written out.
Therefore if charity is the form of the virtues as an exemplar, it should belong not to us, who use the virtues, but rather to God, who makes the virtues in us.
() You can have an exemplar without any copies of it. If charity were the exemplary form of the virtues, then, it would follow that it could exist without any of the other virtues, which is false.
() Every virtue takes its form from its end and its object. Something that is formed through itself does not need to be given form by something else. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.
() Nature always makes what is better; how much more, then, does God? But it is better for something to be with form than without it. Since, then,Godmakesthevirtuesinus,itseemsthathemustmakethemalready formed. Therefore they do not need to be given form by charity.
() Faith is a certain spiritual light. But light is the form of things that are seen by that light. Therefore just as physical light is the form of
Article colours, so faith is the form of charity and of the other virtues. Therefore this is not charity.
() The order of things that perfect follows the order of the things that are perfected. But the virtues perfect the capacities of the soul. Therefore the order of virtues follows the order of the capacities. But among the capacities of the soul, the intelligence is higher even than the will.
Therefore faith is higher than charity; in this way, faith is more a form of charity than vice versa.
() The moral virtues are related to one another in the same way as the theological. But practical wisdom, which exists within the power of cognition, gives form to those other virtues that exist within the power of desire, i.e. justice, courage, temperateness, and so on. Therefore so should faith, which is found within our power of cognition, give form to charity, which is found within our power of desire, and not vice versa.
() The form of a virtue is its measure. But it is the job of reason to impose measure on desire, and not vice versa. Therefore faith, which is found in reason, should be the form of charity, which is found in the desiring part, rather than vice versa.
() On Matthew :, 'Abraham begot Isaac and Isaac begot Jacob', the gloss comments that faith begot hope and hope begot charity. But everything that is begotten receives its form from its begetter. Therefore charity receives its form from faith and hope, and not vice versa.
() Within one and the same thing, an actualisation is preceded in time by the related capacity. Therefore if charity is related to the other virtues as their form and actualisation, in one person the other virtues ought to exist before charity does. But that does not happen.
() In moral matters, it is the end which gives the form. But all the virtues are ordered, as their ultimate end, towards the vision of God, which is our complete reward (as Augustine says [Trin ..]), and which follows faith. Therefore all the other virtues receive their form from the end proper to faith. Therefore it seems that faith must be the form of charity rather than vice versa.
() According to Aristotle [Phys ., b], the end, the efficient cause, and the form do not coincide in one and the same thing. But charity is both the end of the virtues and what moves them. Therefore it cannot be their form.
() The form is what gives something its principle of being. But the principle of spiritual existence is grace, according to Corinthians :,
On Charity 'I am what I am by the grace of God.' Therefore the grace of God is the form of the virtues, and not charity.
But on the other hand Ambrosesays[accordingtoSent...],'Charityistheformandmother of the virtues.'
My reply Charity is (i) the form of the virtues, (ii) their moving cause, and (iii) their root.
To prove this we need to know that our actions ought to be judged according to the relevant dispositions. Therefore when something that belongs to one disposition A functions as the formal cause of the actions of another disposition B, then A must be related to B as its form. But in all voluntary action what gives the form is what comes from the end. This is because each action receives its form and type in accordance with the form of the agent, for example, in the case of heating, in accordance with heat. Now the form of the will is its object, which is its good and end (in the way that what is intelligible is the form of the intelligence). Therefore whatever comes from the end ought to give form to the will's actions.
That is why an act of the same type when ordered towards one end may come under the form of a virtue, but when ordered to a different end may come under the form of a vice. The following example makes this clear: you can give alms for the sake of God, or for the sake of conceitedness.
Again, the actions of one vice when they are ordered towards the end of another vice receive the form of the second: so, for example, someone who steals in order to fornicate is materially speaking a thief, but formally speaking intemperate.
It is clear, however, that the acts of all the other virtues are ordered towards the end that is distinctive of charity, which is charity's own object, i.e. the highest good. (a) This is clear with the moral virtues, because they deal with created goods, which are themselves ordered towards the uncreated good as their ultimate end. (b) This is also clear with the other theological virtues. As concerns faith, uncreated being is its object as somethingthatistrue;andthat,quasomethingdesirable,hasthecharacter of a good. In this way, faith directs itself towards its object qua desirable,
Article because no one believes unwillingly. As for hope, its object, though it too is uncreated being, depends qua something good on the object of charity; for the object of hope is a good qua something that can be longed for and attained; and no one longs to pursue a good except because he loves it.
(i) Therefore it is clear that in the case of all the virtues their actions receive their form from charity. To this extent, charity is called the form of the virtues.
(ii) This makes it clear how it is also the end of all the virtues, in that all the actions of all the virtues are ordered towards the highest good as something loved, as I have shown. Since the precepts of the law concern virtuous actions, St Paul says in Timothy :that 'the end of the precept is charity'.
(iii) It is also clear from this how charity is the moving cause of all the virtues, in that it commands the activities of all the other virtues; for every virtue or higher capacity is said to move a lower power by commanding it, in that the actions of the lower are ordered towards the goal of the higher.
For example, the builder gives instructions to the bricklayer, because what is done through the bricklayer's skill is ordered towards the form of the house, and this is the end proper to the skill of the builder. So since all the other virtues are ordered towards the end of charity, charity itself commands the actions of all the virtues, and is therefore called their moving cause.
Because we use the word 'mother' of someone who conceives in herself, we call charity the 'mother' of all the virtues, insofar as it is the end proper to charity that conceives to produce the actions of the other virtues. For the same reason, charity is called the root of all the virtues.
Replies to objections () Although charity does not bestow on each virtue its own distinctive type, it does give each one its general type, i.e. its being a virtue (at least now we are talking of virtue as the principle of deserving reward).
() There is no form of a form in the sense that one form stands as the subject of another. However, nothing prevents several forms coexisting in one subject if they follow a certain order, so that one is the form of another, as colour is the form of surface. In this way, charity can be the form of the other virtues.
On Charity () Charity is included in the definition of a meritorious virtue, as is clearfromAugustine'sdefinition,whichsaysthatvirtueis'agoodquality of mind by which we live rightly'. For living rightly must mean living in such a way that our life is ordered towards God, and charity brings this about.
() This argument is based on the sort of form that is integral to something's constitution. But charity is not called the form of the virtues in that sense, but in another, as I have explained.
() Since charity is the form common to the virtues, it draws the virtues into one common type. However, it does not make them all into one distinctive type in the strict sense (what is called a 'specific type').
() Charity can be described as the exemplary form of the virtues.
However, this does not refer to a likeness in accordance with which they are made, but rather to their acting to some degree in its likeness. That is why, wherever it is necessary for virtuous activity to take place, it is necessary for there to be charity.
() Although creating the virtues belongs only to God, doing things in a virtuous way also belongs to human beings who possess virtue. That is why they need charity.
() Charity is related to virtuous activity not only as its exemplar, but also as the effective power that moves it. There is no effective exemplar without a copy, since the exemplar brings the copy into existence. That is why charity does not exist without the other virtues.
() Each virtue receives the form of its type, which makes it the virtue that it is, from its own distinctive end and object. But it receives a general form from charity, which makes it merit eternal life.
() God makes virtues in us that are formed according to both the form of their type and a common form. The former comes from their object and end, the latter from charity.
() Light is the form of colours insofar as they are actually visible through light. Similarly, faith is the form of the virtues insofar as they are knowable by us; we recognise through faith what is virtuous and what is contrary to virtue. But insofar as the virtues are something practical, they are given their form by charity.
() Intelligence is prior to will simply speaking, because the good as understood is the object of the will. However, the will is prior when it
See DQVirtGen , n. .
Article comes to doing and moving. For the intelligence does not move anything unless the will is present. In this way, the will qua active moves the intelligence, for we make use of our intelligence when we want to. Hence, since believing is something the intelligence does when it is moved by the will
(for we believe something because we are willing to), it follows that charity gives form to faith rather than vice versa.
() An act of the will follows the ordering of its agent towards things as they are in themselves. By contrast, an act of the intelligence follows the fact that the things understood are in the agent. Therefore (i) when things are lower on the scale than the person who understands them, the understanding of them is more valuable than the will to have them. For in thiscase,thesethingsarehigheronthescalewhenfoundintheintelligence than they are in themselves (for anything that exists in something else does so in the manner that that thing exists). However, (ii) when the things in question are higher on the scale than the person understanding them, then the will rises higher than the understanding can reach.
That is why in moral matters, which are lower on the scale than human beings, a cognitive virtue informs the desiring virtues, as practical wisdom does the other virtues. However, with the theological virtues, which concern God, the virtue of the will, i.e. charity, informs the virtue of the intelligence, i.e. faith.
()Thepowerofreasonprovidesalimitforthedesireinthingsthatare lower than us, but not in things that are higher than us, as I have explained.
() Faith precedes hope and hope precedes charity in the order of comingintobeing,inthewaythatwhatisimperfectprecedeswhatisperfect.
But in the order of perfecting, charity precedes faith and hope. That is why it is called their form, as the thing that perfects what is imperfect.
() Charity is not the form of the virtues in the sense of being a part of their essence, so that it must follow in time after the other virtues, or rather after some raw material for the virtues, as with the forms of things that come into being. It is their form in the sense that it gives them form; therefore it ought naturally to exist before the other virtues.
() This very vision, in that it is our end qua something good, is the object of charity.
() An intrinsic form cannot be the end of a thing, although it can be the end of a thing's coming into being. But charity is not an intrinsic form, as I have said. Rather, it forms the other virtues precisely by drawing them to its own end, as is clear from what I have said.