On the Cardinal Virtues: Article 1: Whether there are four cardinal virtues, i.e. practical wisdom, justice, courage, an
On the Cardinal Virtues The first question is whether the cardinal virtues are practical wisdom, justice, courage, and temperateness.
The second is whether the virtues are connected in such a way that if you possess one of them you possess them all.
The third is whether all the virtues within a person are equal.
The fourth is whether when we are in our homeland the cardinal virtues will remain.
Article : Whether there are four cardinal virtues, i.e. practical wisdom, justice, courage, and temperateness
Objections It seems not, because:
() If things are not distinguished from one another, they ought not to be counted up together, since distinctions are what make it possible to have numbers, as John Damascene tells us [OrthF .]. But the virtues in question are not distinguished from one another, since Gregory says
[MorJob ..], 'Practical wisdom is not true unless it is just and temperate and courageous; temperateness is not complete unless it is courageous and just and has practical wisdom; courage is not whole unless it has practical wisdom and is temperate and just; justice is not true unless it has practical wisdom and is courageous and temperate.' Therefore these ought not to be described as four distinct cardinal virtues.
() These virtues seem to be known as 'cardinal' because they are more fundamental than others: hence some people describe as fundamental
On the Cardinal Virtues what others call cardinal, as Gregory makes clear [MorJob ..]. But since an end is more fundamental than whatever contributes to that end, the theological virtues, which have as their object the ultimate end, seem to be more fundamental than the virtues in question here, which concern whatever contributes to that end. Therefore the virtues in question ought not to be called 'cardinal'.
() Things that come from different classes ought not to be included within a single system of ordering. But practical wisdom comes in the class of intellectual virtues, as is clear from Aristotle [NE .., b]. The other three, however, are moral virtues. Therefore it is wrong to count the four virtues in question as cardinal.
() Among the intellectual virtues, wisdom is more fundamental than practical wisdom, as Aristotle proves [NE .., a], because wisdom deals with questions relating to God and practical wisdom with those relating to human beings. Therefore if it were right to include an intellectual virtue among the cardinal virtues, it ought rather to be wisdom, as the more fundamental.
() The other virtues ought to be traced back to the cardinal virtues. But Aristotle distinguishes [NE ..–, bff.] several other virtues on a par with courage and temperateness, e.g. liberality and magnanimity, withouttracingthembacktotheformer.Thereforethevirtuesinquestion are not cardinal virtues.
() Something that is not a virtue ought not to be included in the cardinal virtues. But temperateness does not seem to be a virtue, because you can possess the other virtues without having it, as is clear from St Paul, who possessed all the other virtues, but not temperateness. For he still had disordered sensual desire in his limbs, according to Romans :, 'I see another law within my limbs, in conflict with the law in my mind.'
The temperate person differs from the self-controlled in that the former does not have disordered sensual desires, while the latter does have them, but does not obey them, as is clear from Aristotle [NE .., b]. Therefore it is wrong to number the cardinal virtues in question as four.
() One is ordered to one's neighbour through virtue in the same way that one is ordered to oneself. But two virtues are given, i.e. courage and temperateness, which order one to oneself. Therefore there should be two virtues, and not only justice, for ordering one towards one's neighbour.
Article () Augustine says [MorCath .] that virtue is the ordering of love.
Graced love, though, is included under the two precepts about loving God and neighbour. Therefore there should be only two cardinal virtues.
() If matter is varied by extending it, it only makes more things. If it is varied by receiving different forms, then it makes things of different classes. That is why, as Aristotle says [Met ., b], destructible and indestructible things differ in their class. But the virtues in question differ because their respective matter varies in that the way that it receives its form is differently characterised, e.g. with temperateness as restraining the emotions, and with courage as striving towards something when emotion is pulling one away from it. Therefore the virtues in question differ in their class; therefore they should not share a single ordering as cardinal virtues.
() The character of a moral virtue comes from its connection with reason, as is clear from Aristotle [NE .., a], who defines virtue as following right reason. But right reason is a standard that is measured by the first standard, i.e. God, and it takes from there its power of measuring.
Therefore the moral virtues possess the character of a virtue in particular insofar as they touch on the first standard, i.e. God. But the theological virtues, which concern God, are not called cardinal. Therefore neither ought the moral virtues to be called cardinal.
() Reason is the principal part of the soul. But temperateness and courage are not found in the reason, but belong to the non-rational parts of the soul, as Aristotle says [NE .., b]. Therefore they ought not to be classed as cardinal virtues.
() It is more praiseworthy to give of what is yours than to return, or not to take, what is someone else's. But the former is part of liberality, the latter part of justice. Therefore liberality rather than justice ought to be counted as the cardinal virtue.
() If a virtue provides a foundation for the others, then it seems to be more of a cardinal virtue. But humility is of this sort: for Gregory says that someone who piles up the other virtues without humility might as well be carrying straw in a gale. Therefore humility ought to be counted among the cardinal virtues.
()Virtueisasortofperfection,asAristotlesays[Phys.,b].But as James :says, 'Endurance does what is perfect.' Therefore as something perfect, endurance ought to be included among the cardinal virtues.
On the Cardinal Virtues () Aristotle says [NE ..–, bff.] that magnanimity does great things among the virtues, and is a sort of embellishment of the other virtues. But that would seem to be the role of a principal virtue. Therefore magnanimityseemstobeacardinalvirtue.Thereforeitiswrongtonumber the cardinal virtues as four.
But on the other hand Ambrose says [CommLuke .on Luke :, 'Blessed are the poor in spirit']: 'We know that there are four cardinal virtues: temperateness, justice, practical wisdom and courage.'
My reply 'Cardinal' is derived from cardo, a hinge, which allows a door to turn, as Proverbs :puts it: 'Just as a door turns on its hinge, so do the lazy on their beds.' That is why those virtues that are the basis of human life are called 'cardinal', because we enter through the door of human life.
Human life, though, corresponds to human beings. In human beings, the first thing we find is (i) a sensory nature, which is shared with nonrational animals; then (ii) practical reason, which is distinctive of human beings according to their own level; then (iii) the theoretical intelligence, which is not found in human beings in the full way that it is in angels, but only through their participating in something else. That is why the life of contemplation is not, strictly speaking, human, but above what is human. The life of sensual pleasure, though, which clings to the things we perceive through the senses, is not human, but suited to animals {cf. (i)}.
Therefore the life distinctive of humans is the active life, which consists in exercising the moral virtues {cf. (ii)}. That is why the virtues known strictly as cardinal are those on which the whole moral life in a sense turns and is based, as if they are a sort of principle of this life. For that reason, this sort of virtue is also called 'principal'.
We need to consider, though, that there are four elements of the character of a virtuous act, as follows: (i') The substance of the act itself, in the way that it is, in itself, qualified: an act is described as 'good' from this, when it relates to the appropriate matter and is accompanied by the appropriate circumstances. (ii') The fact that the act is related in the appropriate way to the subject, i.e. that it is firmly rooted in the subject.
Article (iii') The fact that the act corresponds in the appropriate way to something external, as to its end. These three elements are aspects of the act that is being directed by reason. (iv') The fourth is awareness, which is an aspect of the reason that is doing the directing.
Aristotle touches on these four when he says [NE .., a] that it is not enough for virtue to do something justly or temperately, which refer to how the act is qualified (i'). The other three elements are also needed on the part of the person doing the thing. Firstly, they need to know what they are doing (iv'), which relates to the awareness which directs the action. Then they need to choose, and to choose on account of something, i.e. the appropriate end (iii'). This is what makes the act right in the way that it is ordered to something external. Finally, (ii') they need to be firm and unshakeable and to act in the same way.
These four elements, then, i.e. awareness that directs (iv'), correctness (iii'), steadiness (ii') and being properly qualified (i') are needed for every virtuous action, though each one of them may have a kind of priority when particular types of matter or action are in question.
Three things are required from the point of view of practical awareness (iv'). The first (a) is counsel, and the second (b) judgement about what has been proposed by counsel. (In the same way, in the area of theoretical reason, we find 'discovery' or 'inquiry' and 'judgement'.) But because practical intelligence tells us to pursue or avoid things (which theoretical reason does not), as Aristotle says [Soul ., b], it is, thirdly, the role of practical reason (c) to tell us what to do. The other two elements are ordered primarily towards this.
The virtue of thoughtfulness, i.e. taking counsel well, perfects someone inrespectofthefirstelement(a);synesisandgnomeperfecttheminrespect of the second (b), by making one good at judging, as Aristotle says [NE
.., a]. It is, though, the virtue of practical wisdom that makes our reason good at telling us what to do {cf. (c)}, as Aristotle explains in the same place. Therefore it is clear that practical wisdom has the chief role within the awareness that gives us direction. That is why it is counted as the cardinal virtue within this area.
Similarly, the correctness (iii') of an act in relation to something external has the character of something good and praiseworthy even in those things
For the three elements of practical reasoning, see the Introduction, p. xx.
Thesearetechnicalterms,whichAquinasleavesinGreek.Foranexplanation,seetheIntroduction, p. xx.
On the Cardinal Virtues that relate to oneself.But it is particularly praised in cases that concern someone else, when one makes what one does right not only in matters that concern oneself, but also in things that one shares with others. For Aristotle says [NE .., b] that many people are able to exercise virtue in what belongs to them, when they do not manage this in what concerns other people. That is why justice is classed as the principal virtue in this area; for it allows us to become properly adapted in a fair way to other people who are there for us to share with. That is why things that are adapted in the appropriate way are called in common speech 'just'.
Moderation or restraint (i') is praised and has the character of goodness especially when emotion is particularly forceful and reason needs to restrain it in order to meet the mid-point of virtue. Emotion, though, is most forceful in pursuing the greatest pleasures, which are those of touch. That is why temperateness counts as the cardinal virtue in this area, as it holds in check sensual desires for what is pleasurable to the senses involving touch.
Firmness (ii') is praised and has the character of goodness especially in cases where emotion most pushes us to flee. This happens above all in very great dangers, where there is a risk of death. That is why courage counts as the cardinal virtue in this area; for it holds us steadfastly to the good of persevering while there is risk of death.
Of these four virtues, practical wisdom is found in the reason, justice in the will, courage in the aggressive part, and temperateness in the sensual desire. These four capacities alone can act as principles of human, i.e. voluntary, activity.
From all this, it becomes clear that the character of the cardinal virtues comes partly from the way in which they are virtues, i.e their formal character, and partly from their domain, and partly from the capacity which possesses them.
Replies to objections () People speak in two different ways about the four cardinal virtues in question. (i) Some use the four names in question to signify general
The text reads ad unum secundum se ipsum. It is not clear exactly what it means, or ought to read, although Aquinas clearly intends a contrast between self-directed and other-directed actions.
Perhaps unum is a mistake for hominem or aliquem.
Including taste, which Aquinas regards as an extension of the sense of touch.
Article ways of being a virtue, for example, labelling every sort of awareness that gives direction as 'practical wisdom'; every sort of correctness in making human actions fair as 'justice'; every sort of moderation that restrains the human appetites from temporal goods as 'temperateness'; and every sort of firmness of character that holds us steadily to what is good in the face of attack from any type of evil as 'courage'. Augustine seems to use the names in this way in On the Morals of the Catholic Church [..].
We can interpret the passage from Gregory in this way, to the effect that satisfying one of the relevant criteria is not enough for the true character of a virtue, if the other criteria we have given are not also present. On this interpretation, the four things in question are called four virtues not because they are different types of disposition, pursuing different objects, but in respect of different formal characters.
(ii) Other writers, such as Aristotle in the Ethics, discuss the four virtues in question as particular virtues directed towards their own distinctive domain. In fact, we can also corroborate Gregory's words even when interpreted in this way: because of a sort of abundance, the virtues in question operate in those domains where our four general criteria for virtue are exceptionally commendable. In this sense, then, courage is temperate and temperateness courageous, in that someone who can restrain his appetite from pursuing his sensual desires for pleasure (which are dealt with by temperateness) will be even more capable of restraining the impulse to act rashly in danger. Similarly, someone who can stand firm when at risk of death, will be even more capable of standing firm against the enticements of sensual pleasure. On this interpretation, the quality that primarily belongs to temperateness transfers also to courage and vice versa. The same reasoning holds for the others.
() Human desire comes to rest when it reaches its end. That is why the way in which the theological virtues, which concern our ultimate end, are fundamental is not compared to a hinge, which moves, but rather to a foundation or root, which are both stable and still, as Ephesians :puts it, 'rooted in and founded upon charity'.
() According to Aristotle [NE .., b] practical wisdom is right reason in doing things. The things we do are called moral deeds, as is clear from what he says there. That is how practical wisdom shares its domainwiththemoralvirtues,andisnumberedwiththemforthatreason, even though with respect to its own being and to its possessor, it is an intellectual virtue.
On the Cardinal Virtues () Wisdom does not share its domain with the moral virtues, because it treats not human, but divine, matters. That is why it is not numbered among the moral virtues in such a way as to be called 'cardinal' along with them. Indeed, the character of a 'hinge' is incompatible with contemplation, for the latter is not like a door through which we enter to get somewhere else. Rather, it is moral activity that is the door through which we enter to reach the contemplation in which wisdom engages.
() (i) If the four virtues in question are understood from the point of view of the general criteria of virtues, then all the particular virtues treated by Aristotle in the Ethics can be traced back to these four, as types belonging to a class.
(ii) On the other hand, if they are understood as particular virtues dealing with specific principal domains, the other virtues can be traced back to them as something secondary to something primary. For example, playfulness, which moderates our pleasure in fun, can be traced back to temperateness, which moderates our pleasure in the things we touch.
That is why when Cicero [Inv ..–.] classes the other virtues aspartofthesefour,wecanunderstandthisintwoways:assubjectiveparts, if you interpret the virtues in the first way {cf. (i)}; or as potential parts, if you interpret the virtues in the second way {cf. (ii)}. In this same way the sense-faculty is a potential part of the soul, since it does not mark out the whole of the soul's power, but only something belonging to the soul.
() It does not belong to the character of temperateness to remove distorted sensual desire completely; rather the temperate person does not suffer from strong and forceful desires of this sort, in the way that people do who have not practised restraining their sensual desires. Therefore
St Paul did suffer from disordered sensual desires, because of the corruption of fomes,but these were neither strong nor forceful, because he had practised restraining them by chastising his body and making it his servant. That is why he was truly temperate.
()Justice,whichordersonetowardsanotherperson,doesnotdealwith one'sownemotions,butwithwhateveronedoesthatinvolvessharingwith other people, such as buying and selling and so on. Temperateness and That is, all the particular virtues treated by Aristotle will be species or types of the four general classes of virtue. fomes: literally, kindling or tinder. The word was used to describe the proneness of fallen human beings to sin. Metaphorically, the idea is that it takes only a small spark of temptation to ignite full-blown sin.
Article courage,though,dealwithone'sownemotions.Thatiswhy,justashuman beings have one power of desire unrelated to the emotions, i.e. the will, and two involved with the emotions, i.e. sensory desire and aggression, so they have one cardinal virtue that orders them to their neighbour and two that order them towards themselves.
() Every virtue can be described as 'charity' not because every virtue consistsessentiallyincharity,butbecauseeveryvirtueiscausedbycharity, since charity is the mother of the virtues. However, there are always more effects than there are causes. That is why there ought to be more kinds of other virtues than there are of charity.
() The characterisation of the way that something is received can differ either (i) from the point of view of the matter, which is able to receive form; that sort of difference makes a difference in class; or (ii) from the point of view of the form, which can potentially be received by the matter in different ways; that sort of difference makes a difference in type. The second type of difference is at issue here.
() The moral virtues relate to reason as their proximate standard, but to God as their primary standard. Things receive their type from their proximate standard, not from their primary principles.
() The principal part of a human being is the rational part. But something can be rational either (i) in its own being or (ii) through participating in something else. That is why practical wisdom is more fundamental than the other virtues, just as reason is more fundamental than the powers that participate in reason.
() The cardinal virtues are described as more fundamental than the others not because they are more perfect than all the others, but because humanlifeturnsontheminamorefundamentalway,andtheothervirtues are then founded on them. It is clear, though, that human life turns more on justice than on liberality, for we exercise justice in relation to everyone, but liberality only to a few people. Furthermore, liberality itself is based on justice, because a gift would not be a liberal one if you were not giving what was your own; it is justice, though, that allows you to distinguish what is yours from what belongs to someone else.
() Humility supports all the virtues indirectly by removing the things that lie in wait for, to destroy, whatever good the virtues do. However, the cardinal virtues support the other virtues directly.
() Endurance is included within courage, as courageous people possess the essence of endurance, which is not to be made anxious by evils that