On Charity: Article 7: Whether the object that is to be loved through charity is a rational nature
On Charity still act without self-control, it is demonstrable that they love what they are doing more than they love God.
() Charity requires not only that we accept in general that God is to be loved above all else, but also that our actual choosing and willing are directed towards this as something that ought in particular to be chosen. But you cannot choose both one particular thing and something incompatible with it, in the way that sin is incompatible with God.
() It is true that in a direct sense one act is contrary to another, in the way that in a direct sense one disposition is contrary to another. However, in an indirect sense one act can also be contrary to a disposition, because it conforms with a disposition contrary to it. This is because dispositions are brought into being through actions akin to them, and they cause acts that are akin to them. This is true even though not all dispositions are caused by actions.
Article : Whether the object that is to be loved through charity is a rational nature Objections It seems not, because:
() When A is x because of B, B is also more x than A.But human beings are loved through charity because of virtue and of blessedness.
Therefore virtue and blessedness, which are not rational creatures, should belovedmoreoutofcharitythanhumanbeings.Thereforeitisnotrational creatures that are the object, in the strict sense, of charity.
() It is through charity that we conform most closely to God in our loving. But God loves everything that exists, as Wisdom :says, through charity, by loving himself, who is charity. Therefore everything ought to be loved through charity, and not only rational natures.
() Origen says [CommSS prol .] that to love God and to love whatever is good is one and the same. But God is loved out of charity. Therefore since all creatures are something good, all of them should be loved out of charity, and not only rational natures.
() It is only the love of charity that is meritorious. But we may gain merit by loving all sorts of things. Therefore we may love all sorts of things out of charity.
Cf. PostAn ., a; DQVirtGen s.c..
Article () God is lovedfrom charity. Therefore whatever he most loves ought to be loved rather out of charity. But among all created things what
God loves most is the good of the universe, which embraces everything.
Therefore all things ought to be loved out of charity.
() Loving is more closely related to charity than believing is. But charity 'believes all things' as Corinthians :says. Therefore far more must it love all things.
() Rational nature is found most fully in God. Therefore if rational nature is the object of charity, we ought to love God out of charity. But this seems impossible, because the love of charity is love in the fullest sense.
But we cannot love God fully in this life, since in this life we do not know God fully; for we do not know what God is, only what he is not. Loving, though, presupposes knowing: for you cannot love something you do not know. Therefore rational or intelligent nature is not the object, in a strict sense, of charity.
() God is further than any creature is from human beings. Therefore if we do not love other creatures out of charity, we are far less able to love
God in this way.
() The angels also possess intelligent natures. But the angels are not to be loved out of charity, it seems. Therefore intelligent natures are not the objects, in a strict sense, of charity.
To prove the middle premise: friendship consists in sharing a life; for it is distinctive of being friends that you live with one another, as Aristotle says [NE .., a]. But we do not seem to share our lives with the angels. For we do not share our natural life with them, as they possess a far finer nature than we do. Nor do we share our glorified life with them, as gifts of grace and glory are given by God according to the virtue of the receiver, as Matthew :says: 'He gave to each one according to his own virtue.' But an angel's virtue is far greater than a human being's. Therefore angels do not share either type of life with us.
() The person who is loving out of charity also possesses a rational nature. But we ought not to love ourselves out of charity, or so it seems.
Therefore the object of charity is not rational nature. diligit (loves) for diligitur (is loved) gives a much simpler argument. As it stands, the argument relies on the thought that we ought to love more from charity those things that are loved more by those whom we love from charity. If we change diligit to diligitur, the argument relies on the thought that we ought to imitate God.
On Charity Toprovethemiddlepremise:therearepreceptsofthelawthatprescribe virtuous actions. But there is no precept of the law that prescribes loving oneself. Therefore to love oneself is not to act with charity.
() Gregory says [HomGosp .], 'You cannot have charity between less than two people.' Therefore one cannot love oneself out of charity.
() Just as justice consists in sharing, so does friendship, according to Aristotle [NE .., ; a–, –]. But strictly speaking one cannot be just towards oneself, as Aristotle also says [NE .., a].
Therefore nor can one be friends with oneself, nor, therefore, have charity towards oneself.
() Nothing that can be counted as a vice is an act of charity. But loving oneself can be counted to one as a vice, according to Timothy :–,
'Dangerous times will afflict us, and there will be people who love themselves.' Therefore loving oneself is not acting with charity. Therefore rational nature is not the object, in a strict sense, of charity.
() The human body is a part of a rational nature, that is, of human nature. But we do not seem to have to love human bodies out of charity, because, as Aristotle says [NE .., b], those who love themselves only in their external nature are blamed for this. Therefore rational nature is not the object of charity.
() No one who possesses charity shuns whatever is loved from charity. But the saints who possess charity shun the body, according to Romans :, 'Who will free me from the body of this death?' The body, then, is not to be loved out of charity. So the same conclusion follows as in the last objection.
() We are not obliged to fulfil obligations when we cannot know if we are doing so. But we are not able to know that we possess charity.
Therefore we are not obliged to love rational creatures out of charity.
() When we say that a rational creature is loved out of charity, the preposition 'out of' picks out some causal relation. But it cannot pick out (i) a material causal relation, because charity is something spiritual rather than material. Nor, again, (ii) a final causal relation, because the end of loving out of charity is God and not charity. Nor, similarly, (iii) an efficient causal relation, because it is the Holy Spirit that moves us to love, according to Romans :, 'The charity of God is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us.' Nor, again,
(iv) a formal causal relation, because charity is not an intrinsic form (since it does not belong to a thing's essence), nor is it an extrinsic, exemplary,
Article formal cause, because then everything that is loved by charity would be assimilated to the type of charity, in the way that copies are assimilated to the type of the original.
Therefore, rational creatures are not to be loved out of charity.
() Augustine says [CT ..] that our neighbour is whoever bestows a kindness on us. But God bestows kindnesses on us. Therefore God is our neighbour. Therefore Augustine's claim that both God and neighbour are to be loved out of charity seems badly expressed.
() Since Christ is the mediator between God and human beings, it seems as though we ought to posit something else that is lovable besides
God and neighbour. In this way, there would be five things that we ought to love out of charity, and not only four, as Augustine says.
But on the other hand The gloss comments on Leviticus :, 'You shall love your neighbour as yourself', as follows, 'Our neighbour does not mean only a blood-relation, but anyone united with us by reason.' Therefore we ought to love things out of charity insofar as they are united with us in possessing rational nature. Therefore rational nature is the object of charity.
My reply When we inquire about things that are dealt with by the activity of a given capacity or disposition, then we need to determine the formal character of the object of that capacity or disposition. For how things are dealt with by that capacity or disposition will be determined by their relation to that formal character. For example, whether things are said to be visible per se or per accidens will be determined by their relation to the formal character of the visible.
Now since the object of love understood generally is the good understood as something common, it is necessary for there to be a particular good as the object of any particular love. For example, the distinctive
See CT ..: 'Thereare fourthingstobe loved:onethatis aboveus, another that is we ourselves, a third that is in company with us, and a fourth that is below us.' He means, respectively, God, ourselves, our neighbours (including angels as well as other human beings), and our bodies. (See the response for further details.) The objection speculates that if there is a mediator between the first two items on the list, there needs to be an additional item, and so there will be five things rather than four that ought to be loved.
On Charity object of the natural friendship we have for our family is such natural good as we derive from our parents. For political friendships, on the other hand, the object is the good of the community. In this way, charity too has its own particular good as its distinctive object, that is, the good of divine blessedness, as I said above. How things are to be loved by charity is determined by the way that they relate to this good.
Weneedtoreflect,though,thatwhenwetalkofloving,whichiswishing the good for someone, something can be loved in two ways: (i) as the thing for which we want the good; or (ii) as the good which we want for someone. In the first sense (i), things can only be loved from charity if we want the good of eternal life for them. These can only be things that are by nature apt to possess the good of eternal blessedness. That is why, since only intelligent natures are by nature apt to possess the good of eternal blessedness, only an intelligent nature can be loved by charity, in the first sense of loving.
For this reason, Augustine distinguishes [CT ..] four types of thing that can be loved by charity, with reference to the different ways thattheycanpossesseternalblessedness.(a)Onethinghaseternalblessedness through its own being, and this is God. Other things have it through participation, and these are (b) those rational creatures that are doing the loving; and (c) other creatures that are associated with these in sharing blessedness. Different again are (d) things that can possess eternal blessedness only by a sort of 'overflow', like our bodies, which are glorified through the glory of the soul overflowing into them.
(a) God is to be loved out of charity as the root of blessedness. Human beings ought to love (b) themselves out of charity as sharing in blessedness; and then (c) their neighbour as a companion in the sharing of blessedness; and then (d) their own body in that blessedness overflows into it.
In the second sense (ii), i.e. when we say that we 'love' the good things that we want for others, we can love any good out of charity insofar as it is a good for someone who is capable of possessing blessedness. For all creatures are there for human beings on their journey, to incline them towards blessedness. Again, all creatures are ordered towards the glory of God insofar as divine goodness is displayed in them. In this way, we are able to love everything out of charity if we order it towards things that either possess blessedness or could do so.
We ought also to bear in mind that types of love are related to one another in the same way as the goods that are their objects. That is why,
Article since all human goods are ordered towards eternal blessedness as to their ultimate end, love in the sense of charity includes all types of human love, except those based upon sin, which cannot be ordered towards blessedness. In this way, the mutual love of family members, or fellow-citizens, or fellow-pilgrims, and so on, can, through charity, be meritorious. But if people love one another because they are allies in robbery or adultery, this can be neither meritorious nor out of charity.
Replies to objections () We love virtue and blessedness out of charity in that we want them for those capable of possessing blessedness.
() God loves everything out of charity not in the sense of wanting blessedness for them, but in ordering them towards himself and towards other things that can possess blessedness.
() All good things are in God as their first principle. That is what Origen meant by saying that to love God and whatever is good is one and the same.
()Weareabletoloveallthingsmeritoriouslybyorderingthemtowards whatever is capable of blessedness, but not by wanting blessedness for them.
() Rational nature is included within the good of the universe as its chief good, as it is capable of blessedness, while other creatures are ordered towards it. In this way, it is fitting, both for God and for us, out of charity to love the good of the universe very greatly.
() Just as charity believes everything that ought to be believed, so it also loves everything to the extent that it ought to be loved out of charity.
() We are not able here to love God as fully as we will love him in our homeland, when we will see him in his own being.
() The reason why other creatures are not loved out of charity is not their distance from us, but the fact that they are not capable of blessedness.
() The angels do not share with us in our natural life in respect of their type, but only in respect of the class of rational natures. We are, however, able to share the life of glory with them. The words 'gave to each one according to his own virtue' should not be taken to mean only the 'virtue' of nature, since it is a mistake to say that the gifts of grace and of glory are given in accordance with the degree of anything natural. 'Virtue' must be taken to refer to something that is also graced, because grace is bestowed
On Charity in order to enable human beings to merit a glory equal to that of the angels.
() (i) The written law was given to assist the law of nature, which was obscured by sin. However, it was not so obscured that it no longer moved us to love in the sense of loving ourselves and our bodies. It was obscured insofar as it failed to move us to love God and our neighbour. That is why the written law had to provide precepts about loving God and neighbour.
(ii) In any case, those precepts also include our loving ourselves, since when we are led to love God, we are led to long for God, and through this we love ourselves very greatly, as we want for ourselves what is the supreme good.
(iii) Again, the precept about loving our neighbour says, 'You will love your neighbour as yourself.' This, then, includes love of oneself.
() Although one cannot be friends with oneself in the strict sense, one can love oneself. For, as Aristotle says [NE .., a], friendliness to another person comes from friendliness to oneself. Insofar as charity means love, one can certainly love oneself out of charity. But Gregory is speaking of charity in the sense that involves the idea of friendship.
() Although friendship, like justice, involves sharing with someone else, love is not necessarily related to someone else, and love is enough for the idea of charity.
() Those who love themselves are blamed insofar as they do so more than they ought. This cannot happen with respect to spiritual goods, because no one can love too much having the virtues. With respect to exterior and corporal goods, one can love oneself excessively.
()Peoplearenotblamedforlovingthemselvesintheirexternalnature, but for seeking external goods beyond the limit that is virtuous. In this way, we are able to love our bodies out of charity.
() Charity does not shun the body itself, but the perishable nature of the body, in keeping with Wisdom :, 'A body, which is perishable, weighs down the soul.' That is why St Paul talks in a figurative way of 'the body of this death'.
() Just because we do not know for certain that we possess charity, it does not follow that we cannot love out of charity, but only that we cannot judge whether we are loving out of charity. Thus we can be required to love out of charity, but not to judge that we do so. That is why St Paul says in Corinthians :–, 'I do not judge myself; he who judges me is the Lord.'