On the Cardinal Virtues: Article 4: Whether when we are in our homeland the cardinal virtues will remain
Article () The virtues exist in a person correlatively, as I have said. That is why it does not follow that they are possessed in an unequal way.
() The situation in our homeland is opposed to faith because of the clear vision we will have, which is not achieved through an increase of charity. That is why faith need not diminish as charity increases.
Replies to objections under 'But on the other hand'
() to (). The replies to these are clear from what has been said.
() John Damascene understands virtues to exist in every one equally, meaning generally.
() The reward in its essence is a response to the root, which is charity.
For this reason, even if we grant that all the virtues are not equal, still only one reward will be due to one person, because his charity will be one and the same.
We accept objection ().
Article : Whether when we are in our homeland the cardinal virtues will remain Objections It seems not, because:
() Gregory says [MorJob .] that what we do in our active life will pass away together with the body. But the cardinal virtues complete us for what we do in our active life. Therefore the virtues will pass away along with the body. Therefore they will not remain in our homeland.
() When you have achieved your end you no longer need whatever contributed to that end; just as you no longer need the ship when you have reached harbour. But the cardinal virtues are distinguished from the theological virtues by the fact that the latter have the ultimate end as their object, while the former have whatever contributes to that end. Therefore once we have reached our ultimate end in our homeland, we will not need the cardinal virtues.
() When you remove an end, whatever contributes to the end disappears too. But the cardinal virtues are ordered towards the civic good,
This means: it is equally true of everyone that he or she shares in the virtues, not: everyone shares in the virtues to an equal degree.
On the Cardinal Virtues which will not exist in our homeland. Therefore neither will the cardinal virtues exist in our homeland.
() If something remains not according to its own distinctive type, but only according to the general character of its class, then it is said to 'pass away' rather than to remain in our homeland. In this way, faith is said to 'pass away' even though awareness remains, which is the class to which faith belongs. But in our homeland, the cardinal virtues will not remain in accordance with those distinctive types that distinguish them; for Augustine says [LCG ..] that there virtue will be wholly and only loving what you see. Therefore the cardinal virtues will not remain in our homeland but will pass away.
() The virtues derive their types from their objects. But the object of the cardinal virtues will not remain in our homeland. After all, practical wisdom deals with doubtful matters, which need counsel; justice deals with agreements and judgements; courage deals with the danger of death; while temperateness deals with sensual desires for food and sex. None of these will exist in our homeland. Therefore the cardinal virtues will not exist in our homeland.
() Rejoinder: the virtues will have other things to do in our homeland.
But on the other hand if any element of the definition of A is altered, A will be altered in type. Now an action is an element of the definition of a disposition, since according to Augustine [GMarr .] a disposition is what enables us to act when the opportunity arises. Therefore if there are different activities, there will also be dispositions that differ in type.
() According to Plotinus, as Macrobius tells us [Dream .–], the virtues of a purified soul are different from the political virtues. But the virtues of a purified soul seem most to be the virtues that we will have in our homeland. The virtues we possess here, however, are political virtues.
Therefore the virtues we have here will not remain there, but will pass away.
() The situations of the blessed and of those on the journey are more differentthanthoseofmasterandslaveorofmanandwomaninthepresent life. Yet according to Aristotle [Pol ., b] the virtues of master and slave are different, and similarly those of man and woman. Therefore the virtues possessed by the blessed and by those on the journey will differ far more.
Article () The dispositions of the virtues are necessary for preparing our capabilities for being actualised. But there this preparation will be adequately effected by glory. Therefore the dispositions of the virtues will not be needed.
() St Paul proves in Corinthians :that charity is more excellent than the other virtues, because it will not pass away. But faith and hope, which do pass away, are nobler than the cardinal virtues, because they have a nobler object, i.e. God. Therefore the cardinal virtues will also pass away.
() The intellectual virtues are nobler than the moral, as Aristotle makes clear [NE .., a]. But the intellectual virtues will not remain, because 'knowledge will be destroyed', as Corinthians :tells us. Therefore the cardinal virtues will not remain in our homeland either.
() James :says, 'Endurance possesses a deed that is perfect.' But endurance will not remain in our homeland except as a reward, as Augustine tells us [CG .]. Therefore much less will the other moral virtues.
() Certain cardinal virtues, i.e. temperateness and courage, exist in thesensorycapacitiesofthesoul:fortheybelongtothesoul'snon-rational parts,asAristotlemakesclear[NE..,b].Butneitherangelsnor separated souls can possess sensory parts of the soul. Therefore virtues of this sort cannot exist in our homeland either in the angels or in the separated souls.
() Augustine says [CG ..] that in our homeland we will be at leisure, we will see, we will love, we will praise. But leisure is an activity of wisdom, seeing an activity of the intelligence, love an activity of charity and praise an activity of worship. Therefore only those will exist in our homeland, and not the cardinal virtues.
() In our homeland, human beings will be like angels, as Matthew :tells us. But human beings do not become like angels through soberness, since angels do not need to consume food and drink. Therefore there will be no soberness in our homeland. Therefore by equal reasoning neither will the other virtues be there.
But on the other hand () Wisdom :says, 'Justice is everlasting and immortal.'
() Wisdom :says of divine wisdom that 'it teaches soberness and practical wisdom, justice, and courage, which are the most useful things
On the Cardinal Virtues in human life'. But in our homeland, we will share as fully as possible in wisdom. Therefore the virtues of this sort will exist more fully in our homeland.
() The virtues are spiritual riches. But there will be a greater wealth of spiritual riches in our homeland than on the journey. Therefore the virtues of this sort will be in more plentiful abundance in our homeland.
My reply Inourhomelandthecardinalvirtueswillremain,buttheywilldodifferent things; for, as Augustine tells us [Trin ..], 'The things that at present justice does in assisting the wretched, practical wisdom in avoiding traps, courage in enduring troubles, and temperateness in restraining corrupt pleasures, will not exist there, since there will be nothing evil there at all.'
But 'the role of justice will be to be subject to the rule of God, of practical wisdom to treat no other good as equal or preferable to God, of courage to cling to him with utter steadfastness, and of temperateness not to take pleasure in any harmful failing'.
To show this, we need to know that virtue involves the upper limit of a capacity, as Aristotle tells us [Heav ., a]. It is clear, though, that different natures have different upper limits to their capacities, because a higher nature has a greater capacity that reaches to more and greater things. For this reason, something that counts as a virtue for one thing does not for another. For example, human virtue is defined in relation to the important things in human life, so that human temperateness consists in a human being's not abandoning reason for the sake of the greatest pleasures, but rather moderating them in accordance with reason; again, human courage consists in standing firm in the face of the greatest danger, i.e. danger of death, on account of the good of reason.
But the upper limit of God's capacity is not found in such things as these, but in something higher, something consonant with the infinity of his power. For this reason, God's courage is his unshakeability, his temperateness is the turning of his mind to himself, his practical wisdom is the divine mind itself, and the justice of God is his eternal law itself.
The next thing we need to bear in mind is that different upper limits can be understood in two ways: (a) as related within the same series of changes; (b) as separate and not mutually ordered.
Article (a) If, then, we take the different upper limits as ordered within a single series of changes, then these different upper limits make the changes differ in type. They do not, though, make a difference in type to the principle of change, because it is the same principle of change that governs a change from start to finish. We can take as an example the case of building: here the final end-point is the completed form of the house; however, we can also take the completion of individual parts of the house to be other final points;thatiswhy,asAristotlesays[NE..,a],thefoundationof the house is one type of change, which is completed when the foundation is built, the raising of the columns is another, and a third is the completion of the whole building. However, the skill of building is one and the same, and is the principle of all three of these changes. The same goes for other examples of change.
(b) If, however, we understand the different ends as separate, i.e. not as part of a single series of changes, but completely separate, then both the changes and the principles of change will differ in type. For example, the skill that is the principle of building a house is different from the one that is the principle of constructing a ship.
In this way, then, (i) where the upper limit is the same in type, the virtue will also be the same in type, as will the activity or change resulting from that virtue. For example, it is clear that both in me and in you temperateness attains an upper limit that is the same in type, i.e. moderation of the enjoyments of touch. That is why neither temperateness nor its activities differ in type in you and in me.
(ii) However, where the upper limit attained by the virtue is neither of the same type nor contained within the same series of changes, there must be a difference in type not only in the activities of the virtue, but even in the virtue itself {cf. (b)}. This is clear with virtues that are ascribed to both God and human beings.
(iii) Where the upper limit of the virtue differs in type, but is still contained under a single series of changes, so that it moves from one to another, then the activity will differ in type, but the virtue be the same {cf.
(a)}. For example, courageous activities are ordered to one upper limit before the battle, to another during it, and to yet another when victory is secured. Hence, the actions of approaching the battle, standing one's ground courageously during it, and rejoicing at winning a victory are different; the courage, though, is the same. Similarly, the same capacity is actualised in loving, desiring, and rejoicing.
On the Cardinal Virtues It is clear, then, from what has been said that since the condition of our homeland is higher than that of our journey, the virtues in our homeland must attain a more elevated upper limit. If, then, the upper limit attained by virtue on our journey is ordered to the upper limit attained by virtue in our homeland, there will have to be one type of virtue, but different types of action {cf. (iii)}. If, on the other hand, the one is not understood as ordered to the other, then the virtues will not be the same either as activities or as dispositions {cf. (ii)}.
It is clear that the acquired civic virtues, which the philosophers discuss, are ordered only to perfecting human beings in civic life, not to perfecting them as ordered towards the winning of heavenly glory {cf. (ii)}. That is why the philosophers held that this type of virtue does not remain after this life, as Augustine tells us was true of Cicero [Trin ..]. On the other hand, the cardinal virtues as given by grace and infused, which we are now discussing, perfect us in the present life for being ordered towards heavenly glory {cf. (iii)}. For that reason, it is necessary to say that the dispositions ofthesevirtuesarethesamehereandthere,eventhoughtheir activities are different. For here such activity is suited to those aiming at the ultimate end, and there to those who are resting in it.
Replies to objections () The virtues of this sort complete us for our active life, a sort of journey by which we reach the goal of contemplation in our homeland. For this reason, they remain in the homeland insofar as their activity has been fully realised in the goal.
() The cardinal virtues concern things that contribute to the end, but not in the sense that their ultimate end is found in them, in the way that the ultimate end of a ship is sailing. Rather, it is through the things that contribute to the end that the cardinal virtues are ordered to the ultimate end. For example, grace-given temperateness does not have as its final end moderating the sensual desires for things we touch, but it does this for the sake of the blessedness of heaven.
() The civic good is not the ultimate end of the infused cardinal virtues, which are under discussion now, but of the acquired virtues, which the philosophers discussed, as I explained in my reply.
() Nothing prevents one and the same thing from being the end of different virtues or skills. For example, protecting the good of the city is
Article the end and goal of both military activity and legislation. That is why both of these types of skill or virtue relate their activities to that as the good that is their end. Military activity, on the one hand, looks to protecting the good of the city to the extent that this is achieved through courageous battles; legislation, on the other, rejoices in the same end, to the extent that the good of the city is protected by the legislative order. In this way, then, the enjoyment of God in our homeland is the end of all the cardinal virtues, but each one rejoices in that end in accordance with the end of its own particular activities. For this reason, one can say that in our homeland there will be only one virtue, in as much as there will be one objectin which all the virtues rejoice. However, there will be different activities and different virtues in as much as there will be different reasons for rejoicing.
() Something can be called the object of a virtue in two ways: (i) as the thing towards which virtue is ordered as its end, in the way that the supreme good is the object of charity, and eternal blessedness is the object of hope; (ii) as the domain with which it deals, directing itself towards something else on the basis of that; in this sense, the pleasures of sex are an object of temperateness. For temperateness does not aim to cling to pleasures of this sort, but rather to hold them in check so as to direct itself towards what is good according to reason. Similarly, courage does not aim to cling to dangers, but rather by overcoming them to achieve what is good according to reason. The same is true for practical wisdom in respect of issues that are doubtful, and of justice in respect of the necessities of this life. For this reason, the further they have withdrawn from such things in their progress in the spiritual life, the more perfect will the activities of these virtues be. The things mentionedrelate to the virtues more as starting points than as finishing points; but the latter is what gives a thing its type.
() Not every difference in activity proves a difference in disposition, as I have now explained.
() The virtues of a purified soul, which Plotinus defined, are relevant to the blessed. For there the role of practical wisdom is simply to gaze on what is divine, of temperateness to forget selfish desires, of courage to ignore the emotions, of justice to possess a perpetual covenant with God.
The text reads, oddly, erit una virtus, in quantum erit in subiecto, de qua omnes virtutes gaudebunt. It is tempting to read in quantum erit una fruitio: 'insofar as there will be a single enjoyment'.
The text reads praedicta verba.
On the Cardinal Virtues The political virtues, however, which he also mentioned, are ordered only towards the civic good in this present life, as I have said.
() The upper limits of the virtues of slave and master, or man and woman, are not mutually ordered in such a way that one passes from one to the other. Therefore the reasoning is different.
() The preparation through glory for those virtuous activities that are produced or perfected by means of glory, is a function, precisely, of the dispositions of the virtues.
() Faith is ordered towards the truth that is not seen, and hope to something hard to get, not yet possessed, as the objects that determine their type. For this reason, although they are more excellent than the cardinal virtues because their objects are higher, they will still pass away because the thing that gives them their type will no longer exist.
()Thedispositionofknowledgewillnotbedestroyedeither;however, it will have different activities.
() In our homeland, endurance will not keep the role that it has on our journey, i.e. enduring trials. However, it will have a role suitable to the end, just as I have said for the other virtues.
() (i) Some people hold that aggression and sensual desire, where temperateness and courage are found, are located in the higher part of the soul, not in its sensory part. This, though, contradicts Aristotle, where he says [NE .., b] that they are virtues of the non-rational parts.
(ii) Others, on the other hand, hold that the powers of the sensory partremainintheseparatedsouleither(a)asacapacityonly;or(b)actively.
The second (b) cannot be true, because the sensory capacity can only be actualised through the body; otherwise the sensory soul of a non-rational animal would be indestructible, which is false. Now a capacity belongs to the same thing as the related activity; that is why capacities of this sort need to be connected with the body. In this way, after death they will not remain actively in the separated soul, but virtually, as in their root, insofar as the capacities of the soul flow from its being {cf. (a)}.
Moreover, the virtues in question exist in aggression and sensual desire in that they flow through them, but their origins and predispositions are in the reason and will; this is because the principal action of moral virtue is choice, which is an action of the rational desire. But the choice in question is applied by means of temperateness and courage so that it finally reaches the emotions of the aggression and the sensual desire.
Article () All four of those things will be part of a single activity that will be for the cardinal virtues their end, insofar as that will consist of heavenly blessedness.
() Soberness does not make us like the angels in what it does on our journey, i.e. dealing with the matter of food or drink, but in what it does in our homeland, which relates to the ultimate end, as with the other virtues.